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Abstract
The achievement of perfect security is out of the question. Even if we are not
yet aware of them, every security aimed technology has weaknesses which attackers can exploit
in order to circumvent the system. We should hence direct our efforts to the development of
applications whose security level make it infeasible for computationally bound attackers to break
the systems.
This Thesis is focused on improving the security and privacy provided by biometric systems.
With the increased need for reliable and automatic identity verification, biometrics have emerged
in the last decades as a pushing alternative to traditional authentication methods. Certainly,
biometrics are very attractive and useful for the general public: forget about PINs and passwords,
you are your own key. However, the wide deployment of biometric recognition systems at both
large-scale applications (e.g., border management at European level or national identity systems)
and everyday tasks (e.g., smartphone or PC access), has raised some concerns regarding the
use and storage of such sensitive data. Therefore, understanding the threats which can affect
those systems and analysing to what extent the subject’s privacy is protected is of the utmost
importance.
In this context, the present PhD Thesis pretends to shed some light into the difficult prob-
lem of security and privacy evaluation of biometric systems. To that end, a systematic analysis
of the privacy provided by unprotected templates is carried out, and new biometric template
protection schemes are proposed to deal with the unveiled privacy issues, being their robustness
to the mentioned privacy threats thoroughly assessed. This way, the experimental studies pre-
sented in this Dissertation can help to further develop the ongoing standardization efforts on
the assessment of template protection schemes.
The Thesis has been developed following the security through transparency principle, which
has been largely applied in other security related areas such as cryptography. This paradigm
relies on the fact that vulnerabilities exist regardless of their publication, and therefore pleads
for making security systems as public as possible instead of keeping algorithms secret. This does
not mean that obscurity cannot provide any protection. However, such a protection is in most
cases only temporary. We should do our best to find threats and propose solutions to mitigate
their effects. We believe that in order to grant the privacy protection that subjects are entitled
to, it is necessary to understand and assess the threats, and publicly report quantitative analyses
of their impact on the subject’s privacy so that effective countermeasures can be developed.
Such privacy issues have already been acknowledged within the biometric community and
numerous biometric template protection schemes have been proposed to tackle them. However,
in most cases, thorough evaluations of the security and privacy provided by those systems are
not carried out. In this Dissertation, after summarizing the most relevant works related to the
Thesis, we describe the privacy and security evaluation methodology that has been followed
throughout the experimental chapters. These are dedicated to: i) the evaluation of unprotected
templates and ii) the proposal and evaluation of biometric and multi-biometric template pro-
tection schemes, focusing on face, iris, fingerprint, handshape, fingervein and on-line signature,
using publicly available biometric data and benchmarks in order to contribute reproducible
research.
The experimental part of the Thesis starts with the security and privacy evaluation of un-
protected biometric systems. To that end, the irreversibility of the templates is analysed posing
ourselves the following question: starting from the information stored in the template, are we
able to reconstruct synthetic samples which are positively matched to the stored references? To
answer that question, we develop and implement two inverse biometric methods and use the
reconstructed samples to launch attacks. Experiments show that it is indeed possible to fool
handshape and iris based systems with those reconstructed images.
To address the privacy concerns raised by the previous study, we then propose a general
framework for biometric and multi-biometric template protection based on Bloom filters. The
proposed scheme not only prevents the reconstruction of synthetic biometric samples, but also
deals with a second set of questions on privacy protection: can someone track my activities
across different biometric verification systems? What if, for instance, my face based template
is compromised: will I not be able to enrol in a system with my face ever again? A thorough
experimental evaluation of face, iris, fingerprint and fingervein verification systems shows that
the proposed scheme is able to protect the privacy of the subjects, even in the case secret keys
are compromised and available to the eventual attacker. Furthermore, the scheme is robust to
attacks based on known weaknesses of the underlying algorithms, preserving at the same time
verification accuracy and speed.
Finally, as an alternative to the aforementioned scheme, we present a general framework
for biometric and multi-biometric template protection based on Homomorphic Encryption. The
security and privacy of the scheme is evaluated in an analogous manner for fingerprint and on-line
signature verification, proving that the encrypted templates and all the operations carried out
in the encrypted domain reveal no information about the underlying biometric data. Moreover,
verification accuracy in the encrypted domain is equivalent to that achieved in the unprotected
domain, and a similar verification speed can be achieved using fixed-length templates.
The research work described in this Dissertation has led to novel contributions which include
the development of: i) a general framework for the security and privacy evaluation of biometric
systems, and, in particular, for the unlinkability analysis of biometric templates, ii) two new
methods to reverse engineer unprotected biometric templates, iii) a new biometric and multi-
biometric template protection scheme based on Bloom filters, and iv) a new biometric and
multi-biometric template protection scheme based on Homomorphic Encryption. Moreover,
different original experimental studies have been carried out during the development of the
Thesis. Besides, the research work completed throughout the Thesis has been complemented
with the generation of several novel literature reviews and the improvement of current signature
verification systems.
A mi familia.
Weisheit ist nicht das Ergebnis der Schulbildung,
sondern des lebenslangen Versuchs, sie zu erwerben.
(Wisdom is not a product of schooling,
but of the lifelong attempt to acquire it)
(La sabidur´ıa no es un producto de la educacio´n,
sino del intento de toda una vida por adquirirla)
Albert Einstein (1879–1955).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What happens if someone hacks a biometric database? Will the attackers be able to
gain some knowledge about me? Or to track my activities? Or even worse, to steal my identity
and impersonate me? All in all, how will biometric technology protect me? These and other
questions commonly raise when dealing with Biometric solutions for security applications. This
PhD Thesis is focused on the analysis of the security and privacy provided by biometric systems.
More specifically, we will study the unlinkability and irreversibility of the templates stored
in biometric databases and propose new biometric template protection schemes to ensure the
privacy of the subject.
Over the last years, with the arrival of cloud computing and personal mobile devices in the
so-called Digital Age, automatic person recognition has become a key factor in our everyday life.
Not only we need to be identified to cross a border, but also to perform banking operations or
even to unlock our smartphones. This has resulted in the establishment of a new technological
area known as biometric recognition, or simply biometrics [Jain et al., 2006]. The basic aim of
biometrics is to discriminate automatically between subjects in a reliable way, and according
to some target application, based on one or more signals derived from physical or behavioural
characteristics, such as face, fingerprint, iris, voice, hand, signature, etc. These personal traits
are commonly denoted as biometric characteristics.
Even if automatic person recognition has been a subject of study for more than forty
years [Atal, 1976; Kanade, 1973], it has not been until the last decade when biometrics has
been established as an specific research area. This is evidenced by recent reference texts [Jain
et al., 2011, 2008; Ratha and Govindaraju, 2008; Ross et al., 2006; Tistarelli et al., 2009], specific
conferences [Bowyer et al., 2015; Chellappa et al., 2015; Fierrez et al., 2013; Kittler et al., 2014;
Tistarelli and Maltoni, 2007; Vijaya-Kumar et al., 2008], common benchmark tools and evalu-
ations [Beveridge et al., 2013; Cappelli et al., 2006; LivDet, 2009; Mayoue et al., 2009; Phillips
et al., 2000a; Phillips, 2006; Phillips et al., 2011, 2009a,b; Przybocki and Martin, 2004; Yeung
et al., 2004], cooperative international projects [BBfor2, 2010; BioSec, 2004; Biosecure, 2007;
COST, 2007; MTIT, 2009; TABULA RASA, 2010], international consortia dedicated specifi-
cally to biometric recognition [BC, 2009; BF, 2009; BI, 2009; EAB, 2012; EAB-CITeR, 2015; US
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CITeR, 2011], standardization efforts [ANSI/NIST, 2009; BioAPI, 2009; ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC
27, 2009; ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37, 2009], and increasing attention both from government [BWG,
2009; DoD, 2009] and industry [IBIA, 2009; International Biometric Group, 2009].
Biometric technology presents several advantages over classical security methods based on
something that you know (PIN, Password, etc.) or something that you have (key, card, etc.).
These methods force the subject to remember difficult PIN codes, which could be easily forgot-
ten, or to carry a key, which could be lost or stolen. Biometric recognition, on the other hand,
is based on the very attractive principle that “you are your own key”, which, therefore, cannot
be lost or forgotten. Furthermore, traditional recognition systems cannot discriminate between
impostors who have illegally acquired the privileges to access a system and the genuine subject,
and cannot satisfy negative claims of identity (i.e., I am not John Doe) [Jain et al., 2011].
For those reasons, some high-scale initiatives, such as the Indian Unique ID [Government of
India, 2012] or the SmartBorders package [European Comission, 2013], have recently adopted
biometrics as their recognition technology. Moreover, biometric systems have been recently
introduced into the banking sector [European Association for Biometrics (EAB), 2015], reaching
our smartphones through specific apps for particular banks1, through general payments apps
such as ApplePay or LoopPay, or even with Mastercard’s “selfie” payments2. Furthermore,
biometric ATMs3,4 are currently being deployed.
However, in spite of those advantages, biometric systems present a number of drawbacks
[Schneier, 1999], including the lack of secrecy (e.g., everybody knows our face or could get our
fingerprints5), and the fact that a biometric characteristic cannot be replaced - if we forget
a password we can easily generate a new one, but no new fingerprint can be generated if an
impostor “steals” it. Recently, a database containing personal information of over five million
federal US employees, including their fingerprints, was compromised6. Such a leakage will have
a direct impact on these individuals’ lives: among other consequences, affected employees may
require “lifetime identity protection coverage”.
It is thus of great importance for the definitive introduction of biometric systems in the
security market to develop new template protection and privacy preserving methods which
increase the security and privacy capabilities of this technology.
In order to prevent external attacks which can violate the privacy of the subjects [Adler,
2005; Hill, 2001; Matsumoto et al., 2002; Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011], and increase the
benefits of these systems for the enrolled subjects, biometric data should be protected. To that
1https://ingworld.ing.com/en/2014-4Q/7-ing-app
2http://www.cnet.com/news/mastercard-app-will-let-you-pay-for-things-with-a-selfie/
3http://www.biometricupdate.com/201301/citibank-launches-smart-atms-with-biometric-
capabilities-in-asia
4http://www.biometricupdate.com/201508/ctbc-bank-piloting-atms-that-use-finger-vein-
scanning-and-facial-recognition
5http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/29/german_minister_fingered_as_hackers_steal_her_
thumbprint_from_a_photo/
6http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/world/asia/hackers-took-fingerprints-of-5-6-million-us-
workers-government-says.html
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end, hashes [Kong et al., 2006; Sutcu et al., 2005; Teoh et al., 2004], cryptographic techniques
[Barni et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2009] or fuzzy extractors [Juels and Sudan, 2006; Juels and
Wattenberg, 1999; Nandakumar and Jain, 2008] have been applied to biometric templates, at
the cost of verification accuracy degradation in most cases.
Regarding the standardization of such protection techniques, while the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO) published in 2009 an international standard on security
evaluation of biometrics [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2009], it has not been
until the last years that efforts have been directed to the development of international standards
for biometric template protection schemes [Rane, 2014]. Recently, the ISO has published the
first standard on the protection of biometric information [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security
Techniques, 2011], and is currently working on an international standard on template protection
schemes testing [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics, 2015].
In spite of those efforts, there is still a long way to go before a standardized methodology
for the protection of biometric systems is defined and becomes extended practice as it occurs
in other Information Technologies. This PhD Thesis pretends to bring some insight into the
difficult problem of enhancing the security and privacy of biometric systems, proposing effective
template protection schemes which can minimize the effects of potential attacks, in order to
increase the confidence of the subjects in this thriving technology. This way, the experimental
studies presented in this Dissertation can help to further develop the ongoing standardization
efforts for the development of template protection schemes to improve the security and privacy
of the systems.
1.1. Biometric Systems and Modalities
A biometric system is essentially a pattern recognition system which makes use of biometric
characteristics to recognize individuals. As mentioned above, the objective is to establish an
identity based on who you are or what you produce, rather than by what you possess or what
you know. This paradigm not only provides enhanced security but also avoids, in recognition
applications, the need to remember multiple passwords and maintain multiple authentication
tokens. Who you are refers to physiological characteristics1 such as face, iris or fingerprint.
What you produce refers to behavioural patterns which entail a learning process and which
characterize your identity, such as the gait, handwriting or the written signature.
The digital representation of the features of a biometric characteristic is known as template.
Reference templates Tr are stored in the system database through the enrolment or training
process, which is depicted in Figure 1.1 (left). The database can be either centralized (this is the
case of most biometric systems working at the moment), or distributed (as in Match-on-Card
systems where each subject carries the only copy of his template in a personal card [Bergman,
2008a]). Once the subjects have been enrolled to the system, the recognition process can be
1Although the term physiological characteristic is commonly used when describing biometrics, the purpose is
to refer to the morphology of parts of the human body, therefore the proper term is morphological characteristic.
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Figure 1.1: Diagram of the two processes involved in a verification system: enrolment (left) and verifica-
tion (right). Both processes occur at different points in time, being enrolment always prior to verification.
performed in two modes [Jain et al., 2011]:
Identification. In this mode, the question posed to the system is: is this person in the
database? The answer might be No (i.e., the person is unknown to the system), or any of
the registered identities in the database. The system has thus to perform a one-to-many
matching process, as it has to compare the input sample to all the stored templates.
In most practical cases, under the identification operation mode, the system usually re-
turns, in a ranked manner, those identities that are more likely to be the searched person
in a previously created database (i.e., those that have produced a higher similarity score),
and then a human expert decides whether the subject is or not within that reduced group
of people. Typical identification applications include Automated Fingerprint Identification
Systems [Komarinski, 2005].
Verification. In this case, what we want to know is whether a person is really who she
claims to be. Whereas the impostors can potentially be the world population, the clients
or targets are known to the system through the enrolment process (Fig. 1.1 left). In this
phase, reference templates Tr are extracted from the input biometric samples Br and
stored in the database.
On the other hand, in order to authenticate a particular subject, the systems receives
two inputs (Fig. 1.1 right): the probe biometric sample Bp and the claimed identity Ir,
corresponding to one of the templates previously stored in the database. The system
performs a one-to-one matching process where the submitted biometric sample (more
specifically, the template extracted from this probe sample, Tp) is compared to the enrolled
template Tr associated with the claimed identity, generating a score S. This score is
subsequently compared to a pre-defined verification threshold δ in order to determine
whether the subject is a client (the identity claim is accepted, S > δ), or an impostor (the
identity claim is rejected, S < δ). Typical verification applications include network login,
ATMs, physical access control, credit-card purchases, etc.
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1.1 Biometric Systems and Modalities
This Thesis is focused on the evaluation of biometric systems working under the verification
mode. However, many of the algorithms and methods developed in the Thesis can be adapted
in a straightforward manner to be used in identification systems.
As mentioned above, different biometric characteristics have been proposed and are used in
various applications [Jain et al., 2011]. In theory, any human characteristic can be used as a
biometric identifier as long as it satisfies the following requirements:
Universality, which indicates to what extent a biometric is present in the world popula-
tion.
Distinctiveness, which means that two persons should have sufficiently different biomet-
rics.
Permanence, which indicates that the biometric should have a compact representation
invariant over a sufficiently large period of time.
Collectability, which refers to the easiness of the acquisition process and to the ability
to measure the biometric quantitatively.
Other criteria required for practical applications include:
Performance, which refers to the efficiency, accuracy, speed, robustness and resource
requirements of particular implementations based on the biometric.
Acceptability, which refers to whether people are willing to use the biometric and in
which terms.
Circumvention, which reflects the difficulty to fool a system based on a given character-
istic by fraudulent methods.
An ideal biometric system should meet all these requirements. Unfortunately, no single
biometric characteristic satisfies all of them at the same time: while some biometrics have a
very high distinctiveness (e.g., fingerprint or iris), they are relatively easy to circumvent (e.g.,
using a gummy finger, or an iris printed photograph). On the other hand, other biometrics
such as vein patterns are very difficult to circumvent, but they are not easy to acquire. In
order to compensate for those weaknesses, several characteristics can be combined in a single
biometric system, known as multi-biometric system [Jain et al., 2011]. Among other advantages
of such multimodal biometric systems, verification accuracy increases, the recognition system
becomes more robust to individual sensor or subsystem failures, and the number of cases where
the system is not able to make a decision diminishes (e.g., bad quality biometric samples due to
bad acquisition or deterioration).
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1.2. Privacy Issues in Biometric Systems
While the use of biometric information for verification offers numerous advantages, many
people are currently concerned about the possible misuse of biometric data [Bustard, 2015].
Among other concerns, biometric data could be used to reveal medical conditions, to gather
personal information, even in a covertly manner given the recent developments in biometrics
at a distance [Tistarelli et al., 2009], or to link databases. Furthermore, geographical position,
movements, habits and even personal beliefs can be tracked by observing when and where the
biometric characteristics of an individual are used to identify him/her [Barni et al., 2015].
In order to address those concerns, biometric data is considered personal data by the Euro-
pean Union data protection directive 95/46/EC [European Parliament, Oct. 1995.]: biometrics
are an intrinsic part of the human body and/or behaviour, which we cannot discard in case of
theft. Within this directive, personal data is defined as “any information relating to an iden-
tified or identifiable natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social iden-
tity”. This means that processing of biometric data is subject to right of privacy preservation,
where the notion of processing means “any operation or set of operations which is performed
upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organiza-
tion, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or
destruction”. More recently, the EU Data Protection Reform IP/12/46 [European Parliament,
2012] raised biometric data to sensitive data, hence requiring a stronger privacy protection.
Those definitions imply that, in order to grant the subject’s privacy, biometric information
should be carefully protected both in its stored form (i.e., biometric templates or references)
and any time it is used for verification purposes. In order to guarantee that privacy, we should
pose ourselves several questions:
In the first place, do the stored templates reveal any information about the original biomet-
ric samples? In other words, are we able to reconstruct synthetic samples whose templates
are similar enough to those of the original subject? If such an inverse engineering process,
also known as inverse biometrics, is possible, an eventual attacker which manages to ob-
tain just a template belonging to a certain subject (e.g. the iriscode or minutiae template)
would be able to reconstruct the original biometric sample. The attacker could afterwards
use it to illegally access the system or even to steal someone’s identity, thus violating the
right of privacy preservation. As a consequence, we must ensure the irreversibility of the
templates.
Even if templates were irreversible, are my enrolled templates in different recognition sys-
tems somehow related to each other? Can someone cross-match those templates and track
my activities? We should not only think about protecting the stored references in order
to make infeasible the inverse biometrics process. With the widespread use of biometrics
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in many everyday tasks, a particular subject will probably enrol in different applications,
such as health care or on-line banking, with the same biometric instance (e.g., my right
index finger). The right of privacy preservation also entails the right not to be tracked
among those applications. If the answer to those questions is yes, we are facing an addi-
tional privacy issue: an eventual attacker who gets access to several templates enrolled in
different systems could combine that information and further exploit it to gain knowledge
of how many bank accounts we have or infer patterns in our regular activity. Therefore,
cross-matching between templates used in different applications should be prevented.
Finally, what if someone steals a template extracted from my right index finger? Won’t I
be able to use that finger again to enrol into the system? Has it been permanently compro-
mised? Since biometric characteristics cannot be replaced, we should be able to generate
multiple templates form a single biometric instance in order to discard and replace com-
promised templates. Furthermore, those templates should not be related to one another,
in the sense that they should not be positively matched by the biometric system, to pre-
vent the impersonation of a subject with a stolen template. Consequently, renewability
of biometric templates is also desired. It should be noted that both cross-matching and
renewability can be addressed at the same time if full unlinkability between templates
belonging to the same subject is granted.
The relevance of these concerns and the efforts being directed to solve them within the
biometric community are highlighted by some recent special issues in journals, such as the
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine Special Issue on Biometrics Security and Privacy Protection
[SPM, 2015], the development of international standards on biometric information protection,
such as the ISO/IEC IS 24745 [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011], specific
tracks on biometric security [Alonso-Fernandez and Bigun, 2016; Bowyer et al., 2015] or privacy-
enhancing technologies [Decker et al., 2016; Locasto et al., 2016] at international conferences,
recent publications [Barni et al., 2015; Ferrara et al., 2014; Nandakumar and Jain, 2015; Rane,
2014] and PhD Thesis [Nagar, 2012; Sutcu, 2009; Zhou, 2012], or the EU FP7 project TURBINE
on Trusted Revocable Biometrics Identities [TURBINE, 2007]. However, it is only since very
recently that those concerns have been raised and started to be addressed.
This Dissertation analyses in a systematic manner the privacy offered by traditional biometric
systems, showing the need for new approaches to biometric verification that ensure no sensitive
personal data is leaked by either the verification process or the stored references. Furthermore,
new protection algorithms are proposed to provide the required security and privacy to the
subjects.
1.3. Biometric Template Protection
As a consequence of the privacy issues related to traditional biometric systems unveiled in
Sect. 1.2, new standardization efforts are being currently directed to prevent such information
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leakages. In particular, the ISO/IEC IS 24745 on biometric information protection [ISO/IEC
JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011] encourages the substitution of traditional biometric
systems (shown in Fig. 1.1) with biometric template protection schemes. This new approach
involves a somehow different operation diagram, sketched in Fig. 1.2. The main differences with
respect to the diagram shown in Fig. 1.1 are the following:
At enrolment, the output of the Feature Extractor, the unprotected template Tr, is not
stored any more as reference in the database. A new module, the Pseudonymous Identifier
Encoder (PIE ), takes the template as input and generates the biometric reference, which
now comprises two different pieces of information:
• Pseudonymous Identifier (PI): this is the part of a renewable biometric reference that
represents an individual within a certain domain by means of a protected identity (i.e.,
the protected equivalent to the unprotected template Tr). At the time of verification,
this is the element to be compared, possibly taking into account the Auxiliary Data
(see below). It should be noted that the PI does not contain any information that
allows retrieval of the original biometric sample, the original biometric features or
the true identity of its owner.
• Auxiliary Data (AD): subject-dependent data that is part of a renewable biomet-
ric reference and may be required to reconstruct pseudonymous identifiers during
verification.
Both parts may be stored in different databases, as depicted in Fig. 1.2 (center).
Similarly, at verification time, the classical probe template Tp (see Fig. 1.2 right) is dis-
carded and substituted by the output of a new module called Pseudonymous Identifier
Recorder (PIR), which takes as input the probe template Tp and the stored ADr (if any),
and computes the PIp of the acquired sample.
Finally, the Pseudonymous Identifier Comparator (PIC ) will output a similarity score S
between the reference protected template, PIr, corresponding to the identity claimed, Ir,
and the probe protected template, PIp. As in traditional biometric systems, S is compared
to the verification threshold δ to reach the final verification decision.
To sum up, in biometric template protection schemes, unprotected templates (Tp, Tr) are
neither stored in the database nor compared for verification purposes. New modules are added to
the system (PIE , PIC and PIR), which extract and compare renewable and protected references
(PIp, PIr). In case of leakage, those references disclose no biometric information about the
subjects, thus protecting the privacy of the subjects. In the rest of the Dissertation, unprotected
templates will be denoted as T and their protected counterparts as C.
In order to guarantee this privacy, in accordance with the ISO/IEC IS 24745 [ISO/IEC JTC1
SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011], biometric template protection schemes have to comply with
the two major requirements of irreversibility and unlinkability :
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Figure 1.2: Diagram of the two modes of operation in a Biometric Template Protection system: en-
rolment (left) and verification (right). Both processes occur at different points in time, being enrolment
always prior to verification. PIE stands for Pseudonymous Identifier Encoder, PIC for Pseudonymous
Identifier Comparator, PIR for Pseudonymous Identifier Recorder and AD for Auxiliary Data.
Irreversibility : in order to overcome the first privacy issue described in the previous sec-
tion (i.e., amount of biometric information which is leaked by the template), we require
that knowledge of a protected template C and corresponding auxiliary data AD cannot be
exploited to reconstruct a biometric signal B′ which positively matches the original bio-
metric sample B. This property prevents the abuse of stored biometric data for launching
spoof or replay attacks, thereby improving the security of biometric systems [Nandakumar
and Jain, 2015].
Unlinkability : in order to overcome the second and third aforementioned drawbacks of
unprotected verification systems (i.e., biometric characteristics should not be matched
across systems and they should be replaceable), given a single biometric sample B, it must
be feasible to generate different versions of protected templates C1,C2, . . . ,Cn, so that
those templates cannot be linked to a single subject. This property guarantees the privacy
of a subject when he is registered in different applications with the same biometric instance
(prevents cross-matching), and also allows issuing new credentials in case a protected
template is stolen.
In addition to the irreversibility and unlinkability properties, biometric template protection
approaches should not affect other important performance parameters of conventional biometric
recognition systems [Simoens et al., 2012b]. For instance, accuracy of unprotected systems
should be preserved and verification speed should be comparable in order to enable real-time
verification.
Even if the research community has dedicated serious efforts to the proposal and development
of new biometric template protection schemes [Patel et al., 2015; Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011],
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some commercial schemes such as BioHASH1 are being distributed, and some standardization
efforts are currently being made [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics, 2015; Rane, 2014], third-
party standardized evaluation of the revocable methods is still needed. To that end, two main
approaches may be adopted: security through obscurity or security through transparency (also
known as security by design). The security through transparency scheme follows Kerckhoffs’
principle [Kerckhoffs, 1883]: a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the
system, except the key, is public knowledge. This principle can be applied to any security
related technology, in particular biometrics: in words of the Biometric Working Group [BWG,
2009], in the context of biometric recognition, applying security through transparency would
mean to “make public exposure of countermeasures and vulnerabilities which will lead to a more
mature and responsible attitude from the biometrics community and promote the development of
more secure systems in the future” [BWG, 2003].
We believe that exposing foreseeable threats, evaluating biometric systems vulnerabilities to
those threats, and proposing new biometric template schemes and/or countermeasures, is the
path that leads to a stronger and more robust biometric technology. This way, throughout the
Dissertation different threats that may compromise the privacy granted by biometric systems
are pointed out, systematically evaluated, and new biometric template protection schemes which
can guarantee a higher level of security and privacy to the subject are proposed. In other words,
this Thesis pretends to shed some light into the privacy and security evaluation of biometric
systems, not only proposing new biometric template protection schemes but also contributing
to the development of some guidelines and procedures for standardized evaluation and testing,
“a necessary step to enable vendors to test their offerings, compare their performance against
competitors, offer end-to-end solutions, and make large-scale deployment of biometric template
protection schemes a reality”, as stated by Rane [2014].
1.4. Motivation of the Thesis
Provided that biometrics is a very powerful tool for reliable automatic identity verification
and that, as presented in the previous sections, security and privacy evaluation is a key issue
for the acceptance of any security-based technology among the enrolled subjects, this Thesis is
focused on the security and privacy assessment of biometric systems and the proposal of new
and general biometric template protection schemes to counterfeit the exposed privacy threats.
The research carried out in this area has been mainly motivated by four observations from the
state-of-the-art.
First, in line with the security through transparency security principle [Kerckhoffs, 1883], to
assess the privacy granted by biometric template protection systems, we need to identify the
threat in order to later quantify the danger posed. This leads to a constant need to search
for new weak points in security applications, in order to make them public and motivate both
industry and researchers to look for solutions to the threat. This is the only way to provide
1http://www.genkey.com/en/technology/biohashr-sdk
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appropriate countermeasures and ensure the full privacy protection that the enrolled subjects
require.
In the second place, the development of new biometric template protection schemes which
fulfil all the requirements established by the ISO/IEC IS 24745 standard on biometric infor-
mation protection [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011], is currently a research
challenge (we refer the reader to Chapter 2 for a review of the current state-of-the-art in the
field). Although different efforts have been carried out in this direction [Ratha et al., 2001; Sutcu
et al., 2005], there is still no definitive solution: even if irreversible and unlinkable schemes have
been proposed, there is a significant gap between the unprotected systems and their protected
counterparts in terms of verification accuracy [Nandakumar and Jain, 2015]. There is a hence
need for new protection methods that comply with the ISO requirements, even under challenging
adversary models [Simoens et al., 2012a].
There is also a lack of protection schemes that can be applied to different biometric char-
acteristics. Most of the current biometric template protection schemes are designed specifically
for one biometric characteristic [Nandakumar et al., 2007; Pillai et al., 2011], and cannot be ex-
tended to other modalities in a straightforward manner. As a consequence, new methodologies
to protect the systems, applicable to any given biometric modality, should be designed in order
to achieve fully unlinkable and irreversible biometric systems.
Last but not least, the fourth observation is strongly related to the previous ones. In the
existing publications, experimental results are obtained and reported without following any
general or systematic protocol, not taking into account all necessary aspects of a rigorous security
and privacy assessment (not only should we analyse whether a zero effort attack can be performed
to extract biometric information from the templates, but also analyse attacks designed ad hoc for
a particular biometric template protection scheme). Moreover, in many cases only proprietary
databases are used. As a consequence, the reported results cannot be compared, losing this way
part of their utility, in accordance with reproducible research principles [Fomel and Claerbout,
2009; Peng, 2011; Vandewalle et al., 2009].
1.5. The Thesis
The Thesis developed in this Dissertation can be stated as follows:
In order to facilitate the wide deployment of biometric systems in real-time scenarios,
templates need to be protected in a standardized manner, preserving the privacy of the
subject from inverse biometrics and cross-matching attacks so that irreversibility and
unlinkability are granted. At the same time, verification accuracy, template size and
verification speed should be maintained with respect to their unprotected counterparts.
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Given the Thesis stated above, the main objectives pursued are as follows:
Reviewing and studying the problem of security and privacy assessment in biometric sys-
tems in order to identify and evaluate new possible threats.
Devising new practical biometric template protection schemes to counterfeit the analysed
privacy issues, in order to enhance the robustness of biometric systems to attacks.
Applying the proposed techniques and methodologies to common scenarios, systems, and
databases widely available for the biometrics research community, with emphasis on face,
signature, iris, handshape, fingervein and fingerprint verification systems.
In order to reach the previous objectives, in this PhD Thesis we follow a two-step approach:
i) commonly used unprotected templates are evaluated and proved to be reversible, and ii)
new general methods are proposed in order to add irreversibility, unlinkability and robustness
to cross-matching attacks to the original unprotected biometric systems. Even though most
security and privacy evaluations of template protection schemes focus only on the analysis of
the similarity scores provided by the system [Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011], a more thorough evaluation
should be carried out, taking into account cross-matching attacks specifically designed for the
scheme at hand, and considering challenging adversary models where the attacker is in possession
of protected templates and any secret information used at verification time [Simoens et al.,
2012a].
1.6. Outline of the Dissertation
The Dissertation is structured according to a traditional complex type with background
theory, practical methods, and three independent experimental studies in which the methods
are applied [Paltridge, 2002]. The chapter structure is as follows:
Chapter 1 introduces the topic of privacy and security in biometric systems, and gives the
motivation, objectives, outline and contributions of this PhD Thesis.
Chapter 2 summarizes related works on which this Thesis is motivated.
Chapter 3 (background theory) considers the issue of privacy preservation in biometric sys-
tems and presents the common methodology followed in the Dissertation for the accuracy,
security and privacy evaluation of unprotected and protected biometric systems. In par-
ticular, a new framework for templates’ unlinkability analysis is proposed. The biometric
databases and unprotected systems used in this Dissertation are also described.
Chapter 4 (experimental) introduces two novel methods for the reconstruction of biometric
samples from the templates stored in the database: i) an inverse biometrics method based
on the uphill simplex algorithm and a biometric samples generator, and ii) an inverse
biometrics method based on genetic algorithms. These methods are then used to evaluate
the irreversibility of a handshape- and an iris-based verification systems.
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Chapter 5 (experimental) introduces a novel biometric template protection scheme based
on Bloom filters in a stepwise manner: i) the original scheme, providing irreversibility, is
first described, ii) then a structure-preserving feature re-arrangement of the unprotected
features is proposed in order to add unlinkability to the original system, iii) a protocol
for estimating the appropriate values for the system parameters is then devised, and iv) a
general weighted feature level fusion for Bloom filter based templates is finally presented. In
the experimental evaluation, the soundness of the parameter estimation method is analysed
and the accuracy, irreversibility, unlinkability and robustness to cross-matching attacks of
the scheme are assessed, for iris-, face-, fingerprint- and fingervein-based biometric systems.
Chapter 6 (experimental) introduces three novel methods for the application of Homo-
morphic Encryption (HE) to biometric template protection systems: i) a scheme for the
comparison of templates of variable-length based on Dynamic Time Warping and HE, ii)
a general scheme for the application of HE to the comparison of fixed-length templates
with the Mahalanobis distance, the Euclidean distance and the Cosine similarity, and iii)
a general framework for feature, score and decision level fusion within biometric tem-
plate protection systems based on HE. The proposed methods are evaluated on on-line
signature and fingerprint based biometric systems, analysing the verification accuracy, the
irreversibility and the unlinkability provided, as well as the computational complexity.
Chapter 7 concludes the Dissertation summarizing the main results obtained and outlining
future research lines.
The dependence among the chapters is illustrated in Fig. 1.3. For example, reading Chapter 3
is required before reading any of the experimental Chapters 4, 5 and 6 (shaded in Fig. 1.3).
Before Chapter 3 one should start with the introduction in Chapter 1, and the recommendation
of reading Chapter 2. Following the guidelines given in Fig. 1.3 and assuming a background
in biometrics [Jain et al., 2011], one can optionally read the experimental Chapter 4 before
Chapters 5 and 6, which in turn can be read independently.
The methods developed in this PhD Thesis are strongly based on popular approaches from
the pattern recognition literature. The reader is referred to standard texts for a background
on the topic [Duda et al., 2001; Theodoridis and Koutroumbas, 2008]. This is especially useful
for dealing with Chapter 4. Chapters 4 to 6 also assume a knowledge of the fundamentals of
image processing [Gonzalez and Woods, 2006], and pattern recognition [Bigun, 2006]. Finally,
Chapter 6 assumes some knowledge of public key cryptography [Ferguson and Schneier, 2003;
Goldwasser and Micali, 1984] and Homomorphic Encryption [Fontaine and Galand, 2007].
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1.7. Detailed Research Contributions
The research contributions of this PhD Thesis are the following (for clarity, journal papers
included in ISI JCR appear in bold):
NOVEL INVERSE BIOMETRICS ATTACKS.
1. Novel inverse biometrics method based on the Uphill simplex algorithm
• M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Galbally, A. Morales, M. A. Ferrer, J. Fierrez and J. Ortega-Garcia, “Inverse
Biometrics: A Case Study in Hand Geometry Authentication”, in Proc. IAPR Int. Conf. on Pattern
Recognition (ICPR), pp. 1281-1284, Tsukuba, Japan, November 2012.
• M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Galbally, A. Morales, M. A. Ferrer, J. Fierrez and J. Ortega-Garcia,
“A novel hand reconstruction approach and its application to vulnerability assessment”,
Information Sciences, Vol. 268, n. 0, pp. 103-121, June 2014.
2. Novel inverse biometrics method based on genetic algorithms.
• J. Galbally, A. Ross, M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Fierrez and J. Ortega-Garcia, “Iris image
reconstruction from binary templates: An efficient probabilistic approach based on genetic
algorithms”, Computer Vision and Image Understanding, Vol. 117, n. 10, pp. 1512-1525,
October 2013 (Selected for Elsevier Virtual Issue: Celebrating the Breadth of Biometrics
Research).
NEW BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION SYSTEMS.
1. Novel biometric template protection scheme based on Bloom filters for facial features.
• M. Gomez-Barrero, C. Rathgeb, J. Galbally, J. Fierrez and C. Busch, “Protected Facial Biometric
Templates Based on Local Gabor Patterns and Adaptive Bloom Filters”, in Proc. IAPR/IEEE Int.
Conf. on Pattern Recognition (ICPR), pp. 4483-4488, Stockholm, Sweden, August 2014.
2. Novel multi-biometric template protection scheme based on Bloom filters for facial
and iris features.
• C. Rathgeb, M. Gomez-Barrero, C. Busch, J. Galbally and J. Fierrez, “Towards Cancelable Multi-
Biometrics based on Adaptive Bloom Filters: A Case Study on Feature Level Fusion of Face and Iris”,
in Proc. Int. Workshop on Biometrics and Forensics (IWBF), Gjøvik, Norway, March 2015a.
3. Novel general biometric and multi-biometric template protection scheme based on
Bloom filters complying to high standards with the requirements of the ISO/IEC IS
24745 on biometric information protection:
• M. Gomez-Barrero, C. Rathgeb, J. Galbally, C. Busch and J. Fierrez, “Unlinkable and
Irreversible Biometric Template Protection Based on Bloom Filters”, Information Sciences,
2016 (Submitted).
• M. Gomez-Barrero, C. Rathgeb, G. Li, R. Ramachandra, J. Galbally and C. Busch, “Gen-
eral Framework for Multi-Biometric Template Protection Based on Bloom Filters”, in
Information Fusion, 2016 (Submitted).
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4. Novel biometric template protection schemes based on Homomorphic Encryption for
unimodal systems.
• M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Galbally and J. Fierrez, “Variable-Length Template Protection Based on Homo-
morphic Encryption with Application to Signature Biometrics”, in Proc. Int. Workshop on Biometrics
and Forensics (IWBF), Limassol, Cyprus, March 2016.
• M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Galbally, E. Maiorana, P. Campisi and J. Fierrez, “Fixed-Length Template Pro-
tection Based on Homomorphic Encryption with Application to Signature Biometrics”, in Proc. Int.
Conf. on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, Las Vegas, USA, June 2016 (Submitted).
5. Novel multi-biometric template protection scheme based on Homomorphic Encryp-
tion.
• M. Gomez-Barrero, E. Maiorana, J. Galbally, P. Campisi and J. Fierrez, “Multibiomet-
ric Template Protection Based on Homomorphic Encryption. A Case Study on On-Line
Signature and Fingerprint”, IEEE Trans. on Information Forensics and Security, 2016 (Sub-
mitted).
LITERATURE SURVEYS.
1. Privacy issues in biometric systems.
• M. Gomez-Barrero and J. Gabally, “Inverse Biometrics and Privacy”, C. Vielhauer (Eds.), User-Centric
Privacy and Security in Biometrics, IET (to appear).
Other contributions related to the problem developed in this Thesis but not presented in
this Dissertation include:
NOVEL BIOMETRIC ATTACKS.
1. Novel hill-climbing attack based on the Uphill Simplex.
• M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Galbally, J. Fierrez and J. Ortega-Garcia, “Hill-Climbing Attack Based on the
Uphill Simplex Algorithm and its Application to Signature Verification”, in Proc. European Workshop on
Biometrics and Identity Management (BioID), Springer LNCS-6583, pp. 83-94, Brandenburg, Germany,
March 2011.
• M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Galbally, J. Fierrez and J. Ortega-Garcia, “Face verification put to test: a hill-
climbing attack based on the uphill-simplex algorithm”, in Proc. Intl. Conf. on Biometrics (ICB), pp.
40-45, New Delhi, India, March 2012.
• M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Gonzalez-Dominguez, J. Galbally and J. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, “Security Evalua-
tion of i-Vector Based Speaker Verification Systems Against Hill-Climbing Attacks”, in Proc. Conf. of
the Int. Speech Communication Association (InterSpeech), pp. 935-939, Lyon, France, August 2013.
2. Novel hill-climbing attack based on genetic algorithms.
• M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Galbally, P. Tome and J. Fierrez, “On the Vulnerability of Iris-based Systems
to a Software Attack based on a Genetic Algorithm”, in Proc. Iberoamerican Conference on Pattern
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Chapter 2
Related Works
This chapter summarizes previous works related to this PhD Thesis. We have focused on the
two fields within biometrics research in which novel contributions have been made, namely: i)
inverse biometrics methods to recover samples from stored templates, and ii) biometric template
protection schemes. The aim of this chapter is not to generate a comprehensive and exhaustive
review of the existing publications dealing with each of the aforementioned topics, but to sum-
marise the most relevant works closely related to this Thesis, and which can help the reader to
compose a general view of the state of the art on each of the matters.
The chapter is structured as follows. First we give an overview of the most important
works on synthetic biometric samples generation, and, more specifically, on inverse biometrics
(Sect. 2.1). Sect. 2.2 then focuses on the most important contributions existing in the state-
of-the-art to Biometric Template Protection for unimodal systems, as a countermeasure to the
issues raised in the previous section. Then Sect. 2.3 focuses on Multi-Biometric Template Pro-
tection. Finally the summary and conclusions of the chapter are presented (Sect. 2.4).
This chapter is based on the publications: [Galbally et al., 2013; Gomez-Barrero et al., 2014b,
2016c,e; Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011].
2.1. Inverse Biometrics
A growing interest has arisen in the biometric community over the last decade for synthetic
biometric samples generation for different biometric characteristics, such as voice [Dutoit, 2001],
fingerprints [Cappelli, 2003], iris [Cui et al., 2004; Makthal and Ross, 2005; Shah and Ross, 2006;
Wei et al., 2008; Zuo et al., 2007], handwriting [Lin and Wang, 2007], face [Poh et al., 2003] or
signature [Galbally et al., 2012a,b; Popel, 2007]. The main reason behind that interest is the
wide range of applications of those synthetic samples, which include but are not limited to:
Increase of biometric data: the amount of available data belonging to the enrolled subjects
could be augmented with synthetic samples. This way, verification accuracy could be
improved, especially for modalities such as the signature where the intra-class variability
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Figure 2.1: Classification of the methods for synthetic biometric samples generation. Inverse biometrics
methods are classified according to the knowledge required to be carried out. The categories to which the
methods proposed in the Dissertation belong are highlighted in blue.
is large [Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2008; Galbally et al., 2015, 2009].
Generation of completely synthetic databases: due to the legal restrictions regarding data
protection and the sharing and distribution of biometric data among different research
groups, we can use synthetic databases to overcome the usual shortage of large biometric
databases, with no privacy concerns since data does not belong to real subjects. Further-
more, this databases have no size restrictions, in terms of number of subjects and samples
per subject, since they are automatically produced by a computer.
Pseudo-identities generation: enrolled templates could be substituted by synthetic tem-
plates generated from reconstructed samples, thereby protecting the privacy of the subjects
[Othman and Ross, 2013].
Vulnerability and irreversibility studies: an attacker could use synthetically reconstructed
images, which would be positively matched to the stored reference, to impersonate the
enrolled subjects [Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011]. Furthermore, the irreversibility of
the stored templates can be analysed in terms of whether it is possible to reconstruct such
synthetic samples.
Depending on the final purpose, different types of synthetic data might be created. Therefore,
synthetic sample generation methods can be broadly divided into three categories, as depicted
in Fig. 2.1:
Duplicated samples: in these methods the generation algorithm starts from one or more
real samples of a given person and, through different transformations, produces different
synthetic (or duplicated) samples corresponding to the same subject. This approach has
been applied to signature [Munich and Perona, 2003; Oliveira et al., 1997], handwriting
[Mori et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2002] or face synthesis [Poh et al., 2003; Wang and Zhang,
2004; Wilson et al., 2002].
Synthetic individuals: in this case, some kind of a priori knowledge about a certain
biometric characteristic (e.g., minutiae distribution, iris structure, signature length, etc.)
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is used to create a model of the biometric characteristic for a population of subjects.
New synthetic individuals can then be generated sampling the constructed model. In
a subsequent stage of the algorithm, multiple samples of the synthetic subjects can be
generated by any of the procedures for creating duplicated samples. Different model-
based algorithms have been presented in the literature to generate synthetic individuals
for biometric characteristics such as iris [Cui et al., 2004; Shah and Ross, 2006; Zuo et al.,
2007], fingerprint [Cappelli, 2003], speech [Klatt, 1980; Pinto et al., 1989] or signature
[Galbally et al., 2012a].
Inverse biometrics: in these methods, given a genuine template, the aim is the recon-
struction of a synthetic biometric sample, which matches the stored biometric reference
according to a particular biometric recognition system. In other words, it denotes a reverse
engineering process which reconstructs synthetic samples from the information conveyed
in real biometric templates, and which has already been applied to fingerprint [Cappelli
et al., 2007; Hill, 2001], iris [Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011] and face [Adler, 2003].
The first type of methods (i.e., duplicated samples) poses no additional privacy threats to
the enrolled subjects: in order to generate synthetic samples, the potential attacker is already
in possession of real biometric data belonging to the same subject. Similarly, the generation of
fully synthetic individuals raises no privacy concerns, as no biometric information belonging to
real subjects is derived. On the other hand, inverse biometric methods do result in a potential
violation of the subject’s privacy: given only a theoretically secure representation of the subject’s
biometric characteristics (i.e., the unprotected template), sensible biometric information can be
obtained. In addition, contrary to the common belief that templates do not comprise enough
information in order to reconstruct the original sample from them [International Biometric
Group, 2002], synthetic samples can be generated and used to impersonate a particular subject,
launching masquerade attacks. Since the main aim of the Dissertation is the analysis and
improvement of the security and privacy provided by biometric systems, we will focus in the
following on this last approach, as highlighted in Fig. 2.1, where inverse biometric methods are
further classified in terms of the knowledge required to be carried out. In addition, a summary
of the inverse biometrics methods introduced in the literature is shown in Table 2.1.
One of the first works that addressed the problem posed by inverse biometrics was carried
out by Hill [2001]. He proposed a general scheme for the reconstruction of biometric samples,
consisting in four successive steps, where only access and knowledge of the templates format
stored in the database is required. In the first step, the attacker needs to gain access to one or
more biometric templates. Then, he or she needs to understand the structure of the template
(i.e., what information is stored, which format is used, etc.). After fully determining the structure
of the templates, a reverse engineering process is carried out in order to reconstruct one or more
digital biometric samples. Finally, the eventual attacker could also reconstruct physical artefacts
from the digital synthetic samples.
The most challenging step is the third one, that is, devising a method for reconstructing
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Table 2.1: Summary of key inverse biometric approaches.
Characteristic Knowledge Reference Acceptance Rate Database
Fingerprint Template Format
Hill [2001] 100%
FVC2000
(110 subjects)
Cappelli et al. [2007]
> 90% FVC2002-DB1
0.1% FMR (110 subjects)
Galbally et al. [2010a]
> 99% FVC2006
0.1% FMR (140 subjects)
Ross et al. [2007]
> 23%
NIST-4f
Rank 1
Face
Simmilarity Scores
Adler [2003] - FRS
Adler [2004]
> 95% NIST Mugshot
1% FMR (110 subjects)
Galbally et al. [2010b]
99-100% XM2VTS
0.1% FMR (295 subjects)
Distance Function Mohanty et al. [2007]
> 72% FERET
1% FMR (1196 subjects)
Iris Feature Extraction Venugopalan and Savvides [2011]
> 96% NIST ICE 2005
0.1% FMR (132 subjects)
digital samples given only the stored templates. In [Hill, 2001], a particular case study on
minutiae-based fingerprint templates is presented, based on three consecutive steps: i) finger-
print shape estimation, ii) orientation field creation and iii) ridge pattern synthesis. In the
first step, decision trees or neural networks are used, depending on the information available
in the template. The orientation field creation relies on the singular points. In the final step,
the ridge pattern is iteratively synthesised starting on the minutiae positions and guided by the
orientation field.
A similar approach for the generation of fingerprint samples from standard minutiae-based
fingerprint templates [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 37 Biometrics, 2011] was proposed in [Cappelli et al.,
2007]. The fingerprint area is estimated with a greedy heuristic algorithm, based on the available
minutiae positions. The Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm [Nelder and Mead, 1965] is used to
synthesise the orientation map, which is used together with the set of minutiae and a fixed
frequency to estimate the ridge pattern. In contrast to Hill’s approach, using different frequency
values on this last step, different synthetic samples can be obtained from a single template.
Finally, an additional rendering step is carried out, in which noise is added to the “perfect”
reconstructed image, thus yielding more realistic images, which in around 90% of the cases
are positively matched to the reference templates for a False Match Rate (FMR) of 0.1%. As
originally suggested by Hill [2001], starting from those synthetic images, Galbally et al. [2010a]
additionally generate gummy fingers on a Printed Circuit Board. All of them are falsely accepted
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as genuine subjects by the verification system for a FMR < 0.1%, thus proving the high quality
of the synthetic physical artefacts.
A different approach is followed in [Ross et al., 2007] to reconstruct fingerprint images, in
which no iterative technique is considered. Assuming that only the minutiae positions and
orientations are available, the orientation field is estimated using minutiae triples. Then, based
on the estimated field and the minutiae distribution, the fingerprint class is estimated. Finally,
the ridge pattern is synthesised using Linear Integral Convolution. In addition, a rendering
step is also undertaken to generate more realistic fingerprints, applying a low-pass filter and
histogram equalization.
A second set of reverse engineering methods assumes knowledge of similarity scores
between probe synthetic images and the enrolled identity, while no knowledge about the structure
of the template is assumed. The method proposed in [Adler, 2003] for the reconstruction of face
images from Eigenface based templates relies on a hill-climbing optimization of synthetic face
images. The authors use the similarity score between the synthetic images and the stored
template as feedback to improve the synthetic reconstruction. A more efficient hill-climbing
technique is proposed in [Adler, 2004], where each quadrant of the synthetic face image is
independently optimized even if only quantized scores are shared by the verification system (as
recommended by the BioAPI Consortium [2001]). Analogously, using a Bayesian hill-climbing
algorithm, face images are recovered from Eigenface- and GMM parts-based systems in [Galbally
et al., 2010b], achieving an acceptance rate of over 85%.
Mohanty et al. [2007] reconstruct face images assuming access to the similarity scores between
a pool of real face images and the face to be reconstructed. Furthermore, knowledge of the
distance function used by the particular face verification system is required. In this approach,
the authors model the face sub-space with an affine transformation, which is a combination
of a PCA baseline and a system dependent non-rigid transformation (i.e., the deviations of
each subject from the average face represented by the PCA matrix). In order to reconstruct a
particular face enrolled in the system, the distances from the pool of real images to the attacked
face are used to compute the point in the affine subspace that corresponds to the attacked
identity. Finally, the affine transformation is inverted to obtain the desired face image. The
approach was tested on several verification algorithms, achieving an acceptance rate of 73% for
a commercial system.
Finally, Venugopalan and Savvides [2011] reconstruct iris images from the iriscodes in a two-
step approach, assuming knowledge of the feature extraction algorithm. First, using a
reversed version of the Gabor function used to extract iriscodes from iris images, and a pool of
real iris images, a subject-specific iris pattern is generated. Then, this pattern is embedded into
a real iris texture to make the image more realistic.
In the face and iris reconstruction methods mentioned, a set of real images is used to either
initialize the optimization process or embed the identity to reconstruct into the subspace. Due
to the free access to different face and iris images databases, this is not a strong limitation for
the eventual attackers.
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It should be finally noted that in the aforementioned studies, and throughout this Disserta-
tion, inverse biometric approaches are analysed from a computer-based perspective: their main
goal is the deception of biometric recognition systems, not the visual resemblance with their real
counterparts. As a consequence, in those studies the quality of the synthetic samples is analysed
launching attacks on recognition algorithms.
2.2. Unimodal Biometric Template Protection
Unimodal Biometric Template Protection schemes, or simply Biometric Template Protection
(BTP) schemes, can be used to prevent the success of the inverse biometric approaches reviewed
in Sect. 2.1, and thereby enhance the privacy provided by biometric systems. As suggested in
[Campisi, 2013; Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011; Tuyls et al., 2007], BTP schemes have been traditionally
divided into:
Cancelable biometrics, where biometric samples are permanently and irreversibily trans-
formed, and comparison is carried out in the protected domain.
Cryptobiometrics, where a digital key is either bound or generated from a biometric
template.
However, in the last few years, new schemes based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Gar-
bled Circuits (GC) have been proposed, which do not belong to these categories. On the one
hand, contrary to cancelable biometric approaches, no information is lost or modified in the
protected (or encrypted) domain with respect to the unprotected templates. On the other hand,
regarding biometric cryptosystems, a regular cryptographic key is used to encrypt the unpro-
tected templates, instead of bounding or generating it from biometric data, and no decryption
of the protected templates is necessary at verification time. As a consequence, in analogy to the
wider concept of privacy-preserving signal processing in the encrypted domain [Lagendijk et al.,
2013], a third class can be added, namely:
Biometrics in the encrypted domain, where techniques such as HE and GC are used
to encrypt the reference templates and comparison is carried out in the encrypted domain.
A diagram with the BTP classification followed in this section is shown in Fig. 2.2, where
the categories of the novel methods proposed in this Dissertation are highlighted in blue. In
addition, Table 2.2 summarises the major advantages and disadvantages of each approach, with
respect to the requirements established in Chapter 1, namely: verification accuracy preservation,
irreversibility, unlinkability and computational complexity.
In the next sections (Sect. 2.2.2 to Sect. 2.2.4), a summary of the most representative works
related to cancelable biometrics, cryptobiometrics and biometrics in the encrypted domain for
unimodal systems is given.
It is important to note, that a fair comparison between the described schemes is hard to
establish. Each system was evaluated on different, and mostly small, databases, under different
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Figure 2.2: Biometric Template Protection schemes classification. The categories to which the methods
proposed in the Dissertation belong are highlighted in blue.
scenarios. Moreover, approaches show different requirements, such as multi-sample enrolment or
mandatory pre-alignment of biometrics samples. Finally, in most cases, even if no attacks have
yet been proposed, no thorough irreversibility and/or unlinkability analysis has been performed.
In spite of such limitations, in each subsection Tables 2.3 to 2.5 include a summary of the most
relevant BTP works in that specific category.
2.2.1. Security and Cryptography Related Terms
Let us introduce some terms, closely related to the fields of security evaluation of biometric
systems and cryptography, that will be used in the following:
Stolen-token scenario: evaluation setting in which the impostor is in possession of the
genuine token or template, in opposition to the non-stolen-token scenario.
Public key encryption: cryptographic algorithms which are based on mathematical prob-
lems that currently admit no efficient solution. This techniques use asymmetric key algo-
rithms, where a key used by one party to perform encryption is not the same as the key
used by another for decryption. Therefore, each subject has a pair of cryptographic keys -
a public encryption key (public key, pk) and a private decryption key (secret key, sk). The
strength lies in the“impossibility”(computational impracticality) for a properly generated
private key to be determined from its corresponding public key. Thus the public key may
be published without compromising security, since security depends only on keeping the
secret key private.
Hash: a hash function is any function that can be used to map data of arbitrary size to
data of fixed size. In particular, a cryptographic hash function is considered practically
impossible to invert, that is, to recreate the input data from its hash value alone.
Three different adversary models can be considered:
Honest-but-curious model : both parties, client and server, follow the established protocols
but may try to learn additional information about the sample/template on the other side.
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Table 2.2: Summary of advantages and disadvantages of BTP approaches
Cancelable Biometrics Cryptobiometrics
Biometrics in the
Encrypted Domain
Accuracy Drops Drops Preserved
Irreversibility Permanent protection Decryption at verification Permanent protection
Unlinkability Not analysed Not analysed Granted
Computational
Preserved Preserved Increased
complexity
Advanced model : the adversary has the full knowledge of the algorithms used for template
extraction, template protection and comparison, following Kerckhoffs’ principles [Kerck-
hoffs, 1883]. In addition, the adversary is capable of executing part of or all sub-modules
of the system that make use of the secret keys, following or not the established protocol,
while the adversary knows none of the secrets.
Full Disclosure Model : this model is the advanced model augmented by disclosing the
secret keys to the adversary.
2.2.2. Cancelable Biometrics
Cancelable biometrics consist of intentional, repeatable distortions of biometric signals based
on transformations which provide a comparison of biometric templates in the protected domain
[Ratha et al., 2001]. As shown in Fig. 2.2, there are two main types of cancelable biometric
schemes:
Non-reversible transformations of the biometric data or unprotected templates.
Biometric salting, in which Auxiliary Data (AD) is blended with biometric data to
derive a distorted version of the biometric template.
One of the earliest methods for generating cancelable biometric templates was based on non-
invertible transforms. Ratha et al. [2001] applied geometric transformations in the image
domain. At enrolment, the transform (e.g. surface folding) is applied to a facial image using
application-dependent parameters. During verification, probe images are transformed employing
the same parameters and compared to the stored reference. Several types of transformations,
such as block permutation, are proposed in [Ratha et al., 2006, 2007] for fingerprints.
In contrast to those techniques, approaches based on feature mixing have been proposed.
Jeong et al. [2006] combine two different feature extraction methods to achieve cancelable face
biometrics: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Independent Component Analysis (ICA)
coefficients are extracted and both feature vectors are randomly scrambled and added in order
to create a transformed template. Regarding variable-length templates, Maiorana et al. [2010]
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Table 2.3: Summary of key cancelable biometric schemes. This table is an updated version of Table 8
in [Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011].
Technique Characteristic Reference Accuracy (%) Database
Fingerprint
Non-invertible:
Ratha et al. [2007] FNMR: ∼ 35, ∼ 15 188 subjects
Block permutation
Non-invertible:
Boult et al. [2007] ∼ 0.08% EER FVC 2004Radial transform
Revocable BioTokens (200 subjects)
On-line Non-invertible:
Maiorana et al. [2010] 10.81% EER
MCYT
Signature BioConvolving (330 subjects)
Face
Salting :
Teoh et al. [2006] 0.0002% EER
ORL-DB/Faces94
BioHashing (194 subjects)
Salting :
Ross and Othman [2011] 6% EER
XM2VTS
Visual Crypto. (295 subjects)
Iris
Salting :
Pillai et al. [2011] ∼ 2% EER ND-IRIS-0405
Rand. Projection (356 subjects)
Non-invertible:
Rathgeb et al. [2013b] 1.75% EER
CASIA-v3-Interval
Bloom Filters (249 subjects)
transform sequences extracted from biometric samples in a two-step approach: each sequence
is randomly divided into a fixed number of segments, and those segments are subsequently
convolved. These transformed signals are then used for identity verification. A case study is
presented for on-line signature, even if the method can be potentially applied to any sequence-
based biometric system.
Then, in [Boult, 2006], cryptographically secure BioTokens are proposed and applied to
existing face recognition schemes, such as PCA. The key idea is to split biometric features into
a stable part and an unstable part. For face, the authors suggest to simply split real feature
values into an integer part and a fractional part. Subsequently, stable parts are encrypted and
unstable parts are obscured applying non-invertible projections. A more thorough analysis of
the BioToken concept is carried out in [Boult et al., 2007] for fingerprints, and an improved
version is proposed providing increased security, privacy and verification accuracy.
Since all the aforementioned schemes rely on some transformation of the images or derived
templates, some accuracy degradation is observed. In opposition to those techniques, one of
the last approaches based on non-invertible transformations relies on the extraction of Bloom
filters [Bloom, 1970] from binary templates, showing no accuracy degradation and achieving
rotation-invariant and compressed templates. These filters are essentially a space-efficient prob-
abilistic data structure representing sets to support membership queries, and have been widely
used in networking applications [Broder and Mitzenmacher, 2005]. In [Rathgeb et al., 2013a,b],
this concept is applied to iriscodes. Similar approaches have been later proposed for fingerprint
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templates based on minutiae vicinities [Li et al., 2015] or the Minutiae Relation Code represen-
tation [Abe et al., 2015]. In spite of the advantages with respect to other cancelable biometric
approaches, Bringer et al. [2015] proposed a reconstruction approach for iriscodes given their
corresponding Bloom filter templates, able to produce iriscodes which, even if not visually realis-
tic, were positively verified by the original unprotected iris system. Furthermore, some concerns
have been raised regarding the unlinkability of the proposed schemes [Hermans et al., 2014].
A second set of cancelable biometric approaches is based on biometric salting (see Fig. 2.2),
which consists on mixing random or synthetic patterns within biometric templates. The most
popular salting technique is the BioHashing approach [Goh and Ngo, 2003; Teoh et al., 2006,
2004], initially proposed for face biometrics. Basically, this technique operates as a key-binding
scheme (see Sect. 2.2.3), using secret subject-specific tokens (private instead of public AD)
at verification. Prior to the key-binding step, secret tokens are blended with biometric data
to derive a distorted biometric template, hence representing an instance of biometric salting
[Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011].
On the other hand, motivated by the success of the correlation filter-based methods in pattern
recognition and computer vision applications [Patel et al., 2015], Savvides et al. [2004] generate
cancelable face biometrics applying minimum average correlation filters, where subject-specific
secret PINs (secret AD) serve as seed for a random basis of filters.
Another biometric salting approach widely used is based on random projections. In [Pillai
et al., 2010, 2011] the extracted iriscodes are projected onto a random subspace. Since linear
transformations, even if they are independently applied to small sectors of the image, will mix
occluded parts of the iris image or reflections with high quality segments of the iris texture, ver-
ification accuracy is degraded. Only using a subject-specific random matrix as AD can accuracy
be maintained. Similarly, in [Kim and Toh, 2007] subject-specific random projections (AD) are
applied to PCA-based face features followed by an error minimizing template transform.
More recently, visual cryptography has been proposed for protecting biometric templates.
The main idea behind this type of approach is to generate two (or more) random-looking shares
from an individual biometric sample, revealing no biometric information, and store them in
separate databases. Only using all shares can we recover the original biometric image. In
that context, Ross and Othman [2011] present two different schemes for face, and for iris or
fingerprints. The main difference between both methods is that, for face biometrics, a public
image (AD) is combined with the face sample to generate two different shares. Even if almost
no accuracy degradation is observed in these methods for the non-stolen-token scenario, they
present two main drawbacks: on the one hand, two (or more) databases need to be handled,
hence increasing the complexity of the system. On the other hand, should the databases be
compromised, the original biometric sample or template can be recovered, thereby compromising
the privacy of the subject.
It should be noted that in most biometric salting approaches [Savvides et al., 2004; Teoh
et al., 2004], subject-specific keys (secret AD) are incorporated while experiments are performed
under the non-stolen-token scenario, hence omitting the actual biometric accuracy of the system
28
2.2 Unimodal Biometric Template Protection
[Kong et al., 2006; Rathgeb and Uhl, 2010c]. For instance, in follow-up publications [Teoh and
Ngo, 2006; Teoh et al., 2008], a significant degradation of verification accuracy is reported for
the stolen-token scenario.
Finally, in the vast majority of approaches to cancelable biometrics, revocability is provided
by incorporating secret credentials, e.g. random numbers. That is, in order to generate the
protected template C, the PIE may take as input a secret key K, as well as the biometric data,
B: C = PIC (B,K). The key K is system dependent and different protected templates might
be generated from the same biometric sample using different keys: Ci = PIC (B,Ki). Even
thought the key should be kept secret, in an ideal scenario, knowledge of this key by an eventual
attacker would not disclose any information about the unprotected template T or the original
biometric sample B. Consequently, not only accuracy but also irreversibility or unlinkability
evaluations have to be performed under the “stolen-token scenario”, where an impostor is in
possession of valid secrets.
2.2.3. Cryptobiometric Systems
These methods combine cryptographic keys with transformed versions of the original bio-
metric templates to obtain secure templates. In most cases, some public information, known as
helper data or auxiliary data, is generated. As depicted in Fig. 2.2, depending on how the AD
is used, cryptobiometric schemes can be broadly divided into:
Key binding schemes, where AD are obtained combining the key with the biometric
template. At verification time, applying an appropriate key retrieval algorithm to the
probe biometric sample, the key is obtained from the AD.
Key generation schemes, where both the AD and the key are generated directly from
biometric data. Again, at verification time, a key is recovered from the probe sample using
the AD.
Most cryptobiometric systems rely on the fuzzy vault [Juels and Sudan, 2006] and the fuzzy
commitment [Juels and Wattenberg, 1999] schemes, which are classified as key binding ap-
proaches.
In fuzzy commitment schemes, a witness (biometric data) is committed to a codeword (error
correcting code, EEC). The difference between them and a hash value of the codeword are stored
as AD. At verification time, the difference vector is used to reconstruct the codeword from the
acquired biometric sample, and its corresponding hash is compared to the one stored as part of
the AD.
Hao et al. [2006] apply this paradigm to iriscodes, using Hadamard and Reed-Solomon EEC.
Bringer et al. [2007] later proposed a two-dimensional iterative min-sum decoding with Reed-
Muller codes to obtain a more efficient decoding. Several improvements for such systems have
been proposed in successive works [Ignatenko and Willems, 2009a; Rathgeb and Uhl, 2010a].
29
2. RELATED WORKS
Table 2.4: Summary of key biometric cryptosystems. This table is an updated version of Table 7 in
[Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011].
Technique Characteristic Reference FNMR/FMR Database
Key Binding :
Fuzzy commitment
Iris
Hao et al. [2006] 0.42 / 0.0 70 subjects
Bringer et al. [2007] 5.62/0.0
ICE 2005
(244 subjects)
Fingerprint Nandakumar [2010] 12.6/0.0
FVC2002-DB2
(110 subjects)
Signature Argones-Rua et al. [2012] 2.93/2.64
MCYT
(100 subjects)
Key Binding :
Fuzzy vault
Fingerprint Nandakumar et al. [2007] 4.0 / 0.004
FVC2002-DB2
(110 subjects)
Iris Wu et al. [2008a] 5.5 / 0.0
CASIA v1
(108 subjects)
Palmprint Wu et al. [2008b] 0.73 / 0.0
PolyU DB
(750 subjects)
Key Binding :
Face Teoh et al. [2004] 0.0 / 0.0
ORL-DB/Faces94
BioHashing (194 subjects)
Key Generation: On-line Feng and Wah [2002] 28.0 / 1.2 750 subjects
Quantization Signature Vielhauer et al. [2002] 7.05 / 0.0 10 subjects
Although the fuzzy commitment paradigm was first applied to iris biometrics, it has been
also applied to other binary templates. For instance, Teoh and Kim [2007] binarized fingerprint
features applying a randomized dynamic quantization transformation, and subsequently used
Reed-Solomon codes to construct the fuzzy commitment scheme. The transformation consists
on a subject-specific non-invertible projection, hence requiring the secure storage of a subject
token. Similar approaches have been also applied to face hashes in [Zeng and Watters, 2007].
Also for face biometrics, Lu et al. [2009] propose a fuzzy commitment scheme for binarized
PCA based features. More recently, Nandakumar [2010] presented a fuzzy commitment scheme
for a binary fixed-length representation of fingerprints, based on a quantization of the Fourier
spectrum of minutiae sets. Alignment was achieved using high curvature regions.
Regarding behavioural biometrics, subject adaptive EECs were applied in [Maiorana et al.,
2008] to on-line signature, where the error correction information is selected for each subject
based on the intra-variability of the particular subject’s data. More recently, the fuzzy com-
mitment paradigm was applied in [Argones-Rua et al., 2012] to an on-line signature verification
system based on a combination of Universal Background Models (UBM) with Hidden Markov
Models (HMM), achieving a remarkable verification accuracy.
On the other hand, the key idea of the fuzzy vault scheme is to use an unordered set to
lock a secret key. The resulting vault can be unlocked with another set similar enough to the
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original one, thus allowing the reconstruction of the key, and thereby verifying the identity of
the subject. The vault is created applying polynomial encoding and error correction.
The first practical implementation of the fuzzy vault scheme in biometrics was proposed
by Clancy et al. [2003] for minutiae-based fingerprint templates. Fingerprints were assumed to
be pre-aligned. Later on, Nandakumar et al. [2007] suggested the use of high curvature points
of the fingerprint orientation field as AD to solve the pre-alignment issues. Similarly, in [Levi
et al., 2006] a biometric cryptosystem based on minutiae extracted from on-line signatures and
the fuzzy vault paradigm was presented.
On the other hand, Wu et al. [2008a] proposed a fuzzy vault based on iris, where the iris
texture is divided into 64 blocks and the mean gray scale value is computed. In a subsequent
work, Wu et al. [2008b] presented a system based on the features extracted with Gaussian
derivative filters from palmprint samples.
Finally, the BioHashing [Teoh et al., 2004] approach described in the previous section can
be also classified as a key-biding cryptobiometric system.
In spite of the advantages of these key-binding schemes, such as compact representation or
easy key update, several works have proven that fuzzy schemes are vulnerable to attacks on the
AD that compromise the security of the system and the privacy of the subjects [Ignatenko and
Willems, 2009b, 2010; Rathgeb and Uhl, 2012; Scheirer and Boult, 2007].
Regarding key generation cryptobiometric systems (see Fig. 2.2), quantization schemes
model the enrolment samples with intervals for each real-valued feature. Such intervals are
encoded as integer values and stored as AD. At verification time, the characteristics of the newly
presented sample are extracted and mapped into the previously defined intervals, generating a
hash or key. Feng and Wah [2002] proposed an scheme for on-line signature, aligning the samples
with a Dynamic Time Warping algorithm. Similarly, Vielhauer et al. [2002] generated hashes
using interval matrices for each subject. More recently, Freire et al. [2007] proposed a biometric
cryptosystem based on hashes generated from templates comprising signature global features.
On the other hand, a BCH error correcting code and AD are used in the template protection
scheme presented in [Freire et al., 2008].
Although quantization schemes have been extensively applied to signature data, they have
been also applied to other biometric characteristics. For instance, Sutcu et al. [2005] present
a general method for extracting hashes from biometric data, applying it to face samples. This
approach was extended to iris biometrics by Rathgeb and Uhl [2009], obtaining longer hashes.
Again, the main drawbacks of such quantization based techniques are the accuracy degrada-
tion due to the loss in accuracy of converting the original real-valued features to integer-valued
intervals, and potential attacks on the stored AD. Since such data comprise subject-specific in-
tervals for each feature, a potential attacker could easily reconstruct a template to impersonate
a genuine subject.
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Table 2.5: Summary of key biometrics in the encypted domain schemes.
Technique Characteristic Reference Accuracy Database
HE
Fingerprint Barni et al. [2010] ∼ 7% EER Crossmatch
52 subjects
Face Erkin et al. [2009] 96% Det. Rate
ORL Face
(40 subjects)
HE + GC Iris Blanton and Gasti [2011] Not reported
2.2.4. Biometrics in the Encrypted Domain
As an alternative to the aforementioned methods based on cancelable biometrics or cryp-
tobiometrics, Homomorphic Encryption schemes allow for computations to be performed on
ciphertexts, with no additional AD, and which generate encrypted results which decrypt to
plaintexts that match the result of the operations carried out on the original plaintext [Fontaine
and Galand, 2007]. Therefore, combining such an encryption approach with biometric verifi-
cation systems would meet the irreversibility and unlinkability requirements while preserving
verification accuracy [Barni et al., 2015]. Since practical implementations of Fully Homomor-
phic Encryption (FHE) schemes still remain a big challenge [Aguilar-Melchor et al., 2013], semi
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) schemes, which only allow a limited subset of operations in
the encrypted domain, are nowadays being introduced into many applications based on signal
processing [SPM, 2013; Aguilar-Melchor et al., 2013; Troncoso-Pastoriza and Perez-Gonzalez,
2013], and, particularly, biometrics [Barni et al., 2010; Bringer et al., 2013; Ye et al., 2009].
In particular, current approaches to biometric verification in the encrypted domain [Bringer
et al., 2013] are based on Garbled Circuits (GC) [Yao, 1986] and Homomorphic Encryption
(HE) [Aguilar-Melchor et al., 2013; Fontaine and Galand, 2007], as shown in Fig. 2.2.
Since efficient implementations of HE schemes are very recent [Paillier, 1999], only a few
unimodal biometric systems based on this protection technology have been proposed so far. In
[Barni et al., 2010], the authors present a new fingerprint verification system based on the Fin-
gerCode fixed-length representation of fingerprints [Jain et al., 1999] and HE. Results show that
verification accuracy is preserved. However, the database stored in the server is not encrypted
and results are reported on a small database comprising data belonging to only 51 subjects. An
improved version of that approach is suggested in [Bianchi et al., 2010], where a more compact
implementation using quantization is proposed at a small cost in terms of verification accuracy.
In [Erkin et al., 2009], Eigenface based templates are protected with HE. Then, a more ef-
ficient approach is presented in [Sadeghi et al., 2010] using GCs for the threshold comparison.
Furthermore, the SCiFI project [Osadchy et al., 2010] proposes a biometric identification algo-
rithm specifically designed for a more efficient usage in secure computation, based on fixed-length
templates with a constant Hamming weight. In contrast to the Eigenface based approaches, only
the matching process, but not the template construction, is secured.
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In [Blanton and Gasti, 2011], a secure iris BTP based on a combination of HE and GCs
is proposed, handling encrypted iriscodes. In order to deal with the computation of Hamming
Distances in the encrypted domain (divisions are not supported), the division and comparison
with a verification threshold is reduced to a inequality comparison carried out with GCs. Even
though the use of GCs increases the number of computations we can carry out in the encrypted
domain, complexity is increased due to the fact that they have to be designed and evaluated
ad-hoc.
More recently, Bringer et al. [2014a] propose an efficient implementation, known as GSHADE,
of several metrics, including the scalar product, the Hamming, Euclidean and Mahalanobis
distances. Using oblivious transfers, both the computation time and the bandwidth requirements
are improved by a least one order of magnitude with respect to the algorithms proposed in
previous works [Blanton and Gasti, 2011; Osadchy et al., 2010].
Finally, a different approach, in which all computations are carried out on the server side,
with no interaction with the client, is proposed in [Troncoso-Pastoriza et al., 2013]. Using ideal
lattices and a Support Vector Machine (SVM) over Gabor-based face templates, high verification
accuracy rates are obtained on three widely used databases, at the cost of higher communication
requirements than those of interactive schemes.
It should be noted that alignment issues in the encrypted domain are not always considered
[Erkin et al., 2009; Osadchy et al., 2010; Sadeghi et al., 2010]. On the other hand, for iriscodes
[Blanton and Gasti, 2011] and fingerprints [Barni et al., 2010] the authors suggest applying
matching operations on different rotations on the inputs, as in most unprotected verification
schemes, thus leading to a higher computational load.
2.3. Multi-Biometric Template Protection
While all the techniques mentioned in Sect. 2.2 are theoretically sound, they seldom guar-
antee the desired irreversibility and unlinkability properties without significantly degrading the
recognition accuracy [Nandakumar and Jain, 2015]. This limitation can be overcome by in-
troducing multi-biometric template protection schemes (MBTP) [Nagar et al., 2012], since the
combination of different biometric characteristics generally leads to higher accuracy [Ross et al.,
2006]. As defined in the ISO/IEC TR 24722 on multimodal and other multi-biometric fusion
[ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics, 2007], fusion can be carried out at three different levels [Ross
et al., 2006], namely:
Feature level fusion: a single template of higher dimensionality is generated from the indi-
vidual templates extracted from each characteristic, hence comprising more discriminative
information than each single template.
Score level fusion: each unimodal system returns an individual similarity score, which are
normalized to a common range and combined in order to obtain a more accurate system
[Poh and Kittler, 2012].
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Figure 2.3: Multibiometric Biometric Template Protection schemes classification. Dashed lines refer
to categories for which no multi-biometric template protection schemes have been proposed yet. The
categories to which the methods proposed in the Dissertation belong are highlighted in blue.
Decision level fusion: each unimodal system returns an individual accept/reject decision,
which are fused in order to increase the accuracy of the system.
Even though extensive research has been carried out on the fields of multi-biometric recogni-
tion [Ross et al., 2006] and unimodal biometric template protection [Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011], sev-
eral issues remain unsolved in the development of Multi-Biometric Template Protection (MBTP)
schemes [Rathgeb and Busch, 2012]. Two of the most significant challenges are: i) the devel-
opment of a generic framework for multi-biometric template protection, and ii) the difficulty
to obtain protected templates from non pre-aligned samples, without requiring AD (and hence
avoiding potential information leakage).
Fig. 2.3 shows the classification of the MBTP methods followed during the Dissertation,
where the categories of the novel methods proposed in this Dissertation are highlighted in blue.
As it may be observed, a very reduced subset of cancelable biometric approaches is depicted with
respect to the unimodal BTP classification (see Fig. 2.2) and the biometrics in the encrypted
domain class is shown in dashed lines: so far, no MBTP schemes have been proposed, which fall
into those categories.
In the next subsections, the approaches proposed so far for MBTP systems are described,
and summarised in Table 2.6. As it may be observed, the first five rows comprise schemes
designed for the fusion of several instances of the same biometric characteristic. It should be
also noted that an evaluation of the corresponding biometric systems using unprotected data is
presented in very few cases, thereby preventing the assessment of the accuracy degradation due
to the protection mechanism.
2.3.1. Cancelable Multi-Biometrics
As shown in Fig. 2.3, MBTP have only been proposed for a very reduced subset of non-
invertible transformations and biometric salting approaches. Rathgeb and Busch [2014]
propose the fusion of both iris samples belonging to a given subject using Bloom filters. Paul
and Gavrilova [2012] present a fusion of face and ear samples using random projections and a
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transformation-based feature extraction, reducing dimensionality with PCA and clustering the
features with k-Nearest Neighbours (k-NN) classifiers.
Since in multi-biometric systems several samples are used for verifiaction, different trans-
formations can be applied to each of them to enhance the security and accuracy of biometric
systems. Since the transformations chosen can be either non-invertible or biometric salting,
they are a new subset of cancelable biometrics approaches referred to as transformation mix
in Fig. 2.3. In that context, Canuto et al. [2013] propose the application of BioHashing, in-
terpolation and convolution to voice and iris data. The effects of each transformation on each
individual characteristic are analysed, and then fusions of templates generated with the same
or different transformations, using ensemble systems with Support Vector Machines (SVM) or
k-NN training methods, are compared. As a result of this analysis, the authors proved that the
use of different cancelable transformations is more efficient.
In an analogous manner, Othman and Ross [2013] fuse the spiral and the continuous compo-
nents belonging to two different fingerprints from the same subject into one cancelable template.
While the authors showed that the mixed fingerprint representing a new identity can potentially
be used for verification, being the mixed fingerprint dissimilar from the original ones and robust
to cross-matching attacks, further work is required to enhance the verification accuracy.
2.3.2. Multi-Biometric Cryptosystems
As in the unimodal schemes, most multi-biometric cryptosystems based on the key-binding
concept rely on the fuzzy vault [Juels and Sudan, 2006] and the fuzzy commitment [Juels and
Wattenberg, 1999] schemes. A fuzzy vault scheme is proposed in [Nandakumar and Jain, 2008],
where a single multi-biometric template is derived from fingerprint and iris features. Similarly,
Bringer et al. [2014b] propose the feature-level fusion of several fingerprints applying the fuzzy
vault scheme to the ORed individual fixed-length binary templates, based on minutiae vicinities.
On the other hand, a fuzzy commitment scheme for the fusion of two different feature extraction
algorithms is applied to 3D face data in a single sensor scenario in [Kelkboom et al., 2009].
As pointed out in Sect. 2.2.3, the fuzzy vault scheme is vulnerable to attacks correlating
different templates of the same subject. Secondly, auxiliary alignment data, stored as AD, may
leak information about the protected templates which negatively affects security and privacy. To
avoid those problems, Tams et al. [2015] use alignment-free fingerprint features and fuse several
samples, thereby removing the need to store alignment parameters. Furthermore, the features
are passed through a quantization scheme and then dispersed, thereby thwarting correlation
attacks.
Additionally, fuzzy schemes can be applied to secure sketches, that is, secure representations
of biometric templates in which AD is used to recover the original biometric template and
matching is reduced to an error correction [Verbitskiy et al., 2010]. In [Nagar et al., 2012],
a single secure sketch is generated from multiple and heterogeneous templates, based on the
concatenation of the individual sketches. Practical implementations for fuzzy vault and fuzzy
commitment schemes are then proposed for the fusion of iris, fingerprint and face.
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Table 2.6: Summary of key multi-biometric template protection schemes.
Characteristic Technique Reference Accuracy Database
Fingerprints
Cancelable:
Othman and Ross [2013] 6% EER
WVU
Mixing Fingers (500 subjects)
Cryptobiometrics:
Fuzzy vault
Bringer et al. [2014b] 0.27 / 0.009
FVC2002-DB2
(110 subjects)
Tams et al. [2015]
82% GAR FVC2002-DB1
0% FMR (110 subjects)
Face
Cryptobiometrics:
Kelkboom et al. [2009] 2.45% EER
FRGC v2
Fuzzy commitment (454 subjects)
Iris
Cancelable:
Rathgeb and Busch [2014] 0.48 EER
IITD v1
Bloom Filters (224 subjects)
Iris + Face + Cryptobiometrics:
Nagar et al. [2012]
68% GAR WVU
Fingerprint Fuzzy Vault & Commit. 75% GAR (138 subjects)
Face + Ear
Cancelable:
Paul and Gavrilova [2012]
89% GAR AT&T + UPM
Random projection 0% FMR (17 subjects)
Voice + Iris
Cancelable:
Canuto et al. [2013] ∼ 95% GAR TIMIT + CASIA v1BioHashing, Interp.
BioConvolving (100 subjects)
Iris +
Cryptobiometrics:
Nandakumar and Jain [2008] 1.8 / 0.01
CASIA + MSU-DBI
Fuzzy vault (108 subjects)
Fingerprint
Cryptobiometrics:
Cimato et al. [2008]
CASIA + FVC2000
Cascade 0% EER (108 subjects)
Face + Cryptobiometrics:
Sutcu et al. [2007] 0.92 / 0.0002
Faces94 + NIST
Fingerprint Quantization (152 subjects)
In opposition to those previous schemes, a modular approach for the design of multi-biometric
cryptosystems is proposed in [Cimato et al., 2008]: a secure sketch is extracted from each
biometric template, and used in a sequential manner to secure successive templates. In [Fang
et al., 2010], a more general approach is presented, where multiple secrets are similarly used in
a cascade fashion within the secure sketch framework. In this last case, no evaluation of the
verification accuracy is provided. These approaches, classified as key binding schemes, have the
advantage of an easy escalation to more biometric samples, while the main limitation is that the
overall security is bounded by the security of the outermost layer.
On the other hand, regarding key generation systems, quantization schemes are applied to
SVD-based face features and pre-aligned minutiae-based fingerprint templates in [Sutcu et al.,
2007] to generate a single secure sketch. Even though a good accuracy is achieved with a simple
and efficient fusion, and the security of the template is analysed, the authors point out that one
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of the open issues is how to determine the exact information leakage due to the sketch.
2.4. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have summarised the main works related to this PhD Thesis. We have
started by describing the main threats to biometric recognition systems in terms of privacy
vulnerabilities: inverse biometric algorithms. A taxonomy of those methods has been presented
and the most important works in each category summarised. Then we have focused on Biometric
and Multi-Biometric Template Protection schemes as a countermeasure to minimize the potential
privacy leakage derived from the storage of unprotected biometric templates. The main works
proposed have been presented and categorized.
Being this chapter a summary of the state-of-the-art, no new material has been presented.
Although the exposition of certain parts of the chapter is based on some of the cited publications,
most of the structure and presentation has followed a personal perspective.
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Chapter 3
Security and Privacy Evaluation of
Biometric Systems
This chapter summarizes the common practices in accuracy testing of biometric systems
and presents the evaluation methodology followed in the Thesis for the security and privacy
assessment of unprotected and protected biometric systems.
In order to meet the right of privacy preservation of the subjects, biometric templates need
to be protected and biometric systems should be thoroughly evaluated, taking into account the
privacy issues exposed in Chapter 1, Sect. 1.2. While certain properties are inherent to the
templates (e.g., irreversibility, unlinkability), other performance measurements (e.g., accuracy)
can only be analysed at system level. To assess those requirements, in this chapter we propose:
i) a general framework for the evaluation of unprotected and protected biometric systems, and
ii) a new framework for the unlinkability assessment of protected biometric templates.
The chapter is organized as follows. First we summarize the guidelines for accuracy analysis
of biometric systems (Sect. 3.1). Then we provide a description of the proposed protocol for the
privacy and security evaluation of unprotected and protected biometric schemes followed in the
Thesis (Sect. 3.2). Finally we give an overview of the baseline unprotected systems (Sect. 3.3)
and biometric databases (Sect. 3.4) used in the Dissertation.
This chapter is based on the publications: Galbally et al. [2013]; Gomez-Barrero et al. [2014b,
2016d].
3.1. Accuracy Analysis of Biometric Systems
As it will be later described in Sect. 3.2, in order to assess the security and privacy provided
by traditional (or unprotected) biometric systems and biometric template protection (BTP)
schemes, we first need to analyse the accuracy of such systems. To that end, the first research
works on biometrics [Atal, 1976; Kanade, 1973; Nagel and Rosenfeld, 1977] reported experimental
results using biometric data specifically acquired for the experiment at hand. In contrast to such
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practice, a fair comparison of different recognition strategies can be established using common
and publicly available benchmarks [Jain et al., 2011; Phillips et al., 2000a]. In this context, the
UK Biometrics Working Group has generated a set of best practices for testing and reporting
accuracy results of biometrics systems [Mansfield and Wayman, 2002], to which we adhere in
this PhD Thesis.
Among the three different levels defined by Phillips et al. [2000b] for accuracy analyses
(i.e., technology, scenario and operational), in this Thesis we focus on technology evaluations of
different systems working in the verification mode. The goal of a technology evaluation is to
compare several algorithms, thereby identifying the most promising recognition approaches and
tracking the state-of-the-art. Testing of all algorithms is carried out on a standardized database,
so that the tests are repeatable.
As described in Chapter 1, under the verification mode, the subject issues a positive claim
of identity (i.e., I am John Doe), and the system carries out a one-to-one comparison of the
submitted sample to the enrolled template for the claimed identity. Mansfield and Wayman
[2002] define two types of access attempts in the normal operation scenario of a verification
biometric system: i) biometric mated comparison trial, where a subject makes a truthful positive
claim about his own identity in the system (the probe sample matches the reference template),
and ii) biometric non-mated comparison trial, where a user makes a false positive claim about
another identity in the system (the probe sample does not match the reference template). Mated
trials are also referred to as client or genuine attempts, while non-mated trials are also known
as impostor or zero-effort attempts, and constitute the most basic form of attack to a biometric
system.
Considering these two different types of access attempts, biometric authentication can be
considered as a detection task, involving a trade-off between two types of errors [Mansfield and
Wayman, 2002]: i) False Non-Match (FNM), occurring when a user making a mated claim of
identity is rejected by the system, and ii) False Match (FM), taking place when a user making
an non-mated claim of identity is accepted into the system. In order to estimate the False
Non-Match Rate (FNMR) and False Match Rate (FMR) of a given system, a set of mated and
non-mated matching scores (resulting respectively from mated and non-mated trials) have to
be generated using the available biometric data. Several methods have been described in the
literature in order to maximize the use of the information embedded in the training samples
during a test including resubstitution, holdout, cross-validation, and variants of the jackknife
sampling using the leave-one-out principle [Jain et al., 2000; Theodoridis and Koutroumbas,
2008].
Although each type of error can be computed for a given decision threshold, a single accuracy
level is inadequate to represent the full capabilities of the system. Therefore the accuracy
capabilities of authentication systems have been traditionally shown in the form of FM and
FNM Rates versus the decision threshold. A commonly used graphical representation of the
capabilities of an authentication system, specially useful when comparing multiple systems, is
the ROC (Receiver -or also Relative- Operating Characteristic) plot, in which FM Rate (FMR)
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versus FNM Rate (FNMR) is depicted for variable decision threshold. A variant of the ROC
curve, the so-called DET (Detection Error Tradeoff) plot, is used in this Thesis [Martin et al.,
1997]. In this case, the use of a non-linear scale makes the comparison of competing systems
easier.
A specific point is attained when FMR and FNMR coincide, the so-called EER (Equal Error
Rate). The global EER of a system can be easily detected by the intersection between the DET
curve of the system and the diagonal line y = x. Nevertheless, and because of the discrete
nature of FMR and FNMR plots, EER calculation may be ambiguous according to the above-
mentioned definition, so an operational procedure for computing the EER must be followed. In
the present contribution, the procedure for computing the EER described by Maio et al. [2002b]
has been applied. Furthermore, in accordance with ISO/IEC IS 19795-1 [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37
Biometrics, 2006], FNMR for a specific FMR values are reported.
3.2. Security and Privacy Evaluation of Biometric Systems
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Sect. 1.2, in order to ensure the necessary privacy to the subjects,
the following issues regarding biometric systems should be taken into account:
Do the stored templates reveal any information about the original biometric samples? In
other words, are we able to reconstruct synthetic samples whose templates are similar
enough to those of the original subject?
Are my enrolled templates in different recognition systems somehow related to each other?
Can someone cross-match those templates and track my activities?
What if someone steals a template extracted from (for instance) my right index finger?
Won’t I be able to use that finger again to enrol into the system? Has it been permanently
compromised?
In accordance with the ISO/IEC IS 24745 on biometric information protection [ISO/IEC
JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011], to cope with these issues, protected and unprotected
biometric systems should comply with three main requirements:
Irreversibility of the templates, so that no biometric information can be derived from
the stored references.
Unlinkability of the templates, in order to prevent tracking subjects among different
applications for which the same biometric characteristic has been used for enrolment.
Additionally, in order to tackle with the last issue and provide templates’ revocability,
different templates should be generated from a single biometric instance of a given subject.
Accuracy of the system should be maintained with respect to the unprotected system, in
case a biometric template protection (BTP) algorithm is introduced.
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To assess whether those properties are met for a particular biometric system, a security and
privacy evaluation is carried out. In order to follow a systematic protocol, thereby ensuring
reproducibility and future comparisons with the state-of-the-art, such an evaluation comprises
seven steps:
1. Description of the biometric system that will be evaluated (the baseline unprotected bio-
metric systems used in the present Dissertation are described in Sect. 3.3).
2. Description of the database that will be used in the evaluation (the biometric databases
used in the present Dissertation are described in Sect. 3.4).
3. Description of the information about the system under evaluation required to be known
by the eventual attacker.
4. Description of the experimental protocol that will be followed in the accuracy, irreversibility
and unlinkability analyses that will be carried out in the next steps.
5. Execution of an accuracy analysis of the system being tested (see Sect. 3.2.3).
6. Execution of the irreversibility analysis of the templates (see Sect. 3.2.1).
7. Execution of the unlinkability analysis of the templates (see Sect. 3.2.2).
Each particular analysis (steps 5 to 7) is defined in the next sub-sections.
It should be noted that, if templates are reversible, they are also linkable, since unlinkability
is a stronger condition on the templates. If we are able to reconstruct the biometric sample
from the information stored in the templates, we will then be able to link those reconstructed
samples. On the other hand, even if we are not be able to extract enough information to recover
the biometric sample protected within the template, we still might be able to decide whether two
templates conceal the same identity. As a consequence, if templates fail to pass the irreversibility
analysis, there is no need to conduct the unlinkability analysis.
3.2.1. Irreversibility Analysis of Templates
In order to address the first privacy issue, that is, study whether templates reveal any
biometric information of the subject, the irreversibility of the templates is studied. The main
goal of this analysis is to evaluate the feasibility of reverting the feature extraction process that,
in principle, should conceal our biometric data. To that end, inverse biometrics attacks such
as the ones proposed in Chapter 4 will be carried out on unprotected biometric templates. As
explained in Chapter 2, the aim of these attacks is to reconstruct synthetic biometric samples
which are positively matched to the stored reference template by the system.
The analysis of unprotected templates will therefore comprise two consecutive steps:
Reconstruct synthetic samples for a particular instance, using an inverse biometrics method.
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Present those synthetic samples to the system, and evaluate the chances of deceiving it,
in terms of the Success Rate (SR) of the attack.
This way, for a given operating point of the system (see Sect. 3.1), the performance of the
attack is measured in terms of its Success Rate (SR), which is the expected probability that
the attack successfully reconstructs a given sample, thereby achieving the impersonation of a
subject. It is computed as the ratio between successful attacks (As) and the total number of
attacks carried out (AT ):
SR = As/AT × 100 (3.1)
This measure gives an estimation of how dangerous it is a particular attack for a given biometric
system: the higher the SR, the bigger the privacy threat. Or, in other words, the more reversible
the templates. Since in general the success of an attack is highly dependent on the FMR of the
system, the vulnerability of the system to the attacks with the reconstructed images should be
evaluated at different operating points. We propose the analysis at the points corresponding to
FMR = 0.1%, FMR = 0.05%, and FMR = 0.01%, which, according to [ANSI-NIST, 2001], cor-
respond to a low, medium and high security application, respectively. For completeness, systems
should be also tested at very high security operating points, for example those corresponding to
FMR  0.01%.
Regarding BTP schemes based on a transformation of the templates (such as those proposed
in Chapters 5 and 6), we may assume that such reverse engineering process is eventually possible
for any given unprotected template. Therefore, in order to analyse protected templates, we will
restrict to reversing the protection technique in order to reconstruct the original unprotected
references. In an analogous manner to the aforementioned analysis of unprotected templates, we
will try to access the baseline unprotected system with those reconstructed templates, reporting
the SR of such attempts or analysing the score distributions of real and reconstructed templates.
As a consequence, the steps to be followed in the analysis of protected templates are:
Starting from a protected template, try to reconstruct its corresponding unprotected tem-
plate, taking advantage of a known weakness in the protection algorithm.
Present those reconstructed unprotected templates to the system, and analyse the score
distributions yielded by real and reconstructed unprotected templates.
3.2.2. Unlinkability Analysis of Templates
In order to provide unlinkability, secret keys are commonly introduced into template protec-
tion schemes. The key space size |K| is thus required to be large enough such that brute force
attacks on the key space should at least be as hard as a false acceptance attack, i.e. |T| ≥ FMR−1
[Cavoukian and Stoianov, 2009], where FMR is the False Match Rate of the protected system.
As a consequence, in order to utilize the entire space of secret keys, a small distance between
two keys should cause a large distance between the resulting protected templates [Argones-Rua
et al., 2012; Ferrara et al., 2014].
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An additional threat can arise from linkage or cross-matching attacks, where an eventual
attacker is in possession of two protected templates C1 = PIE (B1,K1), and C
2 = PIE (B2,K2),
with K1 6= K2. His goal is to determine whether both protected templates, C1 and C2, conceal
the same biometric datum B (i.e., B1 = B2?), or different samples of biometric data extracted
from a the same biometric instance - e.g., the same right index finger.
To prevent such attacks, the dissimilarity score between those templates is required to be
higher than a certain decision threshold τ , used to take a final non-match verification decision:
s = PIC (C1,C2) > τ . Furthermore, given two biometric samples B1 and B2 obtained from
different biometric instances, and two different keys K1 and K2, the following equations to
compute the dissimilarity score s should hold:
s = PIC (C1,C2) > τ
C1 = PIE (B1,K1),C2 = PIE (B1,K2),C1 = PIE (B1,K1),C2 = PIE (B2,K1). (3.2)
As we will explain below, in order for Eq. 3.2 to hold, there has to be a specific overlap
between the inter-class distributions of non-mated comparisons using different keys and the
score distribution obtained by comparing identical biometric instances protected with different
keys [Ferrara et al., 2014].
To extend formality to the problem being addressed, some mathematical notations are in-
troduced in this section. Let us define the following hypothesis:
Hm = {both templates belong to mated instances} (3.3)
Hnm = {both templates belong to non-mated instances} (3.4)
Two types of score distributions will be analysed for the assessment of the unlinkability
provided by protected templates:
Mated instances: scores computed from templates extracted from different samples of a
single instance of the same subject using different keys. It represents the probabilities
p (s|Hm), where s is the dissimilarity score between two templates.
Non-mated instances: scores yielded by templates generated from samples of different
instances using different keys. It represents p (s|Hnm).
In this context, we assume that the attacker:
Is in possession of two protected templates C1 = PIE (B1,K1), and C
2 = PIE (B2,K2),
where K1 6= K2.
Can access the similarity score between them, s = PIC (C1,C2).
Knows the Mated instances and Non-mated instances distributions.
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Figure 3.1: Examples of Mated instances (green) and Non-mated instances (red) distibutions yielded by
(a) fully unlinkable, (b) semi-unlinkable, (c) semi-linkable, and (d) fully linkable templates. While the
blue curve represents the proposed unlinkability measure D↔ (s) for each possible score value, Dsys↔ gives
an estimation of the unlinkability level of the whole system independently of the score range. The dashed
black lines represent LR (s) = 1.
Traditionally, in order to compare the aforementioned distributions, the difference between
probability densities has been estimated in terms of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [Kull-
back and Leibler, 1951] between two discrete distributions, P and Q, which is defined as:
DKL (P ||Q) =
∑
i
P (i) ln
(
P (i)
Q(i)
)
(3.5)
where DKL ≥ 0, and DKL = 0 holds iff P ' Q, i.e. the smaller DKL, the higher the similarity
between distributions.
However, this measure is not appropriate due to three main reasons: i) it gives only an
overall measure of the unlinkability of the system, not being possible to measure the level of
unlinkability for different ranges of the similarity scores, ii) it is not bounded, thus making it
difficult to compare the unlinkability of different systems, and iii) it is not defined for Q(s) = 0
if P (s) 6= 0, hence not taking into account important ranges of scores, or not being at all defined
for fully separable distributions.
As a consequence, we need a new framework to evaluate the degree of unlinkability of such
scenarios. To that end, we propose two different measures: Dsys↔ and D↔ (s):
On the one hand, Dsys↔ ∈ [0, 1] gives an estimation of the linkability of a system as a whole,
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independently of the score. Accordingly, this metric is appropriate for example to compare
the unlinkability level of two systems as a whole. This way, if a system has Dsys↔ = 1 (i.e.,
case in which both the Mated instances and Non-mated instances distributions have no
overlap, as shown in Fig. 3.1d), it means that it is fully linkable in all its score range. That
is, if a cross-matching attack is carried out on the system between two protected templates
C1 and C2, independently of the score produced, the attacker can know (with almost all
certainty) if they conceal or not to same instance. Similarly, Dsys↔ = 0 (i.e., Fig. 3.1a,
where both score distributions totally overlap) means that the system is fully unlinkable
for the whole score range. That is, independently of the score produced in a cross-matching
attack, it is equally probable that the two templates come from the same instance (Hm)
than from different instances (Hnm). All intermediate values of D
sys↔ between 0 and 1
report a decreasing degree of unlinkability (i.e., increasing degree of linkability).
On the other hand, D↔ (s) ∈ [0, 1] gives an estimation of the linkability of a system for a
specific score. As such, this metric is appropriate to analyse within one system in which
parts of the score range it fails to provide unlinkability. This way, if for a specific score s0,
a system yields D↔ (s0) = 1, it means that, in case a cross-matching attack produced s0,
the attacker would be able to link both templates C1 and C2 to the same user with almost
all certainty. On the other hand, D↔ (s0) = 0 should be interpreted as full unlinkability for
that particular score. In other words, if s0 were produced in a cross-matching attack, the
probability that both templates came from the same instance or from different instances
would be the same. All intermediate values of D↔ (s) between 0 and 1 report a decreasing
degree of unlinkability (i.e., increasing degree of linkability).
It should be noted that both measures yield values in a closed range, in opposition to DKL,
in order to allow a more straightforward comparison of different schemes. Next, we describe how
both metrics, D↔ (s) and Dsys↔ , are computed. Furthermore, to illustrate the different levels of
unlinkability that templates can achieve, four different scenarios are shown in Fig. 3.1, where
the Mated instances distribution is depicted in green and the Non-mated instances distribution
in red, and the newly proposed D↔ (s) in blue:
A fully unlinkable scenario is shown in Fig. 3.1a, where both distributions are identical.
In this case, no decision can be made on whether, for a given score, the templates protect
the same identity.
A semi-unlinkable scenario is shown in Fig. 3.1b, where the Mated instances distribution
is enclosed within the Non-mated instances curve. As we may observe, for score values in
[0.79, 0.81] we can state with some certainty that both templates are more likely to belong
to the same instance. On the other hand, if the score is out of that range, the attacker
can assume that such templates belong to different instances with a higher probability.
Similarly, if he were able to compare a protected template with several references enrolled
in the system in order to find the template concealing the same identity, he could discard
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templates yielding scores out of the aforementioned range and hence reduce the domain
of his search.
A semi-linkable scenario is shown in Fig. 3.1c, where the Mated instances distribution
spans further than the Non-mated instances curve. More specifically, if the score is out
of the range [0.79, 0.81], the probability of both templates belonging to different instances
is almost zero. As a consequence, we can assume with almost all certainty that both
templates protect the same instance, thus making the templates linkable.
A fully-linkable scenario is shown in Fig. 3.1d, where the Mated instances and Non-mated
instances distributions are fully separable. Therefore, the attacker can make a decision
with almost all certainty for all scores.
3.2.2.1. Computation of D↔ (s) and Dsys↔
Inspired in the analysis of biometric forensic evidence [Gonzalez-Rodriguez et al., 2006;
Morrison, 2011], likelihood ratios can be used to give an estimation of those certainties or
unlinkability levels. For a given score s, LR (s) is defined as
LR (s) =
p (s|Hm)
p (s|Hnm) (3.6)
In particular, two different cases can be defined based on LR (s):
If LR (s) ≤ 1, we can state that it is more likely that both templates belong to non-mated
instances, thereby making the templates unlinkable for those score values. Therefore, we
will have D↔ (s) = 0.
Bear in mind that a system is considered to be linkable if it allows determining, with some
certainty, that two templates come from the same person. In the case of LR (s) ≤ 1, a
potential attacker knows, with some certainty, that both templates do not belong to the
same subject and therefore he cannot link them. That is why for those score values the
system is considered to be unlinkable, i.e., D↔ (s) = 0.
If LR (s) > 1, we can state that it is more likely that both templates belong to the same
instance, thereby making the templates somewhat linkable for those score values. In fact,
the higher LR (s), the more linkable the templates are. As a consequence, we will define
an increasing value D↔ (s) ∈ (0, 1], with higher values for more linkable templates (i.e.,
the higher LR (s), the closer D↔ (s) to 1).
Keeping those remarks in mind, we define D↔ (s) as a function of s and its corresponding
LR (s). Since LR (s) yields values in the range [0,∞), in order to obtain the desired measure
in the range [0, 1], we perform a two step normalisation, as depicted in Fig. 3.2. In the first
step (Fig. 3.2a), we normalise LR (s) − 1 to the range [0.5, 1] with a sigmoid function. Then,
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Figure 3.2: Two step normalisation followed to obtain the final unlinkability metric D↔ (s): (a) LR
values in [1,∞) are normalised to the range [0.5, 1] with a sigmoid function, and (b) the interval [0.5, 1]
is mapped to the interval [0, 1] to obtain the final D↔. The dashed black line represents the point at which
LR (s) = 1.
we subtract 0.5 and multiply by 2 to map that interval to [0, 1] (Fig. 3.2b). Therefore, we can
finally define D↔ (s) as
D↔ (s) =
0 if LR (s) ≤ 12 · ((1 + e−(LR(s)−1))−1 − 0.5) if LR (s) > 1 (3.7)
As it was previously described, it is also useful to have an estimation of the unlinkability
of the whole system (and not for every single score). For this purpose, we define Dsys↔ as the
partial area under the curve D↔ (s), normalised by p (s|Hm) in order to get values in [0, 1], and
computed on the whole score range (i.e., [smin, smax]):
Dsys↔ =
∫ smax
smin
D↔ (s) · p (s|Hm) ds (3.8)
This way, the final value of Dsys↔ depends on: i) the range of scores where the system is
linkable; ii) how linkable the system is in that range of scores; and iii) how probable it is that
such scores are produced.
Let us now evaluate the scenarios shown in Fig. 3.1 with the proposed measures:
For the fully unlinkable scenario shown in Fig. 3.1a, D↔ (s) = 0 for all scores, thus yielding
the desired value Dsys↔ = 0.
For the semi-unlinkable scenario shown in Fig. 3.1b, we may observe that D↔ (s) = 0 for
all scores where Hnm holds (i.e., s /∈ [0.79, 0.81]). Additionally, D↔ (s) reaches a maximum
of 0.2 for a score value of 0, where the LR is the highest (LR (0) ∼ 1.5) and we can thus
assume with the highest certainty that both templates conceal the same identity. Overall,
we obtain Dsys↔ = 0.14, reflecting the fact that only for a small range of scores we could
link templates.
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For the semi-linkable scenario shown in Fig. 3.1c, we observe that D↔ (s) = 1 for scores
out of [0.79, 0.81], where p (s|Hnm) = 0, and we can assume with almost all certainty that
the compared templates conceal the same instance. As a consequence, we obtain a higher
value for Dsys↔ = 0.32, with respect to the semi-unlinkable scenario.
For the fully linkable scenario shown in Fig. 3.1d, we observe that D↔ (s) = 1 where only
the Mated instances distribution is non-null (i.e., s ∈ [0.55, 0.65]), since templates are fully
linkable in such range. On the other hand, D↔ (s) = 0 in any other place. Therefore the
system as a whole is fully linkable, as it holds that Dsys↔ = 1, as desired.
Finally, it should be noted that such unlinkability analysis is not sufficient to ensure the cross-
matching resistance of protected templates, since the robustness against specifically designed
attacks has to be analysed as well [Simoens et al., 2012b]. To that end, the aforementioned
distributions will be estimated not only for the dissimilarity scores computed by the biometric
system, but also for other appropriate distance measures for the cross-matching attack at hand
(e.g., Hamming Distance, Hamming Weight difference), and analysed in the same manner.
3.2.3. Accuracy Analysis
As defined in Sect. 3.2.1, during irreversibility analyses of unprotected templates, defining the
operating points of the system will enable to compare, in a more fair manner, the vulnerabilities
of different systems to the same inverse biometrics attack (i.e., we can determine for a given
FMR or FNMR which of them is less/more robust to the attacking approach). To that end,
we need to evaluate the accuracy of the unprotected biometric system following the guidelines
established in Sect. 3.1:
Define which mated and non-mated comparison trials will be issued.
Compute the operating points at which the inverse biometrics attack will be carried out.
Secondly, in the case a BTP algorithm is integrated in the system, the first question to
analyse is the impact of the proposed improvements on the biometric accuracy of the baseline
unprotected system. Therefore, the accuracy of the baseline unprotected biometric system and
that of the proposed BTP are evaluated on the same standardized database, following a common
protocol. According to Sect. 3.1, the main parameters of each system should be reported,
namely: EER, FNMR at specific FMRs and DET curves. Only that way can we establish a fair
comparison between both scenarios (i.e., unprotected and protected) and evaluate the accuracy
degradation (if any). As a consequence, a three-step protocol will be followed:
Define a common accuracy analysis protocol for both scenarios: which mated and non-
mated comparison trials will be issued.
Analyse the accuracy of the baseline unprotected system.
Analyse the accuracy of the BTP system.
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Assess the accuracy degradation comparing the results of both analyses.
3.3. Biometric Verification Systems
As defined at the beginning of Sect. 3.2, the first step in the proposed methodology for the
security and privacy evaluation of biometric systems is to define the biometric systems used for
the accuracy, irreversibility and unlinkablity analyses. In this section, we present the unprotected
biometric systems analysed in Chapter 4 and then protected with Bloom filters in Chapter 5 and
with Homomorphic Encryption in Chapter 6. All systems are publicly available, well described
in the literature or commercial, in order to ensure reproducible research.
3.3.1. Hand Verification
In order to ensure unbiased results, and fully analyse the vulnerabilities of hand-based sys-
tems to the new inverse-biometric method proposed in Chapter 4, four different systems will be
evaluated. The first one is used for the development experiments, and the last three systems at
the validation stage.
3.3.1.1. Geometry-based system I
Ferrer and Morales [2011] compute geometric features of the hands (48 widths and 4 lengths
from the little, ring, middle and index fingers) by measuring the widths and lengths of each
finger. For verification, a least squares support vector machine (LS-SVM) is used to model each
hand [Suykens et al., 2002; Yen et al., 2013]. This system does not take into account any features
obtained from the thumb as, due to their high variability, it has been demonstrated that they
do not improve the accuracy of the geometry-based hand recognition systems [Duta, 2009].
3.3.1.2. Geometry-based system II
Burgues et al. [2009] take measures of the four fingers (excluding the thumb) lengths and
widths. Then, the Manhattan distance between hand feature vectors is used as dissimilarity
measure.
3.3.1.3. Appearance-based system
Yo¨ru¨k et al. [2006] propose a system which makes its decisions based on the whole hand
shape, including the thumb, considering independent component features (ICA2) and images
normalized after pose correction.
3.3.1.4. Silhouette-based system
Ferrer and Morales [2011] present a new method based on direct silhouette alignment of 50
equal spaced samples of the finger contour of the hands, excluding the thumb. The matching
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score is computed estimating the modified Hausdorff distance between the silhouettes of the
fingers of two hands after an alignment that includes translation and rotation with no shape
deformation.
3.3.2. Iris Verification
The vulnerabilities of iris templates, or iriscodes, to inverse biometrics methods are analysed
in Chapter 4, using two different systems in order to ensure unbiased results. Afterwards, in
Chapter 5, Bloom filter template protection is applied to iris verification.
3.3.2.1. LogGabor filter-based
This system is used in Chapter 4 for the development experiments. In this particular im-
plementation of Masek’s matcher [Masek and Kovesi, 2003]1, the different stages involved in iris
recognition are implemented following a classical approach: i) for segmentation, the method
proposed in [Ruiz-Albacete et al., 2008] is followed, modelling the iris and pupil boundaries as
circles; ii) for normalization, a technique based on Daugman’s rubber sheet model that maps the
segmented iris region into a 2D array is used [Daugman, 2004]; iii) feature encoding produces
a binary template of 20 × 480 = 9, 600 bits by filtering the normalized iris pattern with 1D
Log-Gabor wavelets and quantizing the filtered output to four levels (i.e., two bits) according to
[Daugman, 2004]; and iv) for matching, a modified Hamming distance that takes into account
the noise mask bits is used.
The particular implementation of this system within the publicly available University of
Salzburg Iris Toolkit v1.02 [Uhl and Wild, 2012], yielding a higher accuracy, is protected in
Chapter 5 with Bloom filters. In this case, the iris texture is divided into 10 stripes to obtain
5 one dimensional signals, each one averaged from the pixels of 5 adjacent rows. A row-wise
convolution with a complex Log-Gabor filter is then performed on the texture pixels. The
phase angle of the resulting complex value for each pixel is discretised into 2 bits, which are
subsequently used to generate a binary code comprising 20× 512 = 10, 240 bits.
3.3.2.2. VeriEye
For the validation experiments in Chapter 4, the VeriEye [Neurotechnology] commercial
matcher marketed by Neurotechnology3 is used to determine the matching potential of the
reconstructed iris images. The motivation for its selection is two-fold: i) it was ranked among
the top performing matchers in the NIST Iris Exchange (IREX) independent evaluation in 2009
[Grother et al., 2009], and, ii) being a commercial matcher it works as a black-box for the
subject, who has no knowledge of the algorithms used in any of the stages of the iris recognition
process (being a commercial system its implementation details are proprietary).
1www.csse.uwa.edu.au/pk/studentprojects/libor/sourcecode.html
2http://www.wavelab.at/sources/
3http://www.neurotechnology.com/verieye.html
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3.3.3. Face Verification
This system is protected in Chapter 5 with Bloom filters. It is an implementation of the
Local Gabor Binary Pattern Histogram Sequences (LGBPHS) algorithm [Zhang et al., 2005], a
state-of-the-art system robust to illumination changes. In a fair benchmark among four state-
of-the-art algorithms for face recognition established in [Gu¨nther et al., 2012], using the same
databases and protocols, LGBPHS achieved a top accuracy. Feature extraction is applied in
a block-wise manner, i.e. the facial image is divided into 80 non-overlapping sub-images, from
which spectral histograms are computed and concatenated to form the final template.
In the Dissertation, we have used the implementation within Bob1 [Anjos et al., 2012], a free
signal and image processing toolbox, which includes a library with implementations of several
face verification algorithms - the Facereclib [Gu¨nther et al., 2012]. Furthermore, out of the total
80 sub-images, we have considered only the central 32 sub-images for verification purposes.
3.3.4. Fingervein Verification
The unprotected biometric system proposed in [Raghavendra et al., 2014], which outper-
forms other fingervein verification systems in the state-of-the-art, is protected in Chapter 5 with
Bloom filters. In this particular approach, the Region of Interest (ROI) is segmented following
the method described in [Raghavendra et al., 2013]: images are rotated according to the angle
between the central axis [Huang et al., 2010] and the image reference axis, in order to obtain
alignment-free templates, and the ROI is extracted based on the detected fingertip point. Then,
ROI images are enhanced using adaptive histogram equalization [Zuiderveld, 1994] before apply-
ing the maximum curvature method presented in [Miura et al., 2007] to extract the connected
vein pattern. In the original approach, two successive steps were followed: the minutiae points
are determined based on convolution filters according to the algorithm described in [Olsen et al.,
2011] and finally, the real-valued Spectral Minutiae Representation (SMR) [Xu et al., 2009a] is
extracted. Then, as proposed in [Xu et al., 2009b], in order to reduce the dimensionality of the
template, column-PCA is applied to the SMR, and only the top 18 rows are retained. Finally,
the Hamming Distance is used to compute similarity scores.
3.3.5. Fingerprint Verification
3.3.5.1. Variable-Length Fingerprint Verification
This system, based on minutiae vicinities, is protected in Chapter 5 with Bloom filters. In
the first step, minutiae are extracted with the Neurotechnology VeriFinger SDK 6.0 2, and only
those minutiae in the neighbourhoods of the core points are considered. Binary templates of size
256×nVicinities are generated following the method proposed in [Yang et al., 2010], where each
column represents one minutiae vicinity [Yang and Busch, 2009], comprising a central minutia
1http://idiap.github.io/bob/
2http://www.neurotechnology.com/verifinger.html
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and its three closest neighbouring minutiae. From each vicinity, a 36 dimensional vector is
generated with the x and y coordinates, as well as the angle information, of all the possible
minutiae pairs within the vicinity. Finally, this vector is projected to a 36 × 16 = 576 binary
string, which is further downsized to an 256 binary vector. Templates are then compared in a
vicinity-wise way, minimizing the Hausdorff distance between corresponding vicinities.
3.3.5.2. Fixed-Length Fingerprint Verification
This system is protected in Chapter 6 with Homomorphic Encryption. In the FingerCode
scheme presented in [Jain et al., 1999], a region of interest is located and divided into 80 sectors.
These sectors are filtered with eight Gabor filters, and the final template comprises the standard
deviations of the grey values comprised by each sector for each filter. From the original 80×8 =
640 features, a subset of the best performing 100 has been selected with the method proposed
in [Maiorana et al., 2009]. Similarity scores are computed using the Euclidean distance, with no
specific pre-alignment between samples.
3.3.6. On-Line Signature Verification
Two different systems are protected in Chapter 6 with Homomorphic Encryption, the former
based on variable-length templates and the later on fixed-length templates.
3.3.6.1. Variable-Length Signature Verification
Martinez-Diaz et al. [2014] propose the use of a subset of F = 9 time sequences selected
using the Sequential Forward Floating Selection (SFFS) algorithm from the total set of functions
defined in [Martinez-Diaz et al., 2014]. Those time sequences, which include, for instance, the
horizontal and vertical coordinates, the speed or the pressure, are directly compared using DTW
[Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005].
In particular, in order to obtain a dissimilarity score between the probe and the reference
templates, a cost matrix is computed, minimizing the distance between signature points in terms
of their Euclidean distance. To reduce complexity, only three directions are considered at each
step. The final dissimilarity score is the last cell of the matrix.
For a more detailed description of the use of DTW for on-line signature verification the
interested reader is referred to [Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005; Martinez-Diaz et al., 2014].
3.3.6.2. Fixed-Length Signature Verification
In this system, signatures are parametrized using the set of features described in [Martinez-
Diaz et al., 2014], which include information such as the total duration of the signature, the
number of pen-ups or the average speed. In that work, a set of 100 global features was proposed,
and the individual features were ranked according to their individual discriminant power. A good
operating point for the systems tested was found when using the first 40 parameters. In the
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present contribution we use this 40-feature representation of the signatures, normalizing each of
them to the range [0,1] using the tanh-estimators described in [Jain et al., 2005].
The similarity scores are computed using the Mahalanobis distance between the input vector
and a statistical model of the attacked client, using a number of enrolment signatures (4 or 5 in
our experiments).
3.4. Biometric Databases
As defined at the beginning of Sect. 3.2, the second step in the proposed methodology for
the security and privacy evaluation of biometric systems is to define the databases used for
the accuracy, irreversibility and unlinkablity analyses. In this section, we present the biometric
databases used in the experiments in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. References to the evaluations where
they have been used are also included. All databases are publicly available in order to ensure
reproducible research.
3.4.1. Hand Biometric Databases
In Chapter 4, the security and privacy of hand-based templates is analysed. To that end,
several databases are used to ensure unbiased results.
3.4.1.1. GPDS Hand Database
The first set of images reconstructed in Sect. 4.2.1 come from the GPDS1 dataset [Ferrer
et al., 2007], which comprises 144 subjects with 10 images per subject (only right hand of each
subject, 144 × 10 = 1, 440 hand images). All of them were acquired in one session with a
commercial digital scanner of 150 dpi at the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, placing
the right hand flat on the glass platen.
3.4.1.2. GPDS2 Hand Database
In order to train the required parameters, in Sect. 4.2.1 the GPDS2 database [Morales et al.,
2012] is used. It comprises one sample of the right hand of 100 subjects (100 hand images),
captured with a 60 dpi commercial scanner in one session. It should be noted that with such
resolution (60 dpi) the hand shape is not very accurately defined.
3.4.1.3. UST Hand Database
The second database used in the validation experiments in Sect 4.2.1 is the UST database
[The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Department of Computer Science]. It
comprises 564 instances (right and left hands belonging to the same person are regarded as
different identities) with 10 images per instance (564 × 10 = 5640 hand images). Images were
1http://www.gpds.ulpgc.es/download/index.htm
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captured using a CCD camera (1280× 960 pixels) by the Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology. The final version of this database has not been published yet and includes a small
number of duplicates.
3.4.2. XM2VTS Face Database
In Chapter 5, the Bloom Filter based template protection scheme proposed in the present
Dissertation is applied to face data. The experimental evaluation for this particular case study
is run on the Extended M2VTS multimodal face Database1 [Messer et al., 1999]. For the
experiments, a subset of the entire videos, captured with a Sony VX1000E digital cam-corder
and DHR1000UX digital VCRF, comprising four frontal images from each of the 295 subjects
was selected (295× 4 = 1, 180 face images).
3.4.3. IITD Iris Database
In Chapter 5, the Bloom Filter based template protection scheme is applied to iris data.
The widely used IIT Delhi Iris Database version 1.02 [Kumar and Passi, 2010] is used for the
accuracy analysis. It comprises five NIR images from 224 different subjects, captured with a
JIRIS JPC1000 digital CMOS camera (224× 5 = 1120 iris images).
3.4.4. FVC2002 Fingerprint Database
In Chapter 5, the Bloom Filter based template protection scheme is applied to fingerprint
data. The DB2A subset of FVC 20023 [Maio et al., 2002a] is used for the accuracy analysis.
This subset includes eight samples of 100 fingers (100× 8 = 800 fingerprint samples), acquired
with the Biometrika FX2000 optical sensor.
3.4.5. Fingervein Biometric Databases
In Chapter 5, the Bloom Filter based template protection scheme is applied to fingervein
data. Two different databases are used for the development experiments and the final analysis.
3.4.5.1. UTFVP Fingervein Database
For fingervein, development experiments are performed on the UTFVP database4 [Ton and
Veldhuis, 2013], which was captured with a specific device designed at the University of Twente.
The database comprises data from 60 different subjects, from whom the vascular pattern of the
index, ring and middle finger of both hands was collected twice at each of the two acquisition
sessions (60× 6× 4 = 1, 440 fingervein samples).
1http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CVSSP/xm2vtsdb/
2http://www4.comp.polyu.edu.hk/~csajaykr/IITD/Database_Iris.htm
3http://bias.csr.unibo.it/fvc2002/databases.asp
4http://www.sas.el.utwente.nl/home/datasets
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3.4.5.2. SDUMLA-HMT Fingervein Subset
The SDMULA-HMT multimodal database1 [Yin et al., 2011], used in the accuracy analysis,
comprises fingervein, gait, iris and fingerprint data from 106 subjects. The fingervein subset was
acquired with a device designed at the Wuhan University, capturing six images of each subject’s
index, middle and ring fingers of both hands. Therefore, the database comprises a total number
of 106× 6× 6 = 3, 816 fingervein samples, belonging to 106× 6 = 636 different identities.
3.4.6. Multimodal Biometric Databases
Two different multimodal databases have been used in Chapters 4, 5 and Chapter 6.
3.4.6.1. Biosecure Multimodal Biometric Database
The Desktop Dataset of the Multimodal Biosecure database2 [Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010]
comprises voice, fingerprints, face, iris, signature and hand samples of 210 subjects, captured
in two timespaced acquisition sessions. The face subset includes four frontal images (two per
session) with an homogeneous grey background, captured with a reflex digital camera without
flash (210×4 = 840 face samples). Eyes were automatically annotated using VeriLook SDK 4.0,
developed by Neurotechnology3. The iris subset includes four samples (two per session) acquired
with the LG Iris Access EOU3000 infrared sensor (210 × 4 = 840 iris samples). Finally, four
fingerprint samples (two per session) of the thumb, index and middle fingers of each hand were
captured with the Biometrika FX2000 optical sensor (210×3×2×4 = 5, 040 fingerprint samples,
belonging to 210× 3 × 2 = 1, 260 different identities). These subsets are used in Chapter 5 for
the development experiments.
Additionally, in Chapter 4, irides were reconstructed.
3.4.6.2. BiosecurID Multimodal Biometric Database
Very few multimodal databases including on-line signature data are available. Among them,
BiosecurID DB [Fierrez et al., 2009] is one of the most recently acquired, comprising fingerprint,
signature, face, hand, iris and speech data belonging to 400 subjects. All samples were acquired
in four time-spanned sessions at six different sites in an office-like uncontrolled environment
simulating a realistic scenario.
For the on-line signature subset, four genuine signatures were captured in each session with
the Wacom Intuos3 A4 Inking Pen Tablet, thus yielding 400×4×4 = 6, 400 genuine signatures.
The fingerprint subset comprises data of four fingers per subject, captured with a thermal and
an optical sensor (Biometrika FX2000). For the present study, only the right index acquired
with the optical sensor has been considered, therefore having 400 × 4 × 4 = 6, 400 fingerprint
samples. These subsets are protected in Chapter 6 with Homomorphic Encryption.
1http://mla.sdu.edu.cn/sdumla-hmt.html
2http://biosecure.it-sudparis.eu/AB
3http://www.neurotechnology.com/verilook.html
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3.5. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have outlined some best practices for accuracy analysis in biometric
authentication. We have also provided a description of the security and privacy evaluation
protocol followed in this Thesis to assess both unprotected and protected biometric systems,
which can serve as guideline to carry out systematic and replicable security and privacy studies.
Finally we have described the databases and unprotected biometric systems used in this Thesis.
This chapter includes novel contributions in:
Proposal of a systematic protocol for security and privacy evaluation of unprotected and
protected biometric templates, in order to assess whether BTP schemes fulfil the require-
ments established in the ISO/IEC IS 24745 on biometric information protection [ISO/IEC
JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011].
New framework for the unlinkability analysis of biometric templates.
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Chapter 4
Inverse Biometrics Attacks to
Unprotected Biometric Templates
In this Chapter, we propose two new inverse biometrics methods based on optimization algo-
rithms to analyse the security and privacy offered by unprotected biometric systems, according
to the protocol described in Chapter 3, Sect. 3.2. In particular, the irreversibility of unprotected
templates will be analysed with the aforementioned methods. Their aim is to reconstruct a set of
biometric samples from the information stored in the unprotected template. The reconstructed
samples, due to the probabilistic nature of the optimization algorithms, will be different to
each other. However, all of them will positively match the reference template, thereby posing a
threat to the subject’s privacy. Such threat is analysed launching attacks to different biometric
systems.
Two different methods are proposed:
Novel inverse biometric algorithm for the reconstruction of handshape samples, based on a
combination of a handshape images generator and the uphill simplex integer optimization
algorithm.
Novel inverse biometric algorithm for the reconstruction of iris samples, based on a genetic
algorithm for the optimization of real valued matrices.
The chapter is structured as follows. Sect. 4.1 estates the problem to be solved with the
aforementioned inverse biometric methods, which are described in detail in Sects. 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
The privacy threat posed by those schemes is evaluated in Sect. 4.2 following a common protocol,
and results for each case study are given in Sect. 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively. Finally, Sect. 4.3
summarises and concludes the chapter.
This chapter is based on the publications: [Galbally et al., 2013; Gomez-Barrero et al., 2014b,
2012a].
We will use the following notation throughout the chapter:
I: real biometric image that we want to reconstruct.
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T: unprotected template extracted from a real biometric image and stored in the database.
IR: reconstructed synthetic image.
TR: template associated to IR.
F: function that extracts an unprotected template, given a biometric sample, i.e., T =
F(I).
J: function that computes the similarity score between two templates, i.e., J(T1,T2).
V: function that computes the similarity score between the reference template and the
reconstructed image, i.e., V(T, IR) = J(T,F(IR)) = J(T,TR).
4.1. Inverse Biometrics Based on Optimization Algorithms
According to the security and privacy evaluation methodology presented in Chapter 3,
Sect. 3.2, one of the key steps in the evaluation is the irreversibility analysis of the templates. To
perform such assessment, in this section we present two new methodologies for the reconstruc-
tion of biometric samples. In addition to the description of the systems and databases used in
the evaluation, the aforementioned protocol requires the definition of: i) the assumed knowledge
for the attacker and ii) the experimental protocol (i.e., problem or challenge to be solved and
algorithms to solve it). We will do so in the following.
Problem statement. Consider the problem of finding an IR matrix such that, its associated
TR = F(IR) matrix (unknown), produces a similarity score (s) greater than a certain threshold
δ, when it is compared to a known binary matrix T according to some unknown matching
function J, i.e., J(T,TR) > δ. For clarity, we will define a new function V as: s = V(T, IR) =
J(T,F (TR)).
Assumed Knowledge. Let us assume that we have access to the evaluation of the function
V(T, IR) for several trials of IR.
Algorithm. In the next subsections, we will propose two different algorithms for the recon-
struction of hand shape (Sect. 4.2.1) and iris samples or images (Sect. 4.2.2).
The reconstruction methods proposed share some characteristics:
Due to the probabilistic nature of the optimization algorithms (either the uphill simplex
initialization - step 2: random sampling of the statistical model G - or the four rules applied
by the genetic algorithm), the methods produce different solutions at each execution. This
permits the reconstruction of more than one sample (IR) with very similar templates (TR)
to the target (T).
Furthermore, the algorithms do not require any information about:
• The mapping function F between the reconstructed biometric samples (IR) and their
corresponding templates (TR).
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Figure 4.1: General diagram of the hand shape reconstruction method. A detailed diagram of
the reconstruction approach is given in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3, where points A, B and C show, respectively,
the input and output of the algorithms.
• The matching function J.
• The function V, only needing access to its outcome for given inputs.
4.1.1. Attacking Handshape Templates: Inverse Biometrics Based on the
Uphill Simplex Algorithm
In the case of biometric systems based on handshape, the problem stated above may be solved
combining the hill-climbing approach based on the Uphill Simplex algorithm first presented in
[Gomez-Barrero et al., 2011] to optimize the input of a generator of hand shape images, according
to the general diagram presented in Fig. 4.1.
Handshape generator . The generator used to obtain the matrices IR (hand shape images)
that will be compared with the reference template target, T, is based on the Active Shape Model
approach [Cootes et al., 2001, 1995]. A general diagram of the generator is shown in Fig. 4.2.
The first step is to train the ASM model using the aligned hand contours from the development
set. The process of aligning the contours can be divided in four stages: i) for each hand image,
we automatically locate 14 landmarks (see crosses in Fig. 4.2) using the methodology proposed
in [Ferrer and Morales, 2011]; ii) the contours are aligned by placing the hand geometric center
as the coordinate origin, and rotating the hand contour by an angle equal to the slope of the
line between the 1st and 3rd finger-web: this allows to reduce the effects of translation and
rotation; iii) the envelope line between landmarks is sampled with a number of points equal to
the average envelope length in the development set divided by five; iv) finally, the hand contour
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Figure 4.2: General diagram of the hand shape generator used in the hand shape reconstruction
method, with a zoom on the hand landmarks and contour. Points B and C (input and output of the hand
shape generator respectively) may be seen for reference in Fig. 4.1.
is represented as a 2n element vector composed by the coordinates (x and y) of n = 630 selected
contour points.
As we enforce a common number of points between landmarks, the alignment in the posi-
tioning of landmarks inside the sampled vector is ensured for all the contours.
Let x¯ be the hand mean contour obtained as x¯ = 1100
∑100
i=1 xi, being xi ∈ R2n×1 the vector
that represents the contour of the i-th development subject. Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) is applied to determine the k main directions of variation of the development set. A
reconstructed hand-contour can be then generated as:
IcR = x¯+ Py (4.1)
where P ∈ R2n×k is the projection matrix, whose columns are the eigenvectors of the covariance
matrix, and y = [y0, . . . , yk−1] is the vector of parameters defining the handshape contour,
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Figure 4.3: Diagram of the probabilistic method proposed in the present work for the reconstruction
of hand shape images from their stored templates. Points A and B (input and output of the optimization
algorithm respectively) may be seen for reference in Fig. 4.1.
which will be optimized by the Uphill Simplex (see below). Using that contour vector IcR, the
reconstructed binary handshape, IR, is obtained ensuring the continuity of the contour points
by linear interpolation and applying a flood-fill operation on background pixels of the binary
contour image generated with IcR.
Uphill Simplex . In order to optimize the input of the hand shape generator, as depicted
in Fig. 4.1, the proposed reconstruction approach uses the Uphill Simplex algorithm [Gomez-
Barrero et al., 2011]. Let us consider a simplex, that is, a polygon defined by k+1 points yi in the
k-dimensional space, obtained from randomly sampling a statistical model G (computed from
a development pool of subjects). Each of these yi k-dimensional points (with i = 1, . . . , k + 1)
is transformed into a hand shape image IR using the hand shape generator (see Fig. 4.2 and
Eq. 4.1). We iteratively form new simplices by reflecting one point, yl, in the hyperplane of
the remaining points, in order to increase at each iteration the value of the mapping function
V(IR,T). The point to be reflected will always be the one with the lowest score s, since it is, in
principle, the one furthest from our objective (see Fig. 4.3). The algorithm stops when one of
the IR
i images produces a score higher than the threshold δ.
In particular, the different steps followed by the reconstruction algorithm are:
1. Compute empirically the statistical model G from a development pool of subjects.
2. Take randomly k + 1 samples (yi, with i = 1, . . . , k + 1) from the statistical model G,
hence defining the initial simplex, and generate the corresponding matrices IR
i, using the
hand shape generator (see Fig. 4.2, Eq. 4.1).
3. Compute the similarity scores V(T, IR
i) = si.
4. Compute the centroid y¯ of the simplex as the average of yi.
5. Reflect the point yl according to the next steps (see Fig. 4.3), where the indices l and h
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are defined as:
h = arg max
i
(si) l = arg min
i
(si)
a) Reflection: Given a constant α > 0, the reflection coefficient, we compute:
ya = (1 + α)y¯ − αyl.
Thus, ya is on the line between yl and y¯, being α the ratio between the distances
[yay¯] and [yly¯].
Then generate IR
a and compute sa = V(T, IR
a). If sl < sa < sh we replace yl by
ya. Otherwise, we go to step 5b.
b) Expansion or contraction.
1) Expansion: If sa > sh (i.e., we have a new maximum) we expand ya to yb as
follows:
yb = γya + (1− γ)y¯,
where γ > 1 is another constant called expansion coefficient, which represents
the ratio between the distances [yby¯] and [yay¯].
Then generate IR
b and compute sb = V(T, IR
b). If sb > sh, we replace yl by yb.
Otherwise, we have a failed expansion and replace yl by ya.
2) Contraction: If we have reached this step, then sa ≤ sl (i.e. replacing yl by ya
would leave sa as the new minimum). Afterwards we compute
yb = βyl + (1− β)y¯,
where 0 < β < 1 is the contraction coefficient, defined as the ratio between the
distances [yby¯] and [yly¯].
Then generate IR
b and compute sb = V(T, IR
b). If sb > max(sl, sa), then we
replace yl by yb; otherwise, the contracted point is worse than yl, and for such
a failed contraction we replace all the yi’s by (yi + yh)/2.
6. With the new yl value, update the simplex and return to step 4.
Stopping criteria. The hill climbing algorithm stops when sh ≥ δ (i.e., the image has
been successfully reconstructed) or when the maximum number of iterations is reached (i.e., the
reconstruction has failed).
Rationale behind the algorithm. As stated in [Mathews and Fink, 2004], when we move
from the worst vertex (yl) towards any of the other vertices, the function value s increases.
Hence, assuming a continuous fitness function V with a relatively smooth surface following a
general commanding gradient (which is the usual case for unprotected biometric systems), it is
feasible that a point ya lying on the line [y¯yl] on the opposite side of yl with respect to the
hyperplane defined by the other k points (i.e., outside the simplex) achieves higher values of
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V. If the function value sa is higher than the value of all vertices, then we have most likely
moved in the correct direction, and the maximum may lie ahead. This is the case in step 5.b.1,
when the point is further expanded in the same direction. On the other hand, if the new point
ya results in a new minimum (i.e., its function value sa is lower than in any other vertex),
the maximum is probably close to yl. Therefore, the simplex is contracted by finding a new
point in the [yly¯] line inside rather than outside the simplex, as in case 5.b.2. If this new point
achieves no improvement over yl, the only remaining option is contracting the whole simplex:
the maximum probably lies inside the simplex. For clarity, all these scenarios are depicted in
Fig. 4.3 for the two dimensional case, where the simplex is a triangle.
Additional note. It has to be emphasized that the Uphill Simplex is not used to optimize
the templates T deployed by the development recognition system, but the vectors y needed by
the hand shape generator (which do not coincide with T, see Eq. 4.1). This way, the proposed
approach is general as it can be used to reconstruct the handshape images independently of the
template T (e.g., size, format, information stored, ...) used by the system. Furthermore, due to
the random initialization of the optimization algorithm (step 2), different synthetic samples can
be reconstructed from a single template.
Lastly, it should be born in mind that a development pool of subjects is necessary to deter-
mine the initialization parameters of the hand shape generator and the Uphill Simplex, namely:
i) the dimensionality (k) of the vector y, ii) the PCA matrix P , iii) the mean x¯ of the develop-
ment set of hand shape images, and iv) the statistical model G for the Uphill Simplex.
4.1.2. Attacking Iris Binary Templates: Inverse Biometrics Based on a Ge-
netic Algorithm
In the context of iris-based recognition systems, the problem stated in Sect. 4.1 can be
solved using a probabilistic approach based on a real-valued genetic algorithm. As mentioned in
Chapter 2, in the context of iris recognition a very recent study has been the first to address the
problem of generating iris images from binary iriscodes [Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011]. In
that work, the authors take advantage of the prior knowledge of the feature extraction scheme
used by the recognition system (i.e., functions defining the filters used during feature extraction)
in order to reverse engineer the iriscode. Then, real images are used to impart a more realistic
appearance to the synthetic iris patterns generated.
The differences between the deterministic technique described in [Venugopalan and Savvides,
2011] and the probabilistic method proposed in this Dissertation will be pointed out throughout
the section. However, the most important differences are as follows:
Type of approach. In [Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011], given an iriscode and a fixed
set of parameter values, the resulting reconstructed synthetic pattern is always the same
(i.e., deterministic approach). Our methodology allows the reconstruction of potentially
a large number of synthetic iris patterns with very similar iriscodes (i.e., probabilistic
approach). As will be shown in the experimental analysis (Sect. 4.2.2), having more than
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Figure 4.4: General diagram of the binary templates reconstruction method. A detailed
diagram of the reconstruction approach (dashed rectangle) is given in Fig. 4.5, where points A and B
show, respectively, the input and output of the algorithm.
one synthetic iris significantly increases the chances of a positive match to the genuine
samples.
Knowledge required. The method proposed in [Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011] re-
quires knowledge of the feature extraction scheme being used by the recognition system.
On the contrary, our technique only requires the output score of an iris matcher to re-
construct the image and does not need any prior information about how the recognition
system obtains that score.
Images required. In order to generate somewhat realistic iris-like patterns, the algorithm
described in [Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011] relies on information from real iris images.
No real iris images are needed in the present study to obtain realistic-looking synthetic
images.
Experimental protocol. Although consistent, the experimental protocol followed in
[Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011] does not allow for the comparison of its results with
other methods, as the iris matchers used for development and validation are proprietary
implementations and not publicly available. In the present chapter, the experimental
protocol has been designed to be fully reproducible so that an objective comparison may
be carried out with other reconstruction approaches proposed in the future.
Taking those considerations into account, the problem stated in Sect. 4.1 may be solved using
a genetic algorithm to optimize the similarity score given by the system, according to the general
diagram shown in Fig. 4.4. Genetic algorithms, which have shown remarkable performance in
optimization problems [Goldberg, 1989], are randomized hill-climbing beam search methods that
iteratively apply certain rules inspired by biological evolution to a population of individuals
(possible solutions) according to a given fitness function. During each iteration the algorithm
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Figure 4.5: Diagram of the probabilistic method proposed in the present chapter for the reconstruc-
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moves towards better solutions in terms of the fitness function which has to be optimized. In
our particular problem, the following observations ought to be made.
The fitness value associated with each individual (normalized iris image) is the matching
score, s = V(T, IR).
Usually genetic algorithms operate with individuals that are binary vectors. In this prob-
lem, the genetic algorithm has been modified to work with matrices of real values (i.e.,
IR) where each of the H × L blocks represents a gene of the individual.
Consider a R×C dimensional matrix IR of real values, which is divided into H×L square
blocks of dimension R/H×C/L, with H ≤ R and L ≤ C. This matrix is mapped by some
unknown function F to a binary matrix TR (i.e., TR = F(IR)) of dimensions K ×W (K
is a multiple of R and W is a multiple of C).
Keeping those observations in mind, the steps followed by the reconstruction algorithm are
(see Fig. 4.5):
1. Generate an initial population P0 with k individuals of size R×C (i.e., dimensions of the
normalized iris images), and tessellate each individual into H × L rectangular blocks.
2. Compute the similarity scores si of the individuals (IR
i) of the population P0, s
i =
V(T, IR
i), with i = 1, . . . , N .
3. Four rules are used at each iteration to create the next generation Pn of individuals from
the current population:
a) Elite: The two individuals with the maximum similarity scores are retained unaltered
for the next generation.
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b) Selection: Certain individuals, the parents, are chosen by stochastic universal sam-
pling [Baker, 1987]. Therefore, the individuals with the highest fitness values (sim-
ilarity scores) are more likely to be selected as parents for the next generation: one
subject can be selected 0 or many times. From the original N individuals, only N −2
are eligible (as the best two are retained as elite) from which N/2 − 1 fathers and
N/2− 1 mothers are chosen.
c) Crossover: Parents are combined to form N − 2 children for the next generation by
employing a scattered crossover method: a random binary matrix of size H × L is
created and the genes (blocks) for the first child are selected from the first parent if
the value of an entry is 1, and from the second when it is 0 (vice-versa for the second
child).
d) Mutation: Random changes are applied to the blocks of the new children with a
mutation probability pm. When a certain block is selected for mutation, the equivalent
block in the individual of the population with the highest fitness value is changed.
4. Redefine P0 = Pn and return to step 2.
Stopping criteria. The algorithm stops when: i) the best fitness score of the individuals
in the population is higher than the threshold δ (i.e., the image has been successfully recon-
structed), ii) the variation of the similarity scores obtained in successive generations is lower
than a previously fixed value, or iii) when the maximum number of generations (iterations) is
exceeded.
Rationale behind the algorithm. A genetic search algorithm was used in this section,
since the nature of the search space is unknown to us. Specifically, it is not clear if the objective
function results in a smooth or even a continuous search space. Consequently, classical stochastic
gradient descent methods could not be used. Although the previous work in [Rathgeb and Uhl,
2010b] partially supports the assumption of smoothness/continuity, this could not be easily
substantiated in our case. Therefore, by simultaneously searching for multiple solutions in the
solution space, genetic algorithms are more likely to avoid potential minima or even plateaus in
the search space (much like simulated annealing schemes).
Additional note. In addition to the important characteristics of the reconstruction method
presented at the beginning of this section, which differentiate it from other previously published
iris reconstruction techniques [Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011], one more fact should be high-
lighted: no real iris images are involved in the reconstruction process. As will be explained in
Sect. 4.2.2, the initial population P0 is taken from a database of fully synthetic iris images.
4.2. Experimental Evaluation
In this experimental section, we will use the algorithms proposed in Sect. 4.1 to analyse the
irreversibility of unprotected templates, as part of the security and privacy evaluation method-
ology defined in Chapter 3. To that end, the experimental framework has been designed not
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Figure 4.6: Two-stage experimental protocol followed in the experimental evaluation: i) in the devel-
opment stage, the reconstructed database is generated, and ii) in the validation stage, the privacy threat
posed by the reconstructed samples is evaluated launching attacks. In order to obtain unbiased results, dif-
ferent biometric systems are used at each stage (i.e., development and validation). Finally, real databases
are depicted in blue, and synthetic databases in red.
only to avoid biased results, but also to estimate the degree of compliance of the proposed
reconstruction approaches with the next main objectives:
Determine the feasibility of recovering a biometric sample from its template.
Evaluate to what extent the reconstructed samples are able to compromise the security
and privacy granted by biometric recognition systems.
Determine whether it is possible to generate different synthetic reconstructed samples from
one given template.
Keeping those goals in mind, a two-step protocol is proposed, divided into a development
and a validation stage, as depicted in Fig. 4.6:
Development. The purpose of this stage is twofold: i) on the one hand, train any module
if necessary; ii) on the other hand, generate the synthetically reconstructed datasets that
will be used in the validation stage.
Validation. The objective of this stage is to validate the proposed reconstruction scheme
and to estimate its performance. For this purpose, the synthetically reconstructed samples
generated in the development stage are presented to a different biometric system to deter-
mine if they are positively matched to the genuine original images, which would mean that
the reconstruction approach is successful and, as a consequence, templates are reversible.
In particular, three different types of attacks are carried out, reporting the Success Rates
(SR) for each case, as defined in Sect. 3.2. If the reported SRs are high, we can conclude
that traditional or unprotected biometric systems do not grant the necessary privacy to
the subjects.
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The key factors to compute the SR are to define: i) what constitutes an attack, and ii) when
an attack is considered to be successful. For the present analysis of the unprotected templates
irreversibility, three representative attacks will be taken into account in order to estimate the
performance of the proposed reconstruction methods:
1. Attack 1: 1 reconstructed image vs 1 real image. In this case the attack is carried out
on a 1-on-1 basis. That is, one reconstructed image is compared to one real image and,
if the resulting score exceeds the fixed verification threshold, the attack is deemed to be
successful. Two possible scenarios may be distinguished in this case, depending on the
real image being attacked:
a) Attack 1a. The real image being attacked is the original sample from which the
synthetic image was reconstructed.
b) Attack 1b. The real image being attacked is one of the other samples of the same
subject present in the real database.
2. Attack 2: N reconstructed images vs 1 real image. In this case all N reconstructed images
are compared to the real sample. The attack is successful if at least one of the synthetic
images positively matches the real template. This represents the most likely attack scenario
analysed in other related vulnerability studies [Cappelli et al., 2007], where the template
of a legitimate subject in the database is compromised and the intruder reconstructs
multiple images to try and break the system. The attacker will gain access if any one of
the reconstructed images results in a positive score.
The same two scenarios as in attack 1 can be considered here:
a) Attack 2a. The real image being attacked is the original sample from which the
synthetic images were reconstructed.
b) Attack 2b. The real image being attacked is one of the other samples of the same
subject present in the real database.
3. Attack 3: N reconstructed images vs average (M real images). It is a common practice
in many biometric recognition systems to compare the probe sample to several stored
templates and return the average score. To emulate this scenario, each reconstructed
image is compared to the M samples of the real subject available in the database. The
attack is successful if the average score due to the comparison of any of the N reconstructed
images is higher than the given verification threshold.
For the development and validation stages, different unprotected systems and databases
(described respectively in Sects. 3.3 and 3.4) have been used in order to avoid biased results. All
of them are either publicly available, commercial or well described in the literature so that the
experiments are fully reproducible and the results here presented may be compared with future
similar works.
70
4.2 Experimental Evaluation
Two additional facts should be also noted: i) while the real databases used for the experi-
ments are depicted in blue in Fig. 4.6, synthetic databases are highlighted in red, and ii) several
systems will be tested on the validation experiments (see Figs. 4.7 and 4.10 for more details on
the databases and systems used in each case study).
4.2.1. Irreversibility Evaluation of Handshape-Based Verification Systems
As mentioned in Sect. 4.1.1, and depicted in Fig. 4.7, before reconstructing the images, we
need to complete the training of the hand synthesizer and fix the initialization parameters (k,
P , G and x¯) of the reconstruction algorithm. As a consequence, three different databases are
used in the experiments:
First, images from the GPDS2 DB [Morales et al., 2012], described in Sect. 3.4.1.2, are
used for training.
Once the hand shape generator has been trained, it is combined with the Uphill Simplex
algorithm as described in Sect. 4.1.1 to reconstruct the hand images from two real databases,
acquired with different devices and conditions:
The GPDS DB [Ferrer et al., 2007], described in Sect. 3.4.1.1.
The UST DB [The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Department of
Computer Science], described in Sect. 3.4.1.2.
This leads to the generation of two synthetic databases: S-GPDS DB and S-UST DB, respec-
tively.
It is important to notice that, while the images used to train the hand generator and to
compute the initialization parameters are taken from the GPDS2 database [Morales et al., 2012],
the real hand shape samples to be reconstructed are taken from the GPDS [Ferrer et al., 2007]
and the UST [The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Department of Computer
Science] databases. As a consequence, the images used to train the generator are independent
and belong to completely different subjects than those being reconstructed, hence preventing
optimistically biased validation results.
Additionally, the capturing devices used in the acquisition of the two real databases to be
reconstructed are completely different: the GPDS DB was captured using a digital scanner and
the UST DB using a CCD camera. Thus, while hands are placed on a glass platen in the first
case, leading to a certain distortion on the acquired image, hands belonging to the UST DB
are captured using a contactless protocol so that no distortion is produced. This way we will
be able to determine to what extent the proposed reconstruction approach is able to generate
samples acquired under totally different conditions.
Regarding the unprotected systems used, in the development step, a single system is used
to reconstruct the hand images:
Development geometry-based system [Ferrer and Morales, 2011], described in Sect. 3.3.1.1.
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On the other hand, in the validation step three systems based in different sets of features are
used to test whether the images obtained in the previous stage are positively matched to real
samples of the genuine subject by completely independent systems. In particular, the following
systems are evaluated:
Validation geometry-based [Burgues et al., 2009], described in Sect 3.3.1.2.
Validation appearance-based [Yo¨ru¨k et al., 2006], described in Sect. 3.3.1.3.
Validation silhouette-based features [Ferrer and Morales, 2011], described in Sect. 3.3.1.3.
4.2.1.1. Development Experiments: Reconstructing Images
Exhaustive development experiments were carried out on the GPDS2 DB to determine the
four initialization parameters of the hand shape generator [Cootes et al., 2001, 1995], namely: i)
the dimensionality (k) of the vector y, which was finally set to k = 50 dimensions, thus taking
into account 99.9% of the variance in the trained model; ii) the PCA matrix P ; iii) the statistical
model G, which was defined as a uniform distribution within the limits [−3√λj , 3√λj ], being
λj the eigenvalue corresponding to the j-th eigenvector of matrix P (with j = 1, . . . , k); and iv)
the mean x¯ of the development set of hand shape images.
In our previous work [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2011], we carried out an exhaustive set of
experiments in order to select the best possible values for the parameters of the Uphill Simplex
(α, β and γ). Since the goal of the Dissertation is not finding the optimal parameter set, but
proving the efficiency and feasibility of the proposed reconstruction method as well as providing
an estimation of the hand recognition systems vulnerabilities to the reconstruction scheme, no
further experiments have been run to determine new values for these parameters. Furthermore,
by using the same values, we are also testing the robustness of the Uphill Simplex algorithm
against different biometric characteristics.
More specifically, we performed three successive steps fixing in each of them two of the
parameters and sweeping the other in a given range. According to the original Downhill Simplex
algorithm [Nelder and Mead, 1965], the best values for the parameters are α = 1, γ = 2 and
β = 0.5. Thus, the selected ranges were centred on those values, taking always into account
the constraints explained in Sect. 4.1.1, namely: α > 0, γ > 1 and 0 < β < 1. Finally, the
parameters values were set to [α, γ, β] = [1.1, 1.1, 0.8].
In order to determine the positive matching threshold δ at which a hand shape sample
is considered to have been successfully reconstructed, the geometry-based recognition system
accuracy was analysed on the GPDS DB. Each of the 144 subjects comprised in the database was
modelled with four samples randomly selected from the ten samples available, and the matching
process was repeated five times training the subject models with four different samples (random
selection) each time. In each of the five iterations of this process, mated scores were computed
matching the remaining six samples with the subject model (i.e., 144 × 6 × 5 = 4, 320 mated
scores), while non-mated scores were generated comparing these same six samples of each subject
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Table 4.1: Reconstruction rate and average number of comparisons needed to reconstruct a hand (in
brackets) for the two databases reconstructed in the experiments (GPDS DB and UST DB). Results
are given for the reconstruction method proposed in the Dissertation and for an eventual brute force
reconstruction (as baseline).
GPDS DB UST DB
Rec. Method 100% (109) 100% (215)
Brute Force 52% (15,746) 31% (17,562)
to the remaining subjects’ models (i.e., 144 × 143 × 6 × 5 = 617, 760 non-mated scores). The
threshold δ was finally fixed at the operating point corresponding to FMR = 0.01%, since the
probability of having a non-mated score at that point is very low: only one impostor in 10,000
would access the system. Thus, two hand shape images producing a similarity score greater
than δ may be considered to belong to the same subject.
After the initialization parameters were fixed, we reconstructed the hand shapes contained
in the two real validation databases: GPDS DB and UST DB. Each subject was modelled in the
development system with just one randomly selected hand image, and three synthetic samples
were generated using the reconstruction method proposed. Those synthetic samples constitute
the synthetic validation databases: S-GPDS DB and S-UST DB.
For completeness and also as baseline result with which to compare the performance of
our reconstruction method, a brute force reconstruction approach (i.e., an exhaustive search
through a very large number of hand shape images) was also carried out. For this purpose,
20,000 synthetic hand shapes were randomly generated with the hand generator (IR
m with
m = 1, . . . , 20, 000). As the development system is working at an operating point where, on
average, one real hand image in 10,000 would produce a false positive, it seems that 20,000
may be a reasonable number of synthetic samples to find one that is assigned to a given real
identity. Therefore, those images were matched to the subjects of each database (GPDS DB
and UST DB) until one of the synthetic samples produced a score greater than δ. The number
of comparisons needed by the brute force strategy to reconstruct a given hand is M , being IR
M
the first image that produced the winning score.
The results of both reconstruction approaches (the one proposed in the present chapter and
the brute force method) are shown in Table 4.1, in terms of the reconstruction rate (i.e., per-
centage of successfully reconstructed hands) and the average number of comparisons necessary
to reconstruct a hand image. We can observe that only around 40% of the hand shapes were
recovered by the brute force scheme, while all of them were successfully reconstructed using
the method proposed in the present chapter. Furthermore, the Uphill Simplex-based method
is over 100 times faster than the brute force strategy. Therefore, not only the hand shapes are
reconstructed with a considerably lower number of comparisons by the Uphill Simplex-based
approach, but it also guarantees success in the reconstruction, in contrast to the brute force
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Figure 4.8: Examples of the evolution of the score and the synthetic hand shapes through the iterations
of the proposed algorithm for a successfully reconstructed hand shape of the GPDS DB (left) and of the
UST DB (right). The horizontal dashed line represents the objective threshold (δ) where a sample is
considered to have been successfully reconstructed.
scheme.
Finally, in Fig. 4.8 the evolution of the hand shapes (IR) through the iterative reconstruction
process for one subject of each validation database is depicted. The score evolution is also shown,
where the horizontal dashed line represents the objective threshold (δ). Starting from a random
hand (iteration A), it can be seen that the successive synthetically generated samples evolve
towards the original hand (iterations B-E), until the score given by the development recognition
system is higher than δ: the hand image has been successfully reconstructed (iteration F).
4.2.1.2. Validation Experiments: Attacking Unprotected Systems
As explained at the beginning of the present section, the reconstructed images (S-GPDS DB
and S-UST DB) are used to try to access (i.e., attack) the validation systems, thereby evaluating
the security and privacy threat they pose. Since several systems are used in this validation step,
and the appearance- and silhouette-based systems work on independent features with respect
to the ones used by the development system (geometry-based), the results obtained in this
validation stage for each database permit to evaluate in an objective way the ability of the
proposed reconstruction approach to recover the handshape images from their templates.
75
4. INVERSE BIOMETRICS ATTACKS TO UNPROTECTED BIOMETRIC TEMPLATES
Table 4.2: Total number of attacks carried out for each experiment and each handshape database.
GPDS DB UST DB
AT1a 144× 3 = 432 564× 3 = 1, 692
AT1b 144× 3× 9 = 3, 888 564× 3× 9 = 15, 228
AT2a 144 564
AT2b 144× 9 = 1, 296 564× 9 = 5, 076
AT3 144 564
The performance of the attacks is measured in terms of its Success Rate (SR), which is defined
as the expected probability of bypassing the attacked system (see Sect. 3.2). Table 4.2 shows a
summary of the total number of attacks carried out for each experiment and database, where
sub-indices denote the attack under consideration. Furthermore, SR will be computed at three
operating points corresponding to: FMR = 0.1%, FMR = 0.05%, and FMR = 0.01%, which,
according to [ANSI/NIST, 2009], correspond to a low, medium and high security application,
respectively. For completeness, the system is also tested at a very high security operating point
corresponding to FMR 0.01%. Depending on the experiment at hand, these operating points
are estimated (on the GPDS DB or the UST DB), considering subject models computed with
either one hand image (for attacks 1 and 2) or four hand images (attack 3) for each of the
validation systems tested.
Several observations can be made from the results of the validation experiments shown in
Tables 4.3 to 4.8:
The high performance of the reconstruction algorithm is confirmed. As expected, the
performance of the synthetic images is higher when a system based on the same kind of
features as the ones used in the development stage (hand geometry) is used. However,
the SR for the other validation systems, based on completely independent sets of features,
remains considerably high:
• In the case of the geometry-based recognition system, the SR reaches an average SR
of over 85% for the three usual operating points considered and over 90% for the most
likely attacking scenario for the UST DB (i.e., SR2a).
• For the other two validation systems (appearance- and alignment-based), the SR re-
mains between 50 and 60% on average for the three usual operating points considered.
Even for an unrealistically high security point (i.e., FMR  0.01%), the reconstructed
images would have, on average,
• Around 80% chances of entering the geometry-based system for both databases tested.
• Between 30 and 45% chances of breaking the system for the GPDS DB and over 35%
for the UST DB under the appearance- and silhouette-based systems.
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Table 4.3: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the geometry-based system
using the GPDS DB at the four operating points tested.
FMR
GPDS DB - Geometry-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 90.26 87.52 90.26 87.52 92.58 89.63
0.05% 88.96 85.89 88.96 85.89 90.61 88.06
0.01% 85.41 83.27 85.41 83.27 87.37 84.95
0.01% 78.97 75.96 78.97 75.96 81.05 78.20
Table 4.4: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the appearance-based system
using the GPDS DB at the four operating points tested.
FMR
GPDS DB - Appearance-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 58.82 53.38 58.82 53.38 60.78 57.04
0.05% 52.94 41.39 52.94 41.39 58.82 49.50
0.01% 50.98 36.60 50.98 36.60 54.90 46.01
0.01% 31.37 23.97 31.37 23.97 43.14 30.76
Table 4.5: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the silhouette-based system
using the GPDS DB at the four operating points tested.
FMR
GPDS DB - Silhouette-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 62.52 61.28 62.52 61.28 65.27 62.57
0.05% 60.26 51.02 60.26 51.02 63.57 57.23
0.01% 58.92 40.65 58.92 40.65 61.49 52.13
0.01% 45.25 34.97 45.25 34.97 55.66 43.22
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Table 4.6: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the geometry-based system using
the UST DB at the four operating points tested.
FMR
UST DB - Geometry-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 93.29 90.59 93.29 90.59 95.68 92.69
0.05% 92.58 88.95 92.58 88.95 94.56 91.52
0.01% 90.15 86.21 90.15 86.21 92.98 89.14
0.01% 80.27 78.51 80.27 78.51 85.24 80.56
Table 4.7: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the appearance-based system
using the UST DB at the four operating points tested.
FMR
UST DB - Appearance-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 63.58 57.97 63.58 57.97 66.21 61.86
0.05% 57.25 43.46 57.25 43.46 63.25 52.93
0.01% 54.69 40.65 54.69 40.65 59.82 50.10
0.01% 38.25 29.52 38.25 29.52 51.29 37.37
Table 4.8: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the silhouette-based system
using the UST DB at the four operating points tested.
FMR
UST DB - Silhouette-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 52.36 50.28 52.36 50.28 53.24 51.70
0.05% 50.53 47.52 50.53 47.52 51.98 49.62
0.01% 48.27 44.59 48.27 44.59 50.37 47.22
0.01% 35.67 33.28 35.67 33.28 45.29 36.64
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The results are very similar for the appearance- and silhouette-based systems. The only
significant difference is the decrease of the SR for the latter when working on the UST DB.
The reason behind this worsening is a decrease in the accuracy of the system: silhouette
alignment is not as competitive as in the case of the GPDS DB due to projection distortions
caused by the camera acquisition scenario, which leads to a higher EER. Thus, for identical
FMR operating points, the FNMR is higher and therefore more hand images within the
intra-subject variability are rejected.
The probabilities of accessing the system in the scenarios 1.a and 2.a, 1.b and 2.b are the
same for each validation system considered. This means that the validation system is quite
robust to several initializations of the Uphill Simplex algorithm (i.e., reconstructions of the
same template). This way, the scores given by the system do not vary significantly among
reconstructions, which means that either all three or none of them are able to access the
system.
As expected, it is more probable that the synthetic samples are positively matched to the
original image from which they were reconstructed than to other real images of the same
subject (see the decrease in the SR between SR1a vs SR1b and between SR2a vs SR2b).
Even so, the reconstructed images still present a high probability of breaking the system
even when the stored templates are not the one from which they were recovered (average
SR of SR1b and SR2b around 45% for the appearance- and silhouette-based systems).
Furthermore, for the case of using several real samples of the subject for verification (SR3),
the reconstructed samples are still able to access the system for:
• Around 92% of the attempts in the usual operating points, and for almost 80% in the
extremely high operating point tested for the geometry-based validation system.
• Around 60% of the attempts in the usual operating points, and for almost 50% in the
extremely high operating point tested for the remaining two validation systems.
The results presented in Tables 4.3 to 4.8 confirm the first and second objectives set in the
present chapter: hand shape images may be recovered from their templates, and the recon-
structed images represent a real threat to the integrity of automatic recognition systems. In
other words, unprotected templates are reversible, hence putting the privacy of the subject at
risk.
Recall now that the third goal of the chapter is to determine the feasibility of generating
multiple synthetic hand images that yield templates very similar to a real one. In order to
address this point, results from experiment 2.a (i.e., all 3 synthetic images are compared to the
original from which they were reconstructed) are presented in Tables 4.9 to 4.11 from a different
perspective. In this case we present in each column the percentage of attacks in which only n out
of the 3 reconstructed images (with n = 1, 2, 3) were positively matched to their original real
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Table 4.9: Percentage of successful attacks where n out of the total three reconstructions were positively
matched against the original hand image from which they were reconstructed. Results are given for the
four operating points tested on the geometry-based recognition system.
FMR
GPDS DB UST DB
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
0.1% 0 0 90.26 0 0 93.29
0.01% 0 0 88.96 0 0 92.58
0.05% 0 0 85.41 0 0 90.15
0.01% 0 0 78.97 0 0 80.27
Average 0 0 85.9 0 0 89.1
Table 4.10: Percentage of successful attacks where n out of the total three reconstructions were positively
matched against the original hand image from which they were reconstructed. Results are given for the
four operating points tested on the appearance-based recognition system.
FMR
GPDS DB UST DB
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
0.1% 0 0 58.82 0 0 63.58
0.01% 0 0 52.94 0 0 57.25
0.05% 0 0 50.98 0 0 54.69
0.01% 0 0 31.37 0 0 38.25
Average 0 0 48.6 0 0 53.4
Table 4.11: Percentage of successful attacks where n out of the total three reconstructions were positively
matched against the original hand image from which they were reconstructed. Results are given for the
four operating points tested on the silhouette-based recognition system.
FMR
GPDS DB UST DB
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
0.1% 0 0 62.52 0 0 52.36
0.01% 0 0 60.26 0 0 50.53
0.05% 0 0 58.92 0 0 48.27
0.01% 0 0 45.25 0 0 35.67
Average 0 0 56.7 0 0 46.7
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image. For all cases the total attacks performed is ATn = 144 for the GPDS DB and ATn = 564
for the UST DB, and the success rate will be noted as SRn.
As it can be observed, for all the operating points tested, either all the synthetic samples
(n = 3) or none of them were able to access the system: the columns n = 1 and n = 2 show
a SR of 0% in all cases. This means that for all the subjects, it never occurred that only 1
or 2 of the reconstructions were positively matched to the subject model. However, averaging
the four attacked operating points, all three reconstructions (n = 3) were positively matched to
the original image for around 55% of the cases. These results confirm the third objective of the
study: the ability of the proposed probabilistic reconstruction algorithm to generate multiple
hand shapes that match one specific template.
But, why is this the case? Why do either all or none of the reconstructed images of one subject
are able to access the system? A probable explanation to this fact is that, as previously explained
in Sect. 4.2.1.1, the initialization parameters for both the Uphill Simplex (G distribution) and
the hand shape generator (average hand x¯ and PCA matrix P ) remain constant across executions
of the global algorithm: even though the G distribution is randomly sampled, the distribution
does not change; and the same data is used to compute x¯ and P . Therefore, the proposed
method is able to reconstruct a hand sample as long as it lies within the variability range found
in the development database: GPDS2 DB. This way, the reconstructed hand shapes deceive
the system for a given subject either always (n = 3) or never (n = 0): in the first case, the
subject samples fall within the development data variability range, while in the second case the
subject discriminative characteristics are not modelled by the development dataset. Thus, in
order to achieve a higher overall SR, the development database should be as big and statistically
significant as possible.
It should also be noted that the experiments have also proven that the reconstruction method
is robust to:
Databases acquired under totally different conditions: in the GPDS DB a scanner where
the hands were placed flat on the surface (thus leading to a certain degree of distortion in
the images) was used, while the images of the UST DB were acquired with a CCD camera
(no contact plastic distortion).
Systems based on different sets of features: even though a geometry-based system was
used in the development step, while in the validation stage experiments were carried out
on systems based on geometric, general appearance- and silhouette-related features, the
SR of the attacks was over 50% for the three realistic operating points tested.
Finally, in Fig. 4.9 some samples of both real and reconstructed hand images coming from
the GPDS DB, S-GPDS DB, UST DB and S-UST DB are presented. As can be observed, the
reconstructed hand shapes capture all the details of the original subject hands, such as the thick
and short fingers of the fourth hand in the UST DB or the different curvatures of the outer part
of the hand. Furthermore, we can also see that the three reconstructions of the same image vary
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Figure 4.9: Typical hand images that can be found in the real database (first column) with the three
corresponding reconstructions (second to fourth columns) for the GPDS DB (left) and the UST DB (right).
among themselves as could be expected from different real samples of the same subject (i.e.,
intra-subject variability): the position of the fingers is not the same in the three images and
even the shape of the fingers is slightly different.
4.2.2. Irreversibility Evaluation of Iris-Based Verification Systems
In order to analyse the irreversibility of the binary iriscodes, we now use the inverse biometrics
method described in Sect. 4.1.2, which needs a set of iris images for its initialization. This pool
of initial samples is taken from a database of fully synthetic iris images for two main reasons:
on the one hand, this avoids any possible overlap between the reconstructed images and those
used in the reconstruction process (which could lead to overoptimistic results), and, on the other
hand, it avoids the need for using real iris images in the reconstruction method.
As a consequence, two databases, one containing real iris samples and another containing
synthetic samples, are used in the experiments:
The iris images to be reconstructed are taken from the real database: Biosecure DB,
described in Sect. 3.4.6.1
The synthetic dataset (SDB) is used for the initialization of the reconstruction algorithm
(see Fig. 4.10).
Being SDB a database that contains only fully synthetic data, it is not subjected to any
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Figure 4.10: Two-stage experimental protocol followed in the iris-based verification evaluation: i) in the
development stage, the GA parameters (population size, mutation probability and block size) are trained
on the synthetic DB, and a reconstructed database is generated (S-Biosecure), and ii) in the validation
stage, the privacy threat posed by the reconstructed samples is evaluated on a commercial verification
system. Real databases are depicted in blue, and synthetic databases in red.
legal constraints and is publicly available through the CITeR research center1. In particular,
the synthetic irises are generated following the method described in [Shah and Ross, 2006],
which has two stages. In the first stage, a Markov Random Field model is used to generate a
background texture representing the global iris appearance [Makthal and Ross, 2005]. In the
next stage, a variety of iris features such as radial and concentric furrows, collarette and crypts,
are generated and embedded in the texture field. The database includes seven grey-scale images
of 1,000 different subjects.
Similarly, two different iris matchers are used in the experiments (see Fig. 4.10):
The first one, consisting of fully accessible software modules, is used as the development
system for the reconstruction of the iris images [Masek and Kovesi, 2003], and is described
in Sect. 3.3.2.1.
The second one, a commercial system completely different from the previous one, is used
in the validation stage in order to match the reconstructed images against the real ones
[Neurotechnology], and is described in Sect. 3.3.2.2.
Being VeriEye a commercial system, no details on the feature extraction process are provided.
Therefore, the results of our proposed method are ensured to be unbiased and not due to a
specific adaptation of the reconstruction algorithm to a given validation system.
1http://www.citer.wvu.edu/
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4.2.2.1. Development Experiments: Reconstructing Images
The objectives of this first set of experiments are: i) to fix the values of the different pa-
rameters involved in the reconstruction algorithm and, ii) once the parameters have been set,
to reconstruct the real iris images in Biosecure DB starting from their iriscodes.
In order to achieve these two goals, one sample of each of the 420 subjects present in the
Biosecure DB (right and left irises of 210 subjects, see Sect. 3.4.6.1) were randomly selected and
their iriscode computed according to the publicly available iris recognition system developed
by Masek [Masek and Kovesi, 2003]. The dimensions of the normalized iris images produced
by this system are R × C = 20 × 240 and the size of their corresponding binary templates
K ×W = 20× 480 (i.e., each pixel is coded with two bits).
In order to determine the parameter values of the genetic algorithm effectively, certain general
guidelines should be taken into account. Probably, the key factor is to determine the population
size. On the one hand, if it is too small the risk of converging prematurely to a local minima
is increased since the population does not have enough genetic material to sufficiently cover the
problem space (i.e., the diversity is too low). On the other hand, a larger population has a greater
chance of finding the global optimum at the expense of drastically increasing the computation
load (i.e., CPU time) as the number of iterations needed for convergence is greater.
In most GA-related solutions, the individual’s size (i.e., number of blocks H × L) is de-
termined by the problem at hand. However, in our specific case, the same reasoning used for
the population size applies to the individual’s dimensions as well. Therefore, for this particu-
lar problem, a good balance must be obtained between both parameters. As a general rule of
thumb, in this specific case, good results are usually obtained when k ' L.
Besides the aforementioned trade-off, in most GA-related problems the mutation probability
is usually kept below 1% in order to avoid losing diversity.
With these general principles in mind, extensive experiments were undertaken to determine a
good set of parameter values for the reconstruction algorithm, resulting in the following efficient
operating point: population size k = 80, mutation probability pm = 0.003, and block size
R/H×C/L = 2×2 pixels (i.e., each normalized image is divided into H×L = 10×120 blocks).
It must be emphasized that these parameter values could be further optimized. Furthermore,
different strategies than those used here may be adopted in order to implement each of the four
rules described in Sect. 4.1.2 (i.e., elite, selection, crossover and mutation). However, the above
(or other) improvements related to genetic algorithms are outside the scope of the Dissertation,
which is not focused on the study and optimization of this search tool, but rather on the
evaluation of the security and privacy of biometric recognition systems, and, in this particular
chapter, on the irreversibility analysis of unprotected templates. For a more detailed description
of different architectures for genetic algorithms the reader is referred to [Goldberg, 2002, 1989].
Once the parameter values of the reconstruction method were determined and fixed, Masek’s
matcher [Masek and Kovesi, 2003] was used to compute the matching scores needed by the opti-
mization algorithm, in order to generate 5 different reconstructed images of each binary template
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Figure 4.11: Three example executions (right) of the reconstruction algorithm for the same original
image (left). For the reconstruction samples, the evolution of the score through the generations is shown
on top (positive matching threshold marked with a horizontal dashed line), with the final reconstructed
normalized image and its corresponding iriscode shown below.
(i.e., the algorithm was applied 5 times to reconstruct and image from each iriscode), thus lead-
ing to a database of 5 × 420 = 2, 100 reconstructed iris images (referred to as Reconstructed
Biosecure DB in Fig. 4.10).
In order to determine the positive matching threshold δ at which an iriscode is considered to
have been successfully reconstructed, the iris recognition system accuracy was analysed on the
Biosecure DB. Mated scores were computed by matching the first sample of each subject to the
other 3 images of that same subject (i.e., 420×3 = 1, 260 mated scores), while non-mated scores
were generated by comparing the first iris of each subject to the first sample of the remaining
subjects in the database (i.e., 420× 419 = 175, 980 non-mated scores).
In Fig. 4.11 three different reconstruction outcomes corresponding to a single real iriscode
are shown. Although the reconstructed patterns do not visually resemble the original one and
block artifacts are discernible, their corresponding iriscodes are all very similar to each other
and exhibit a high degree of resemblance with the original. The visual dissimilarity between the
original and the reconstructed patterns may be explained by the absence of amplitude-related
information in the iriscodes. This leads to arbitrary amplitude values in the synthetically gener-
ated samples which, nevertheless, present comparable phase information, resulting in accurate
iriscode reproductions. Above each reconstructed image in this figure, the evolution of the
score across iterations is shown. Marked with a horizontal dashed line is the positive matching
threshold δ.
4.2.2.2. Validation Experiments: Attacking Unprotected Systems
The iris images reconstructed in the development stage are now used to test the vulner-
abilities of the VeriEye iris matcher (see the validation chart in Fig. 4.10). As mentioned in
Sect. 3.3.2.2, this system operates as a black-box, i.e., given an input, it returns an output with
no information about the internal algorithms used to get that final result. Several remarks have
to be made regarding the inputs and outputs of VeriEye:
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Figure 4.12: Four reconstructed iris images in pseudo-polar coordinates (top) all recovered from the
same original iris, and their corresponding denormalized images in cartesian coordinates used to attack
the VeriEye commercial matcher (bottom).
Inputs. Normalized iris samples in polar coordinates are not accepted by VeriEye. The
input to the system has to be an image containing a circular iris in cartesian coordinates.
For this reason, in order to attack the system, all the reconstructed irides were reconverted
into Cartesian coordinates as shown in Fig. 4.12.
Outputs. The system outputs a non-zero similarity score in case of a positive match. When
the matching threshold is not reached, a 0 is returned, thereby making it difficult to launch
a hill-climbing attack [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2012b]. In case an error occurs during the
recognition process (most likely during the segmentation stage), a negative score value is
returned.
As was mentioned before, this commercial matcher does not return non-mated scores (i.e.,
they are always 0) which means that its FMR may not be statistically computed on a given
database. In order to fix the threshold for the different operating points, a deterministic equation
is given in the documentation enclosed with the system.
In the experiments, the system was unable to segment (i.e., reported an error) 1.4% of the
real images in the Biosecure DB. This implies that, for these cases, a sample from a legitimate
subject would have not been able to access the system. Thus, the highest SR that can be
reached by the attacks is 98.6%. Moreover, 0.5% of the reconstructed images were not correctly
segmented (these are regarded as unsuccessful attacks).
As in the previous case study, the performance of the attacks is measured in terms of its
Success Rate (SR), which is defined as the expected probability of bypassing the attacked sys-
tem (see Sect. 3.2). Table 4.12 shows a summary of the total number of attacks carried out
for each experiment and database, where sub-indices denote the attack under consideration.
Furthermore, SR will be computed at three operating points corresponding to: FMR = 0.1%,
FMR = 0.05%, and FMR = 0.01%, which, according to [ANSI/NIST, 2009], correspond to a
low, medium and high security application, respectively. For completeness, the system is also
tested at a very high security operating point corresponding to FMR  0.01%.
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Table 4.12: Total number of attacks carried out for each experiment for the iris case study.
Biosecure DB
AT1a 420× 5 = 2, 100
AT1b 420× 5× 3 = 6, 300
AT2a 420
AT2b 420× 3 = 1, 260
AT3 420
Table 4.13: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered for the VeriEye matcher at the four
operating points tested.
FMR
SR(%) - VeriEye
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 81.2 66.7 96.2 92.8 96.7 86.7
0.05% 79.2 63.4 96.2 91.4 95.2 85.1
0.01% 77.3 60.9 95.2 90.9 93.8 83.6
0.0001% 69.0 49.1 92.8 82.8 82.9 75.3
Several observations can be made from the results of the validation experiments carried out
on VeriEye as shown in Table 4.13:
The high performance of the proposed reconstruction algorithm is confirmed, reaching an
average SR of around 85% for the three usual operating points considered, and over 95%
for the most likely attacking scenario (i.e., SR2a).
Even for an unrealistically high security point (i.e., FMR=0.0001%), the reconstructed
images would have, on average, almost 75% chances of breaking the system.
As expected, it is more probable that the synthetic samples are positively matched to the
original image from which they were reconstructed than to other real images of the same
subject (see the decrease in the SR between SR1a vs SR1b and between SR2a vs SR2b).
Even so, the reconstructed images still present a high probability of breaking the system
even when the stored templates are not the one from which they were recovered (average
SR of SR1b and SR2b around 75%).
Furthermore, in the case of using several real samples of the subject for verification (SR3),
the reconstructed images are still able to access the system ∼94% of the time at the usual
operating points, and 80% of the time in the extremely high operating point tested.
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Table 4.14: Percentage of successful attacks where n out of the total 5 reconstructed images were
positively matched against the original iris image from whose iriscode they were reconstructed. Results
are given for the four operating points tested on VeriEye.
FMR
SRn (%) - VeriEye
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
0.1% 1.9 5.3 13.3 24.8 50.9
0.05% 2.4 6.7 13.8 27.6 45.7
0.01% 3.8 6.2 13.8 28.1 43.3
0.0001% 7.6 6.7 21.9 24.7 31.9
Average 3.9 6.2 15.7 26.3 42.9
Besides, a new possible vulnerability of iris recognition applications has been raised, as
the tested matcher positively matches images with a black circle in the middle and a white
background (such as the ones shown in Fig. 4.12) that should by no means be recognized
as an eye image.
The last observation emphasizes the need for incorporating some type of pre-checking stage,
prior to the localization and segmentation of the iris, in order to confirm that the sample
presented to the system is really that of an eye, and not some simple iris-like image.
The results presented in Table 4.13 confirm the first and second objectives set in the present
chapter: iris images may be recovered from their iriscodes, and the reconstructed images repre-
sent a real threat to the integrity of automatic recognition systems. In other words, unprotected
templates are reversible, hence putting the privacy of the subject at risk.
Recall now that the third goal of the study is to determine the feasibility of generating
multiple synthetic iris patterns with iriscodes very similar to a real one. In order to address this
point, results from experiment 2.a (i.e., all 5 synthetic images are compared to the original image)
are presented in Table 4.14 from a different perspective. In this case we report in each column
the percentage of attacks in which only n out of the 5 reconstructed images (with n = 1, . . . , 5)
were positively matched to the original real image. In each case, the total number of attacks
performed is ATn = 420 and the success rate is denoted as SRn.
Averaging over the four operating points, all five reconstructed images were positively
matched to the original image in 42.9% of the cases. This increases to 69.2% if we consider
n = {4, 5}, and to 84.9% when taking into account n = {3, 4, 5}. These results confirm the
ability of the proposed probabilistic reconstruction method to generate multiple iris patterns
which are positively matched to one specific iriscode. As can be seen in Table 4.13, this ability
gives the proposed method a much higher attacking potential than deterministic algorithms that
can only generate one image from each iriscode: the success rate increases by around 27% on
an average when several reconstructions of the iris image are available (i.e., attack 2: 1vs5)
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compared to the case in which only one reconstructed sample is used to access the system (i.e.,
attack 1: 1vs1).
4.3. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have introduced two novel algorithmic methods for the reconstruction of
synthetic biometric samples, which are positively matched to the reference templates extracted
from real biometric data. The first method relies on the combination of a handshape images
generator and the Uphill Simplex algorithm to optimize its input. The second makes use of
a genetic algorithm to optimize normalised gray-scale iris images. The security and privacy
threat entailed by such synthetic samples has been later analysed within the general framework
presented in Chapter 3 for the evaluation of unprotected systems, and, more specifically, the
irreversibility analysis of the templates.
Both reconstruction methods assume that i) the system stores unprotected templates (or the
attacker is able to override this protection) and ii) the attacker has access to the scores produced
by a development system between the referenced template and several synthetic samples. It
may be hence argued that attacks such as the ones considered in this chapter can be successful
only when the reference template is compromised. This may be difficult (although possible) in
classical biometric systems where the enrolled templates are kept in a centralized database. In
this case, the attacker would have to access the database and extract the information, or intercept
the communication channel when the stored template is released for matching. But the threat
is heightened in Match-on-Card (MoC) applications where an individual’s biometric template
is stored in a smartcard possessed by the person. Such applications are rapidly growing due
to several appealing characteristics such as scalability and privacy [Bergman, 2008b]. Similarly,
biometric data is being stored in many official documents such as the new biometric passport
[ICAO, 2006], some national ID cards [Government of Spain], the US FIPS-201 Personal Identity
Verification initiatives (PIV) [NIST] and the ILO Seafarers Identity Card Program [ILO, 2006].
In spite of the clear advantages that these type of applications offer, templates are more likely to
be compromised as it is easier for the attacker to have physical access to the storage device and, as
has already been demonstrated [van Beek, 2008], fraudulently obtain the information contained
inside. This makes MoC systems potentially more vulnerable to the type of threat described in
this chapter especially when the biometric data is stored without any type of protection [NIST],
or printed in the clear on plastic cards as 2D barcodes [ILO, 2006].
Assuming such knowledge (i.e., the attacker can obtain the similarity score between the ref-
erence template and several reconstructed images), the experimental evaluation has shown that
the information summarized in handshape and iris templates is sufficient to generate synthetic
images with very similar templates to those of the original biometric samples. The experimental
findings indicate that an eventual attack to biometric systems using such reconstructed images
would have a very high chance of success, hence violating the privacy of the subjects.
It should be noted that the methods proposed are not specific for the systems evaluated.
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On the one hand, different biometric systems, relying on independent features, have been used
to generate and validate the reconstructed samples. On the other hand, since they require no
knowledge about the templates’ format, they can be potentially used to reconstruct samples
from templates based in a different set of features. In addition, the experimental findings have
also shown that, given the probabilistic nature of the optimization algorithms used, not only
one but several synthetic samples can be generated from a single template. This not only
significantly increases the success rate of the attacks compared to methods that can generate
only one synthetic sample, but it also opens up the possibility of other applications besides
inverse biometrics, such as to increase the amount of available data of a subject.
As a consequence of the high success chances inverting the templates to the original biometric
samples, the work presented in this chapter has reinforced the need for including template
protection schemes in commercial systems. If unprotected templates are stored or used at any
time for verification purposes, it has been proven that the information comprised is enough
to successfully reconstruct synthetic images which are positively identified as genuine samples.
Furthermore, such positive matches are carried out by other independent systems, not necessarily
the ones used for the reconstruction. With such reconstructed samples, an eventual attacker
could impersonate a particular subject, hence constituting a severe privacy threat. This fact has
motivated the development of adequate biometric template protection schemes in the following
chapters.
Novel contributions of this chapter are:
Two inverse biometrics methods for the reconstruction of handshape and iris samples,
based on optimization algorithms.
The systematic evaluation of the security and privacy of unprotected templates for three
handshape based systems and a commercial iris system using the reconstructed synthetic
samples.
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Chapter 5
Biometric Template Protection
Based on Bloom Filters
In this chapter we present a generic Biometric and Multi-Biometric Template Protection
scheme based on Bloom filters to deal with the privacy issues unveiled in Chapter 4. Then, we
evaluate it in terms of accuracy, irreversibility, unlinkability and robustness to cross-matching
attacks, in accordance with the security and privacy evaluation protocol established in Chapter 3,
Sect. 3.2, and with the requirements established in the ISO/IEC 24745 International Standard
on biometric information protection [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011].
As indicated in Chapter 2, even though Bloom filter based template protection offers fast
and accuracy-preserving biometric verification, some concerns have been raised regarding the
unlinkability of the templates. Additionally, although schemes for different characteristics have
been proposed, the main parameters for the Bloom filter computation have to be specifically
devised for each case study.
In this Chapter, we present two different protection schemes:
An unlinkable and irreversible biometric template protection scheme based on Bloom fil-
ters.
A general multi-biometric template protection scheme based on a weighted feature level
fusion.
Furthermore,
We propose a methodology for estimating the appropriate parameters for the Bloom filter
based template computation.
In a reproducible research framework, two sets of experiments are carried out on independent
and publicly available databases in order to avoid biased results. First, the parameters of the
Bloom filter template computation are estimated on the development databases. Then, the
security and privacy of the schemes is evaluated on the test databases. In a first stage, the
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verification accuracy is analysed for several case studies (face, iris, fingerprint, fingervein and
a face and iris fusion). At a second stage, the irreversibility, unlinkability and robustness to
cross-matching attacks are systematically analysed for the face based scheme.
The chapter is structured as follows. Sect. 5.1 gives a brief introduction to the original Bloom
filter based BTP and describes the proposed systems, with one subsection dedicated to each of
them: Sect. 5.1.1 describes the novel unlinkable and irreversible template protection scheme
based on Bloom filters, Sect. 5.1.2 presents the methodology for the parameter estimation,
Sect. 5.1.3 describes the new multi-biometric template protection scheme based on Bloom filters
and Sect. 5.1.4 summarises potential attacks to Bloom filter based schemes. Then all schemes are
evaluated on Sect. 5.2. First, appropriate parameters are estimated for four different case studies
(face, iris, fingerprint and fingervein) in Sect. 5.2.1 and the obtained accuracy is evaluated in
Sect. 5.2.2. Then, for the face case study, irreversibility is analysed in Sect. 5.2.3, unlinkability
in Sect. 5.2.4 and robustness to cross-matching attacks in Sect. 5.2.5. The chapter summary
and conclusions are presented in Sect. 5.3.
This chapter assumes a basic understanding of the fundamentals of pattern recognition [Duda
et al., 2001; Theodoridis and Koutroumbas, 2008], and image processing [Gonzalez and Woods,
2006].
This chapter is based on the publications: [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2016d,e, 2014c; Rathgeb
et al., 2015].
We will use the following notation throughout the Chapter:
Tp and Tr: probe and reference unprotected templates.
|T|: unprotected template size.
b: Bloom filter.
|b|: number of bits activated, or set to one, in a Bloom filter.
nBlocks: number of blocks into which the unprotected template is divided.
nWords and nBits: dimensions of the aforementioned blocks, corresponding to the number
of words inserted into the corresponding Bloom filter (nWords), and length of such words
(nBits).
Cp = {b1, . . . ,bnBlocks}: cancelable template corresponding to Tp, and comprising nBlocks
Bloom filters.
SBF : similarity score between two cancelable templates corresponding to Cp and Cr,
computed according to Eq. 5.2.
nSeq : number of possible sequences, or unprotected templates T, which yield the same
protected template C.
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Figure 5.1: Unprotected vs Protected Biometric Verification. In the unprotected scenario (left),
a probe biometric sample is acquired and its features extracted (Tp). The similarity score with respect to
the probe reference Tr is computed, S = d (Tp,Tr), and the final output is the mated/non-mated decision
D = (S > δ). In the protected scenario (right), all the protected data or information flow is depicted in
red: Cp, Cr and SBF . In this case, an additional module is added to compute the protected templates,
Cp (more details in Fig. 5.2), and a different distance function, specific for the Bloom filter templates, is
used (see Eq. 5.2).
Ktrans : secret key for the structure-preserving feature transformation or for the weighted
feature level fusion, with trans ∈ {perm, XOR}.
|K|: key space size.
pnWords : probability of activating one particular bit within a Bloom filter, after inserting
nWords words.
5.1. Biometric Template Protection Based on Bloom Filters
In general, biometric verification involves the following steps, as depicted in Fig. 5.1 (left):
Feature extraction: the probe biometric sample is acquired and features extracted and
encoded in the probe template Tp.
Similarity score computation: the similarity score S between the probe Tp and reference
Tr templates, stored in a possibly external database, is generated.
Comparison: the final mated/non-mated verification decision D = (S > δ) is computed,
where δ is the pre-defined verification threshold.
As shown in Chapter 4, the storage and comparison of unprotected templates raises severe
security and privacy issues due to the possible information leakage. To tackle them, cancelable
biometric approaches irreversibly transform the unprotected templates T into protected refer-
ences C by adding a new module, and, if necessary, modifying the similarity score computation
function. In particular, for Bloom filter based BTP schemes, the following steps are undertaken
(see Fig. 5.1, right):
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Feature extraction: the probe biometric sample is acquired and features extracted and
encoded in the probe template Tp.
Bloom filter computation: the protected biometric template, Cp, is computed from its
unprotected counterpart, Tp, which is automatically discarded.
Similarity score computation: the similarity score SBF between the probe Cp and reference
Cr templates, stored in a possibly external database, is generated.
Comparison: the final mated/non-mated verification decision D = (SBF > δ) is computed,
where δ is the pre-defined verification threshold.
For the Bloom filter based template computation, initially introduced for iris verification,
Rathgeb et al. [2013a] propose to divide the binary iriscode into nBlocks blocks comprising
nBits × nWords bits. From each such block, one Bloom filter, b, of length 2nBits is computed
- the final cancelable template is thus composed of nBlocks Bloom filters. In order to extract a
Bloom filter from a given binary block, columns (denoted as words) are mapped to their decimal
value, and the corresponding index in b - initially set to zero - is set to one. Each bit can be thus
set to one multiple times, but only the first change has an effect, thereby achieving irreversible
templates. In this original approach, the authors propose to XOR the columns with secret keys
before activating the corresponding bits in the Bloom filter in order to achieve unlinkability.
However, it has been proven that templates are still linkable [Bringer et al., 2015; Hermans
et al., 2014]. To avoid such privacy violation, in the next section we propose an improved Bloom
filter BTP scheme.
5.1.1. Irreversible and Unlinkable Biometric Template Protection
A diagram of the proposed improved Bloom filter based BTP scheme is depicted in Fig. 5.2.
In contrast to the original concept, an additional processing step, referred to as Structure-
preserving feature re-arrangement, is introduced (highlighted in red in Fig. 5.2). Hence, the
improved scheme comprises three key components:
1. Feature extraction: in the first step, an unprotected two-dimensional binary feature vector
is extracted from the biometric samples, e.g. facial image. In the same way as in the
original concept, the binary feature vector is divided into nBlocks blocks of size nBits ×
nWords bits, as shown as part of Fig. 5.2.
2. Structure-preserving feature re-arrangement : the goal of this processing step is to dissipate
the statistical composition of the biometric feature vector. In order to maintain recognition
accuracy, a certain structure of words within feature blocks has to be retained. Otherwise,
stability of discriminative words is lost prior to the computation of Bloom filters. In order
to reach a balance between verification accuracy and diffusion of feature vectors, we first
re-group the nBlocks blocks into nGroups sets of B blocks (nBlocks = nGroups × B, see
Fig. 5.2).
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Figure 5.2: System overview: 1) a binary feature vector consisting of nBlocks binary feature blocks
of size nBits × nWords is extracted; 2) the entire set of blocks is disposed into nGroups vertically con-
catenated groups consisting of B blocks, and structure-preserving feature re-arrangement is applied; 3) a
total number of nBlocks Bloom filters is extracted (one for each transformed feature block).
Within such groups of blocks, a row-wise permutation (perm) is performed: for each of the
nGroups sets, the rows of the vertical concatenation of the corresponding B blocks are
permuted. Note that a permutation of columns would not cause any change in the resulting
Bloom filters, since changing the order of insertion of the words into the Bloom filter makes
no difference in the final output. Due to the fact that horizontal neighbourhoods of bits
within rows persist, this sub-step prevents from a potential loss of discriminative power of
resulting feature blocks. On the other hand, the dissipation of rows among groups of blocks
significantly improves the information diffusion and prevents block-based attacks. In case
of a permutation within feature blocks, a potential attacker, which has full knowledge
of the employed permutation key (full disclosure model), would be able to revert Bloom
filters to feature blocks separately after applying the reverse permutation, which involves
an arrangement of |b| words to a block of length nWords with nSeq possible sequences of
words (see below, Eq. 5.4). However, applying an inverse permutation across a group of
blocks prior to reverting Bloom filters to feature blocks is not feasible, since without loss
of generality, the number of activated bits in Bloom filters of feature blocks of one group
differs. This means that, after applying the correct inverse permutation adjacencies of
bits forming each word are potentially lost. As a consequence, one out of nSeq sequences
would have to be guessed for each of the B blocks of a group, prior to applying the inverse
permutation. Moreover, the re-grouping of feature blocks increases the size of the key
space for the applied permutation.
3. Bloom filter computation: in the final step one Bloom filter is computed from each of the
nBlocks blocks, such that the final protected template C consist of nBlocks Bloom filters
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of size 2nBits. An example of this processing step for a single feature block is shown as
part of Fig. 5.2. All the bits in the corresponding Bloom filter b are initially set to zero.
Then, each binary word wi = {wi[1], . . . , wi[nBits]} (i.e., a column within the feature
block) is translated into its corresponding decimal value, H (wi), for i = 1, . . . ,nWords.
Subsequently, the bits corresponding to those decimal values are activated in b:
b [H (wi)] = 1 with H (wi) =
nBits∑
j=1
wi[j] · 2j−1 (5.1)
This operation is repeated for each of the nBlocks, in order to obtain the final protected
template C = {b1, . . . ,bnBlocks}, where the length of each b is 2nBits .
The final comparison score SBF between a probe and a reference cancelable templates, Cp
and Cr, is then defined as the average Bloom filter dissimilarity score:
SBF = PIC (Cp,Cr) =
1
nBlocks
nBlocks∑
i=1
HD(bip,b
i
r)
|bip|+ |bir|
|bip|+ |bir| 6= 0 (5.2)
where |b| denotes the number of bits within a Bloom filter b set to 1, and HD(bip,bir) the
Hamming distance between two Bloom filters.
Within the presented scheme, irreversibility is achieved by mapping column-wise words to
Bloom filters. Given a Bloom filter b of length 2nBits we restrict to inserting only nWords words,
where nWords ≤ 2nBits (blocks do not contain more than 2nBits columns). In case of uniformly
distributed data, the probability that a certain bit is set to 1 during the insertion of an element
is 1/2nBits . Conversely, the probability that a bit is still 0 is 1 − 1/2nBits . As a consequence,
after inserting a total of nWords words, and under the uniformity assumption, the probability
that a particular bit is activated, puninWords , is
puninWords = 1−
(
1− 1
2nBits
)nWords
(5.3)
However, focusing on biometric data this theoretical expectation does not apply, since bits
of binary biometric feature vectors must not be expected to be mutually independent (i.e.
reasonable parts of feature vectors correlate). Consequently, a significant number of words is
expected to be mapped to identical positions in Bloom filters even for small values of nWords.
Let us assume |b| bits are set to 1 within a Bloom filter after inserting nWords words, i.e.
|b| different words occur in a block of nWords. Hence, the probability of re-mapping a bit
to a certain position is 1 − |b|/nWords. For a potential attacker the reconstruction of the
original template part involves arranging |b| words to nWords positions. For |b| ≤ nWords the
theoretical number of possible sequences is recursively defined by nSeq as a function of |b| and
nWords, where each of the |b| words have to appear at least once within nWords columns,
nSeq (|b|,nWords) =
1, if |b| = 1|b|nWords −∑|b|−1i=1 (|b|i ) · nSeq (i,nWords) otherwise (5.4)
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Figure 5.3: Number of possible sequences nSeq (per block) for different block sizes and proportions of
re-mapped codewords.
In other words, all sequences with less than |b| words are subtracted from the number of all
possible sequences, |b|nWords .
Fig. 5.3 illustrates the rapid increase of possible sequences even for small values of |b| (note
the logarithmic scale in the y axis). Peaks are located around 3/4 · nWords, and in the ex-
tremes we get nSeq (nWords,nWords) = nWords! and nSeq (1,nWords) = 1. For example: for
nWords = 4 and |b| = 2 we get nSeq(2, 4) = 24 − (21) · nSeq(1, 4) = 16 − 2 · 1 = 14 possible
sequences, for nSeq = 4 and |b| = 3 we get nSeq(3, 4) = 34 − (31) · nSeq(1, 4)− (32) · nSeq(2, 4) =
81−3 ·1−3 ·14 = 36 possible sequences, for nWords = 4 and |b| = 4 we get nSeq(4, 4) = 4! = 24
possible sequences and so forth.
Regarding unlinkability, it could be argued that despite the proposed structure-preserving
feature re-arrangement, a random shuﬄing of bits would fulfil the task of dissipating the statisti-
cal composition of the biometric feature vector. However, such an approach significantly affects
verification accuracy, as will be shown in the experiments. Alternatively, XOR-ing the entire
feature vector with a randomly generated binary vector of the same size (one-time pad) could
be considered. However, while such an approach would achieve sufficiently large key spaces,
block-based attacks could be employed in a scenario where an attacker has full knowledge of the
applied key, since biometric information would not be dispersed across feature blocks prior to
the Bloom filter computation.
It should be finally noted that the level of unlinkability and irreversibility achieved by the
proposed system will be influenced by the size of the key space, |K|, of the considered structure-
preserving feature re-arrangement. Two facts should be taken into account for the computation
of |K|: i) the dimensions of feature blocks and concatenated groups of blocks to which the perm
transform is applied, and ii) the number of feature blocks and concatenated groups of blocks,
since different keys are applied for each of these. In our particular approach, we are carrying
out nGroups different permutations (one for each group of blocks) of nBits×B rows. Therefore,
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for each permutation we have (nBits ×B)! different keys resulting in,
|K| = (nBits ×B)!nGroups (5.5)
In contrast to the original approach [Rathgeb et al., 2013a], key space sizes of the proposed
structure-preserving feature re-arrangement are large enough to prevent brute force cross-matching
attacks, as will be shown in the experimental section (Sect. 5.2.5).
5.1.2. Parameter Estimation
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the main challenge in the application of the
Bloom filter based template protection scheme described above to a new biometric characteristic
lies in determining the size of the feature blocks from which the Bloom filters are computed.
That is, finding the appropriate values for nBits and nWords. In the next sections, a two-step
methodology to find appropriate bounds for each parameter are provided based on a statistical
analysis of the binary unprotected templates, as depicted in Fig. 5.4.
5.1.2.1. Computation of nBits
First of all, we should bear in mind that nBits determines the length of the Bloom filters
(2nBits). Therefore, small values will lead to small Bloom filters, which will be unable to grant
irreversibility: if only a few words are inserted, there will be no collisions and it will be easy to
reconstruct the original feature block. On the other hand, if more words are inserted, too many
words will be coded into a single bit and verification accuracy will be severely affected. We
should hence maximize nBits, in order to grant irreversibility, as long as verification accuracy is
not compromised.
Intuitively, the more correlations within the binary template, the more information can
be coded in a single Bloom filter without losing its discriminative power, thereby preventing
accuracy degradation. In order to account for those correlations, we will estimate the Degrees
of Freedom (N) of those templates, and compute the upper bound of nBits as the ratio between
the template size |T| and N (Fig. 5.4, 1):
nBits ≤ |T|
N
(5.6)
In order to estimate N , we can model the non-mated Hamming Distance (HD) distribution
with a binomial distribution with mean p and standard deviation σ [Daugman, 2004]. This is
due to the fact that each comparison between two bits from two different binary templates is es-
sentially a Bernoulli trial, where correlations between successive “coin tosses” are a consequence
of the existing correlations in the biometric samples. The Degrees of Freedom of the distribution
can be hence computed as
N =
p (1− p)
σ2
(5.7)
Finally, we will choose nBits as close as possible to the upper bound estimated in Eq. 5.6,
in order to maximize the irreversibility and unlinkability provided by the system.
98
5.1 Biometric Template Protection Based on Bloom Filters
              
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑇 𝑆𝑛𝑆𝑇
𝐷𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑛 𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑜𝑇 1 
For each sample 
Feature 
Extractor 
Binarization 
nWords 
nBits 
One Bloom Filter from each block 
                                      
        1 −  𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑇𝑛
𝑛𝑛𝑜𝐷𝐹𝑛 < 1 −  �1 − 1
𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑇𝑛
�
𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < 1 −  𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑇𝑛
𝑛𝑛𝑜𝐷𝐹𝑛 2
Computation of nBits Computation of nWords 
See below the computation of 
nBits and nWords 
Impostor distribution of HD between binary templates  nWords bounds 
Figure 5.4: General diagram for the parameter estimation in Bloom filter based template protec-
tion schemes. In the first step, an upper bound is computed for nBits based on the Degrees of Freedom of
the Hamming distance non-mated distribution of the unprotected templates. Then, that value is used to
estimate the appropriate range for nWords, so that verfication accuracy is mantained and irreversibility
is achieved.
5.1.2.2. Computation of nWords
While nBits has a direct impact on the template size, nWords influences the number of
activated bits within a Bloom filter (|b|). Assuming independence, the probability that one
particular bit is activated within a Bloom filter of length 2nBits after inserting nWords columns,
puninWords , is given by Eq. 5.3. However, as already pointed out, not all words are equally probable
due to the correlations existing within the biometric samples. In fact, not even all 2nBits words
will appear in a single template if nBits is big enough with respect to the template size. There-
fore, we will estimate the average number of different words of length nBits for the unprotected
templates, and substitute 2nBits for that average value, nCols, giving a better estimation for
pnWords :
pnWords = 1−
(
1− 1
nCols
)nWords
(5.8)
To establish boundaries for that probability, we will take into account the words re-map rate
R, which models the non-independence between the words of each feature block. For a given R,
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the probability of activating one particular bit after inserting nWords is
pnWords (R) =
(1−R) · nWords
nCols
(5.9)
In order to preserve accuracy while granting irreversibility, the re-map rate should remain
within a certain interval [Rmin, Rmax]. This interval should be centred around R = 0.25, which
is the the optimal value for the re-map rate with respect to irreversibility of templates found
in [Rathgeb et al., 2013a]. Therefore, using Eqs. 5.8 and 5.9, we estimate the lower and upper
bounds of nWords so that the following inequalities hold:
1−Rmin
nCols
nWords ≤ 1−
(
1− 1
nCols
)nWords
≤ 1−Rmax
nCols
nWords (5.10)
The final value for nWords will be chosen within the estimated range, taking into account
the size of the template, so that: i) a sufficient number of Bloom filters can be computed,
thereby preserving verification accuracy, and ii) choosing a value that divides the total number
of columns in the template, in order to minimize the information loss.
In Fig. 5.4 (2) a particular example of those inequalities for nBits = 4 and nCols = 16 is
shown. The shaded area represents the area in which the inequalities hold, and the red curve
represents the function to optimize (the central term in Eq. 5.10). The intersections of the red
curve with the limits of the shaded area hence determine the approximate range of appropriate
values for nWords.
5.1.2.3. General Remarks
Some general remarks ought to be made regarding the methodology described for some
particular cases.
On the one hand, some verification systems divide the initial sample into sub-images before
extracting the features (e.g., the face verification system used in the experiments, see Sect. 3.3.3).
In that case, in order to retain all the discriminative information, nBits will be estimated for
each sub-image and the minimum value will be considered. Then, nWords will be subsequently
estimated for that sub-image.
On the other hand, when we are dealing with variable length templates (e.g., the fingerprint
verification system used in [Li et al., 2015], see Sect. 3.3.5.1), Hamming Distances can not
be computed in a straightforward manner. In those cases, given two templates T1, T2, with
|T1| > |T2|, we will divide each template into its basic units (e.g., minutiae vicinities in [Li
et al., 2015]). Then, for each basic unit in T2, t
i
2, with i = 1, . . . , |T2|, we will find the closest
unit in T1, t
j
1, in terms of their Hamming Distance, HD
(
ti2, t
j
1
)
. The final Hamming Distance
between the templates can be thus computed as the average HD between their basic units:
HD (T1,T2) =
1
|T2|
|T2|∑
i=1
min
j
HD
(
ti2, t
j
1
)
(5.11)
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Figure 5.5: General diagram for feature level fusion in Bloom filter based template protection
schemes. The smaller template (in blue) is re-allocated over the bigger one (in red), according to the posi-
tions defined by the system (in purple), and they are ORed to obtain the final fused template. Additionally,
in order to achieve a weighted fusion, multiple bits are activated with each word w, using a Multi-Key
XOR (MK-XOR) approach for the Bloom filter computation of one of the fused characteristics.
Finally, it should be noted that N takes into account all correlations within the template,
in both the vertical and horizontal directions. However, in order to estimate an appropriate
value for nBits, only the former should be taken into account. Therefore, for those unprotected
templates presenting correlations in both directions (e.g., the binary iriscode or the Spectral
Minutiae Representation), N/2 will be used in Eq. 5.6.
5.1.3. Multi-Biometric Template Protection
In order to improve verification accuracy and the level of security and privacy provided,
we propose a general weighted feature level fusion for protected templates of possibly different
sizes. Firstly, nBits and nWords are estimated for each individual characteristic, according
to the methodology proposed in the previous section. Since the proposed fusion technique is
based on the OR of Bloom filter based cancelable templates, it can be applied to any number of
biometric characteristics. However, for the sake of clarity, we will focus in the two-case scenario.
A general diagram for the proposed scheme is depicted in Fig. 5.5, describing the fusion of
two characteristics, whose estimated parameters are {nBits1,nWords1} and {nBits2,nWords2}.
Without loss of generality, let us assume |T2| = 2nBits2 × nBlocks2 ≥ 2nBits1 × nBlocks1 = |T1|
(i.e., the protected template extracted from the second biometric characteristic, in red, is bigger
than the first one, in blue). The final fused template is computed as the OR of the individual
101
5. BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION BASED ON BLOOM FILTERS
protected templates: that way, a bit activated in any of the templates will be in turn activated
in the fused template. However, since we consider the general case where |T2| ≥ |T1|, we cannot
OR templates of different sizes. Therefore, we will randomly allocate each Bloom filter of the first
template (b1i ∈ C1 for i = 1, . . . ,nBlocks1) on the second template, fulfilling two requirements:
i) there is no overlap in that allocation, and ii) we will allocate on average the same number
of Bloom filters b1i ∈ C1 over each bigger Bloom filter b2j ∈ C2, with j = 1, . . . ,nBlocks2 (i.e.,
nBlocks1/nBlocks2 on average). To that end, we will generate a random vector {posi}nBlocks1i=1
that will determine where to allocate each Bloom filter b1i ∈ C1. Finally, the OR will be carried
out on those parts, keeping the contents of the second template for the remaining bits, which is
equivalent to ORing them with the neutral element, 0. In Fig. 5.5 we show an example of such
a fusion, where the second and bigger template is depicted in red, the smaller template in blue,
and the fused parts are depicted in purple, representing the fusion of the two original red and
blue templates.
We further present an improvement with respect to this simple feature level fusion, inspired
on weighted score level fusion approaches. Whereas fusing templates at feature level offers a
higher security, score level can provide better accuracy when the fused score is computed as
a weighted sum: s = α · s1 + (1− α) · s2. Therefore, we propose a weighted feature level
fusion in which the contribution of each characteristic to the final template can be optimized to
maximize, for example, verification accuracy. For a balanced fusion (i.e., assigning equal weights
of α = 0.5), each characteristic would ideally activate a similar number of bits in the fused Bloom
filters. To that end, we need to take into account the average number of bits activated in the
final fused template for each characteristic:
The first characteristic (in blue in Fig. 5.5) activates |b1| bits within each individual Bloom
filter. Since, on average, nBlocks1/nBlocks2 filters are mapped into a single fused filter,
the final number of activated bits is
|bfusion1 | = |b1| × (nBlocks1/nBlocks2) (5.12)
The second characteristic (in red in Fig. 5.5) activates |b2| bits in both the individual and
the fused templates.
Therefore, in order to reach the desired balance, assuming that |b2| ≤ |bfusion1 |, the number
of bits activated by the second characteristic will be artificially increased applying a Multi-Key
XOR (MK-XOR) to each word during the Bloom filter computation. An example for a particular
word w is shown in Fig. 5.5, where w is XORed with a random set of keys K = {K1, . . . ,Knα},
hence activating nα bits instead of just one bit in the Bloom filter b: {w ⊕K1, . . . ,w ⊕Knα}.
The appropriate number of keys for a balanced fusion, n0.5, will be estimated as the ratio between
the aforementioned numbers of activated bits:
n0.5 =
⌈
|bfusion1 |
|b2|
⌉
=
⌈ |b1| × (nBlocks1/nBlocks2)
|b2|
⌉
(5.13)
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Finally to obtain a particular weight α, the corresponding number of keys nα is estimated
as
nα =
⌈ α
0.5
· n0.5
⌉
=
⌈
α
0.5
· |b1| × (nBlocks1/nBlocks2)|b2|
⌉
(5.14)
5.1.4. Potential Attacks
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Sect. 3.2, not only similarity scores have to be analysed during
a security and privacy evaluation, but also potential attacks: an eventual attacker may take
advantage of certain statistical properties or weaknesses of the template protection scheme. For
this reason, the robustness of the proposed improved system needs to be analysed with respect
to already proposed as well as foreseeable attacks. To that end, two different adversary models
will be considered:
Advanced model : In this model, the adversary has the full knowledge of the algorithms
used for template extraction, template protection and comparison, following Kerckhoffs’
principles [Kerckhoffs, 1883]. In addition, the adversary is capable of executing part of or
all sub-modules of the system that make use of the secret keys, while the adversary knows
none of the secrets.
Full Disclosure Model : this model is the advanced model augmented by disclosing the
secret keys to the adversary.
Table 5.1 categorizes considered attacks according to the goal of the attack, which can either
be breaking irreversibility or unlinkability (cross-matching). It is implied that a successful
attack on the irreversibility property of a template protection system also breaks unlinkability,
i.e. enables cross-matching.
5.1.4.1. Brute Force Attack
A brute-force cross-matching attack on the original concept of Bloom filter-based template
protection has been proposed by Bringer et al. [2015]. Let B be a biometric datum which is
protected applying two different secret keys K1 and K2 resulting in C
1 = PIE (B,K1) and C
2 =
PIE (B,K2). Since the indices of the resulting sets of Bloom filters C
1 = {b11,b12, . . . ,b1nBlocks}
and C2 = {b21,b22, . . . ,b2nBlocks} are visible to an attacker, the following strategy can be employed
to cross-match C1 and C2. Each index of one of the two associated Bloom filters is XORed
with every possible secret T∗ ∈ {0, 1}nBits and it is checked whether b1i [j] = b2i [j] ⊕ T∗, j =
0, . . . , 2nBits − 1, holds for all non-zero indices. This attack can also be applied if C1 and C2
are generated from different biometric inputs of the same subject, by searching for a T∗ which
yields a minimum dissimilarity score (SBF ) between C
1 and C2. In case binary blocks are large
enough, the brute-force search will also succeed if different keys are used for different blocks.
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Table 5.1: Summary of the potential attacks and adversary models: I and U indicate whether attacks
can be performed to break the irreversibility and/or the unlinkability property provided by the scheme.
Attack Type Advanced Full Disclosure
Brute Force U −
Reconstruction I / U I / U
Hamming Weight U −
Exploiting XOR U −
5.1.4.2. Reconstruction Attack
Given a protected template C, the goal of this attack is to reconstruct a biometric datum
B′, which is close to the original biometric input B, i.e. the attack can be employed to break
irreversibility and unlinkability. Given one Bloom filter b, for each activated index i = 1, . . . , |b|,
the corresponding word wi is reconstructed. The entire feature block is reconstructed as one
single word repeated nWords times, where that word represents the bit-wise average of the |b|
reconstructed words. In other words, in the final feature word w, a given bit is activated iff
it was activated at least |b|/2 times. Bringer et al. [2015] carried out this attack against the
original iris-based scheme proposed in [Rathgeb et al., 2013a] without applying any secret keys.
It is shown that, even though the reconstructed iris-codes have not a realistic appearance, the
HD between them and the original iris-codes is below the threshold set at FMR = 10−4, thus
positively matching the original iris-codes and granting access to eventual impostors.
5.1.4.3. Hamming Weights Attack
An efficient cross-matching attack on the original proposal of Bloom filter-based template
protection is presented by Hermans et al. [2014]. This attack takes advantage of the fact that
if W different words appear within one processed binary block, W different bits will be set to
one in the corresponding Bloom filter, regardless of the key used in [Rathgeb et al., 2013a] to
achieve unlikability: the XOR represents a linear mapping, hence forcing no further collisions.
Let us assume that one biometric input B is protected applying two different secret keys K1 and
K2, resulting in C
1 = PIE (B,K1) and C
2 = PIE (B,K2). This means that, regardless of the
values of K1 and K2, the Hamming Weights (HW ) of C1 and C2 will be identical, |C1| = |C2|,
since |b11| = |b21|, |b12| = |b22|, . . . , |b1nBlocks| = |b2nBlocks|. Based on a theoretical analysis for the
setting proposed in [Rathgeb et al., 2013a], the authors report that, in the worst case scenario,
this trivial cross-matching attack succeeds with a probability of at least 96%. Furthermore,
a security analysis on generating false positives and recovery of the secret is presented, both
leading to undesirably low attack complexities [Hermans et al., 2014]. While this attack is more
efficient compared to a brute force attack, it is not clear if it can be extended to cross-match
protected templates generated from different biometric samples B1 6= B2 of the same instance.
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5.1.4.4. Exploiting the XOR-Operation
In the original concept of Bloom filter-based template protection, the application of a XOR
operation represents a linear transform, which is applied to each word of each binary block.
Let us assume that one biometric sample B is protected applying two different secret keys
K1 and K2, resulting in C
1 and C2, respectively. An attacker can now analyse bit-vectors
consisting of the i-th indices of all Bloom filters in C1 and search for an identical vector in C2.
Since the same secret key is applied to generate all Bloom filters of one protected template, for
each vector (b11[i],b
1
2[i], . . . ,b
1
nBlocks[i]), i = 0, . . . , 2
nBits − 1, there will be an identical vector
(b21[j],b
2
2[j], . . . ,b
2
nBlocks[j]), j = 0, . . . , 2
nBits − 1. It is important to note that the mapping
between all vectors of C1 and all vectors of C2 is bijective. In other words, the XOR operation
produces a linear shift of indices within Bloom filters which is identical for each block. This fact
can be exploited by an attacker to cross-match two protected templates at reduced computational
cost, compared to the brute force attack.
Moreover, this attack can be extended to link protected templates generated from different
biometric samples B1 6= B2 of the same instance. In this case, given C1 and C2, the attacker
would search for corresponding bit vectors exhibiting a minimum HD , thus obtaining a permuted
template C2
′
. The final decision on whether C1 and C2 belong to the same subject will be based
on the HD between the first and the permuted templates, i.e., HD(C1,C2
′
).
5.2. Experimental Evaluation
In order to evaluate the soundness of the proposed approach, a two-step experimental pro-
tocol is followed, where independent databases (described below) are used in order to ensure
unbiased results:
Development experiments - Parameter estimation: in the first set of experiments,
run over the development databases, nBits and nWords are estimated following the ap-
proach proposed in Sect. 5.1.2. Four different case studies will be taken into account,
whose corresponding baseline unprotected systems are described in the cited sections in
Chapter 3: face (Sect. 3.3.3), iris (Sect. 3.3.2.1), fingerprint (Sect. 3.3.5.1) and fingervein
(Sect. 3.3.4) verification.
Test experiments - Privacy and security evaluation: the evaluation protocol is
designed to, on the one hand, confirm the soundness of the parameters estimated on
the development experiments, and on the other hand assess to what extent the proposed
approaches meet the requirements of template protection systems defined in [ISO/IEC
JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011]. Therefore, the protocol in Sect. 3.2 will be
followed, comprising four different analyses:
• Accuracy analysis: the first question to analyse is the soundness of the estimated
parameters as well as the impact of the proposed improvements on the biometric
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accuracy of the system. Therefore, the accuracy variation between the baseline system
and the protected system is analysed in the first set of experiments, according to the
protocol proposed in Chapter 3, Sect. 3.1, reporting the EERs and FNMR at a fixed
FMR.
• Irreversibility analysis: once the accuracy has been evaluated, we will focus on
the face case study. In the first place, the irreversibility provided by the proposed
improved Bloom filter-based template protection system is analysed. To that end,
two different aspects will be considered: i) the success probability of guessing the
correct original template, and ii) given a protected template, the probability that the
corresponding unprotected template will be reconstructed applying the reconstruction
attack. In this last case, the quality of the reconstructed template is estimated by
comparing it to the corresponding original binary feature vector in terms of HD .
In the advanced model, attacks on irreversibility also involve guessing the inverse
transforms applied during the structure-preserving feature re-arrangement. In order
to analyse the irreversibility achieved by the proposed method, the resulting score
distributions will be compared to that of random impostors.
• Unlinkability analysis: in order to assess whether the improved system meets the
unlinkability requirement, the methodology defined in Chapter 3, Sect. 3.2.2 will be
used to analyse and compare the original [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2014c] and improved
template protection schemes.
• Robustness to potential attacks: finally, all proposed cross-matching attacks are
applied to the original and improved BTP systems.
In order to obtain unbiased results, experiments are carried out on two independent sets of
databases:
Development databases: in the first set of experiments, the parameters of the system
(nBits and nWords) are estimated over the Biosecure DB for iris, face and fingerprint (see
Sect. 3.4.6.1). For the fingervein case study, since Biosecure lacked these data, we used
the corresponding samples included in the SDMULA-HMT database (see Sect. 3.4.5.2).
Test databases: for the experimental evaluation, we chose widely used benchmarks, to
allow an easier comparison with the state-of-the-art: the IIT Delhi Iris Database version
1.0 for iris (Sect. 3.4.3), the Extended M2VTS multimodal Database for face (Sect. 3.4.2),
the FVC2002 database for fingerprint (Sect. 3.4.4), and the UTFVP database for fingervein
(Sect. 3.4.5.1). In all cases, mated scores are obtained from all possible intra-class com-
parisons and non-mated scores are computed comparing the first sample of each subject
with the second sample of the remaining subjects. For fingerprint and fingervein, in order
to avoid misalignment errors, the protocol followed in [Li et al., 2015] will be used, taking
into account only the first two samples of each subject.
106
5.2 Experimental Evaluation
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
Hamming Distance
0.0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Face
0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60
Hamming Distance
0.0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Iris
0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.035 0.040 0.045 0.050 0.055
Hamming Distance
0.0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Fingerprint
0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60
Hamming Distance
0.0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Fingervein
Figure 5.6: nBits estimation: distribution of the non-mated Hamming Distances for all the biometric
characteristics considered (face, iris, fingerprint and fingervein) on the development databases.
5.2.1. Parameter Estimation
As described in Sect. 5.1.2, in order to find appropriate values for the two parameters of the
system (i.e., nBits and nWords), we follow a two-step approach: i) computation of nBits and
ii) computation of nWords.
The nBits computation is based on the Degrees of Freedom (N) of the non-mated Hamming
distances distributions of the original unprotected templates. Those distribution are depicted
for face, iris, fingerprint and fingervein in Fig. 5.6. Then, the upper bound for nBits is estimated
according to Eq. 5.6. Those bounds and the final value chosen (in parentheses) are presented in
Table 5.2 together with the necessary data for Eq. 5.6, namely: mean (p), standard deviation
(σ) and N of each distribution, as well as unprotected template sizes |T|. As indicated in
Sect. 5.1.2.3, for face templates the computations will be run on the portion of the templates
extracted from one sub-image, which comprises 2,400 bits.
As we may observe, the estimated value for face is the lowest one: nBits = 4. This is due
to the high inter-class variability of face samples, accounting for different lightning conditions,
presence or absence of glasses or beards, etc. For iris, an upper bound of 8 is obtained. However,
in order to utilize the entire iriscode, comprising 20 rows, we will use nBits = 10 as proposed in
the original work [Rathgeb et al., 2013a]. For fingerprint, in [Li et al., 2015] a value of nBits = 13
was found optimal, very similar to the value found in the present work: nBits = 12. Finally, for
fingervein an upper bound of nBits = 9 was found, which is the value chosen for the following
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Table 5.2: nBits and nWords estimation. In the first rows, p, σ and N values for the distributions
in Fig. 5.6, template sizes |T|, and upper bounds for nBits according to Eq. 5.6, with the chosen value
in parentheses. In the second set of rows, the estimation of nCols, the corresponding range for nWords
and the chosen value in parentheses.
Face Iris Fingerprint Fingervein
Mean (p) 0.27 0.47 0.03 0.48
Std (σ) 0.02 0.02 0.003 0.03
DoF (N) 575 623 3,597 269
Template size (|T|) 2,400 (×32) 10,240 40,960 4,608
nBits bound (used) 4 (4) 8 (10) 12 (12) 9 (9)
nCols 16 95 186 73
nWords range (used) [6, 22] (20) [21, 89] (32) [41, 174] (53) [16, 69] (16)
step, since it divides the number of rows of the template, 18. It should be noted that, due to the
correlations in both horizontal and vertical directions within the iris and fingervein templates,
N/2 has been used to estimate nBits, as stated in Sect. 5.1.2.1.
In the second step, to give an estimation for nWords, we compute the average number
of different words in a template for each characteristic, nCols. This number is subsequently
applied to the inequalities in Eq. 5.10 to estimate the appropriate ranges for nWords, setting
Rmin = 10% and Rmax = 45% in order to reach a balance between templates’ irreversibility and
verification accuracy. Those values, as well as the final ranges, are shown in the second set of
rows in Table 5.2. Following the remarks presented in Sect. 5.1.2.2, we have chosen the following
values:
For face, in order to use the whole template extracted from each sub-image, comprising
rows of 60 bits, we can choose any of its divisors: {6, 10, 12, 15, 20} ∈ [6, 22]. Since the total
number of Bloom filters computed is high (32×40/nBits×60/nWords = 19, 200/nWords),
we choose nWords = 20 in order to maximize the irreversibility.
For iris, in order to use the whole iriscode (with rows of 512 bits), only powers of 2 will
be used: {32, 64} ∈ [21, 89]. In order to obtain a sufficient number of Bloom filters and
thereby preserve verification accuracy, given that nBlocks = 20/nBits × 512/nWords =
1, 024/nWords, we choose nWords = 32.
For fingerprint, in order to have a similar number of Bloom filters as the original approach
in [Li et al., 2015], we need to take into account the average number of minutiae vicinities
of the templates: nVicinities = 160. In that approach, the templates extracted from the
vicinities were horizontally grouped into three blocks. Therefore, within the estimated
range, we choose nWords = 53 ∼ 1/3 · nVicinities, which falls into the computed range,
[41, 174].
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Table 5.3: Accuracy Analysis: EER and FNMR at FMR = 0.01% for the unprotected and protected
scenarios considered. For the Bloom filters based schemes, the number of activated bits |b| is also included.
Unimodal Systems
Face Iris Fingerprint Fingervein
Unprotected
EER (%) 7.0± 0.02 0.6± 0.11 1.1± 0.67 2.2± 0.08
FNMR (%) 42.3 0.5 1.1 3.3
Protected
EER (%) 4.3± 0.02 0.7± 0.12 1.2± 0.12 3.5± 0.01
FNMR (%) 18.4 0.7 3.9 8.7
|b| 6.06 22.86 62.64 9.75
Multimodal: Face + Iris
Feature Score
Unprotected
EER (%) - 0.1± 5 · 10−5
FNMR (%) - 0.2
Protected
EER (%) 0.1± 0.04 0.3± 0.004
FNMR (%) 0.1 0.5
|b| 316.07 -
For fingervein, a range nWords ∈ [16, 69] is obtained. In order to utilize the whole tem-
plate, comprising rows of 256 bits, only powers of 2 will be used: {16, 32, 64} ∈ [16, 69].
To maintain accuracy a sufficient number of Bloom filters should be computed. As a
consequence, given that nBlocks = 18/nBits × 256/nWords = 512/nWords, we choose
nWords = 16.
It should be noted that for iris and face the ranges comprise the optimal values found in
the original approaches [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2014c; Rathgeb et al., 2013a] (i.e., 32 and 20,
respectively).
5.2.2. Accuracy Analysis
In order to confirm the soundness of the estimated values for the parameters, we evaluate the
accuracy of each unimodal biometric system as well as a multi-biometric system based on face
and iris. The Equal Error Rates (EERs), with confidence intervals at 95%, as well as FNMR at
FMR = 0.01% are summarised in Table 5.3, while the corresponding Detection Error Trade-off
(DET) curves are depicted in Figs. 5.7 and 5.8.
Regarding the unimodal systems, in Fig. 5.7a we may observe that for the face-based system,
accuracy is not only preserved for the protected scheme, but even improved (the FNMR is divided
by two FMR = 0.01%). On the other hand, since for iris we chose a value for nBits slightly
higher than the estimated upper bound (ten instead of eight), accuracy could degrade. However,
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Figure 5.7: Accuracy analysis: DET curves for all the biometric characteristics considered, for the
unprotected system and the protected BF based scheme using the parameters estimated in Table 5.2. For
the multi-biometrc scenario considered (face and iris), fusion is carried out at score level (unprotected
and protected) and feature level (protected).
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Figure 5.8: Accuracy analysis: DET curves for the multi-biometrc scenario considered (face and
iris), where fusion is carried out at score level (unprotected and protected) and feature level (protected).
taking into account the confidence intervals at 95% confidence, we observe no degradation at
the EER. A similar behaviour is observed for fingerprints, thus confirming the soundness of the
bounds estimated for nBits and nWords.
In contrast to the previous case studies, some accuracy degradation is obtained at the EER
for fingervein. The reason behind such degradation might be the size of the templates (4,608
bits compared to 76,800 for face, 10,240 for iris or 40,960 for fingerprint), and will be subject to
further studies.
It may be observed that, except for the face case study, a stronger degradation in terms of
the FNMR is observed for FMR = 0.01% than at the EER. Such increases in the FNMR are due
to the intrinsic nature of the Bloom filters, which allow for FMs but not for FNMs. Therefore,
a higher FMR could be expected for fixed values of FNMR. Since FNMR is a monotonically
decreasing function with respect to FMR, in a similar manner, for a fixed value of FMR a higher
value of FNMR could be expected. However, the values provided correspond to high security
applications, according to [ANSI-NIST, 2001]. For higher values of FNMR, corresponding to
medium security applications, the observed degradation decreases until the EER, where accuracy
is preserved.
Once the accuracy variation has been analysed for each unimodal case study, we assess
the accuracy of the feature level fusion approach proposed. With the values estimated in the
previous section for nWords and nBits, we first need to estimate and optimize the weight α and
its corresponding number of keys nα for the MK-XOR. According to Eq. 5.13 and Table 5.2, we
have
n0.5 =
⌈
6.06× (1, 024/32)
22.86
⌉
= 9 (5.15)
Optimizing the weight α with respect to verification accuracy for values of nα around nine, we
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found an optimal accuracy for n0.7 = 12.
In order to provide a fair comparison with score level fusions of protected and unprotected
templates, we have independently optimized the weights for such fusions, obtaining α = 0.6 in
the unprotected system, and α = 0.8 for the protected score level fusion. As it may be observed,
the unprotected score level fusion outperforms the Bloom filter score level fusion. However, the
best accuracy, at all operating points, is achieved by the Bloom filter based feature level fusion.
Since this fusion is the one providing the highest security and privacy protection, due to the
storage of a single template and the further concealment of the biometric data granted with
the OR operation, we may conclude that the weighted feature level fusion for multi-biometric
template protection based on Bloom filters achieves a higher accuracy while further protecting
the subject’s privacy.
Without loss of generality, and in order to keep the present study within a reasonable length,
in the following subsections only the face-based authentication system will be analysed.
5.2.3. Irreversibility Analysis
For the improved face-based template protection scheme, the average number of bits set
to one for a given Bloom filter, denoted as |b|, and the corresponding average number of re-
mapped words R, R = 1 − |b|/nWords, are empirically obtained from the protected templates
of all samples in the database. Based on these values, the average number of possible sequences
nSeq resulting in a single Bloom filter, defined in Eq. 5.4, is raised to nBlocks, the number of
Bloom filters forming protected templates, in order to estimate the entire inverse image set of
the protected template prior to the Bloom filter computation.
Therefore, given a protected template, the success probability of guessing the corresponding
unprotected feature vector is estimated as nSeq
−nBlocks
for the full disclosure model, where
K is known to the adversary. In the case of the advanced model, an attacker would further
have to guess the employed key K, i.e. the success probability of guessing unprotected feature
vectors is calculated as nSeq
−nBlocks × |K|−1, which for some configurations is significantly
smaller than directly guessing the feature vector of size nBlocks × nWords × nBits = 76, 800.
Table 5.4 summarizes the results obtained for the improved system with respect to the level of
irreversibility provided, where key space size is estimated as follows, see Eq. 5.5,
|K| = (5× 32)!32 ≈ 230,261 (5.16)
It is important to note that those estimations yield lower bounds for success probabilities, since
these refer to the probability of guessing the correct original template and not a template which
is close to the original one. However, even in case the attacker is in possession of protected
templates and their corresponding keys, it is still not possible to directly revert the protected
template to the original feature vector. As it may be observed, the success probability of guessing
the correct unprotected template is below 2−40,000 (∼ 10−12,000).
Focusing on the reconstruction attack proposed in [Bringer et al., 2015], HD-based distribu-
tions between the original templates and the ones obtained with the suggested reconstruction
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Table 5.4: Irreversibility analysis: average number of bits set to one per Bloom filter, average
percentage of re-mapped words, average number of possible sequences per block, and success probabilities
for guessing original unprotected templates.
|b| R (%) nSeq Success Probability
Advanced Full Disclosure
6.56 56.3 240 2−71,221 2−40,960
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Figure 5.9: Irreversibility analysis: HD-based score distributions between the reconstructed and
the original unprotected templates, compared to the mated and random non-mated scores between real
unprotected templates.
attack are depicted in Fig. 5.9, where only the full disclosure model has been considered. As
can be observed, non-mated HDs are even lower than those obtained with the reconstructed
templates for the improved system. We conclude that, even for the full disclosure model, the
improved system does not allow an efficient reconstruction of templates close to the original
ones. Furthermore, yielding HDs higher than the random non-mated distances implies that also
the security of the system is enhanced, since access will not be granted to such reconstructed
templates.
5.2.4. Unlinkability Analysis
In order to assess the level of unlinkability provided by the improved system, we will follow
the protocol established in Chapter 3, Sect. 3.2.2. To that end, the two score distributions (i.e.,
Mated instances and Non-mated instances) are compared in Fig. 5.10 for sets of nKeys = 10
secret keys. D↔ (s) and Dsys↔ are also depicted in the same figure.
As it may be observed in Fig. 5.10, the distributions obtained for the improved system
(Fig. 5.10b) overlap to a bigger extent than those corresponding to the original system (Fig. 5.10a).
In fact, Dsys↔ has a small value of 0.09 (67% lower than that of the original system), since only
for a small range of scores, [0.91, 0.94], it is slightly more likely that the compared templates
represent the same instance. We may thus conclude that templates are almost fully unlinkable
when compared in terms of their dissimilarity scores.
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Figure 5.10: Unlinkability analysis: scores distributions for comparisons of protected templates
generated with nKeys = 10 different keys for the original scheme (left) and the improved system (right)
The dashed black line represents LR (s) = 1.
5.2.5. Robustness to Cross-Matching Attacks
In order to analyse the uniformity of the templates, the entropy of the protected templates is
compared to that of the unprotected templates. The entropy, E, is defined as, E = −∑ p log p,
where p is the probability of occurrence of a given value. In our particular case, the distribution
of bits set to one is first estimated over the whole database, yielding the p probabilities. Then
the entropy of those distributions is computed, yielding E = 4.01 for feature vectors of the
original unprotected system, and E = 4.08 for the protected templates. Since the entropy is
maintained between both systems, no additional correlations are introduced by the protection
scheme and therefore they cannot be exploited by eventual statistical attacks.
Let us now assess the robustness of the enhanced BTP scheme to each of the cross-matching
attacks proposed in Sect. 5.1.4.
5.2.5.1. Brute Force Attack
In the advanced model the efficiency of a brute force cross-matching attack depends on the
size of the key space: on average, an attacker needs to guess correct sequences of words within
feature blocks as well as the key in order to succeed. The average success probability of this
attack can be thus estimated as 2(nSeq
−nBlocks×|K|)−1. Since the suggested structure-preserving
feature transforms obscure rows among nGroups = 32 groups of binary blocks, the success rate
of cross-matching attacks may be increased to 2(nSeq
−nBlocks/nGroups×|K|)−1, in case the attack
is applied simultaneously to each group of blocks. However, even if a brute force cross-matching
attack is parallelized for groups of blocks, success rates for the improved system remain rather
low. We thus conclude that brute force cross-matching attacks are computationally infeasible.
In the full disclosure model cross-matching would involve guessing the inversion of the
Bloom filter-based transform prior to performing the inverse structure-preserving feature re-
arrangement, hence, success rates increase to 2(nSeq
−nBlocks
). For parallelized group-based
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Figure 5.11: Robustness to cross-matching attacks: distributions for the analysis of three different
cross-matching attacks for the original scheme (left) and the imrpoved system (right). The dashed black
line represents LR (s) = 1.
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attacks success rates further increase to 2(nSeq
−nBlocks/nGroups
), yielding success rates below
2−1,279. It should be noted that, if block-based transforms such as the XOR with one-time pad
were applied, success rates would increase to 2−39 in case cross-matching is performed simulta-
neously for each block.
5.2.5.2. Reconstruction Attack
In case of cross-matching, the aim of this attack is to revert two protected templates and
link them. Given the low success probabilities estimated for brute force attacks, in this case
we restrict the analysis to the full disclosure model. As in the initial unlinkability analysis,
the distributions of the HDs between the reconstructed unprotected templates generated from
the Mated instances or Non-mated instances, are depicted in Fig. 5.11a and Fig. 5.11b, for the
original and improved systems, respectively.
Similar to the unlinkability analysis, the distributions Mated instances and Non-mated in-
stances overlap to a bigger extent for the improved system, reducing the final Dsys↔ in 70%, from
0.59 to 0.33. As a consequence, even if the system is more vulnerable to this attack than to the
analysis of plain scores under a normal operation mode, for which Dsys↔ = 0.09 (Fig. 5.10b), we
may conclude that the templates’ robustness to this cross-matching attack has been considerably
improved.
In addition, it should be noted that this attack assumes the highest amount of knowledge
on the attacker, who is in possession of the secret keys used by the system. Therefore, the Dsys↔
reaches its highest value for all the cross-matching attacks analysed.
5.2.5.3. Hamming Weights Attack
The HW s of the protected templates might be used to cross-match templates generated
with different keys. The distributions of the differences in HW s between protected templates
generated from the Mated instances or Non-mated instances, are depicted in Fig. 5.11c and
Fig. 5.11d, for the original and improved systems, respectively. As we may observe, in both
cases all distributions are centred on the same value, zero. However, while for the original
system Dsys↔ = 0.33, twice as large as under a normal operation mode (Fig. 5.10a), in the
improved system Dsys↔ = 0.09 (i.e., same value obtained for the improved system under normal
operational conditions with no attack shown in Fig. 5.10b), reducing the linkability in over 250%.
This is due to the fact that for the improved system D↔ (s) < 0.2∀s. Therefore, even for the
few cases in which we can assume that two templates belong to the same instance taking into
account their HW s, the probability of them belonging to different instances is still high, yielding
low values of D↔ (s). We can hence conclude that templates are robust to this cross-matching
attack.
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5.2.5.4. Exploiting the XOR-Operation
The XOR operation proposed in the original concept of Bloom filter-based template protection
might be exploited to carry out a cross-match attack. To apply this attack, we need to compute
HDs between optimally re-permuted protected templates. Then, the distributions of such dis-
tances, generated from Mated instances or Non-mated instances, are depicted in Fig. 5.11e and
Fig. 5.11f, for the original and improved systems, respectively. As can be observed, the original
system is highly vulnerable to this attack: both distributions are easily separable, except for
a small range of scores, hence yielding Dsys↔ = 0.84. On the other hand, for the improved sys-
tem, only the tails of the Mated instances distributions are slightly heavier, thus showing values
close to 1 for D↔ (s). This means that the templates yielding those distances are more likely
to belong to the same instance. However, since the scores presenting high D↔ (s) values (i.e.,
the distribution tails) are very unlikely to happen, the final unlinkability value achieved for the
system is very low, Dsys↔ = 0.08, which is over ten times smaller than that of the original system,
and below the one obtained for the improved system working on normal operation conditions
with no attack (see Sect. 5.2.4). Therefore, we may conclude that, unlike the original system,
the improved system is robust to cross matching attacks based on the XOR-Operation.
5.3. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
We have proposed in this chapter the first general framework for biometric and multi-
biometric template protection based on Bloom filters, where all the information, either stored
in the database or handled at verification time, is permanently protected.
An improved version with respect to the system described in [Rathgeb et al., 2013a] has been
proposed, in order to meet the unlinkability requirement for protected biometric templates. To
that end, an easily integratable module based on a structure-preserving feature re-arrangement
of the unprotected templates is added to the original scheme.
Regarding the multi-biometrics approach, the preferred fusion level (i.e., feature level) con-
sidered in the ISO/IEC TR 24722 on multimodal and other multi-biometric fusion [ISO/IEC
JTC1 SC37 Biometrics, 2007] has been chosen.
According to the protocol established in Chapter 3, Sect. 3.2, we have evaluated the system
in order to assess the key requirements within the ISO/IEC IS 24745 on biometric information
protection [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011], namely: i) verification accuracy
preservation, ii) irreversibility and iii) unlinkability. Furthermore, the robustness to potential
attacks based on known weaknesses of the original Bloom filter based schemes, has been studied.
To that end, experiments were carried out on two sets of widely used and publicly available
databases, following a clear protocol in order to make our research reproducible and allow
future comparisons to other methods. The main findings of the chapter can be summarised in
the following:
The proposed methodology for the estimation of the key Bloom filter computation param-
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eters yields appropriate values, which reach a balance between all requirements proposed
in the ISO/IEC IS 24745 on biometric information protection [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT
Security Techniques, 2011].
In general, there is no accuracy loss in the protected domain. Furthermore, for the proposed
multi-biometrics scheme, an EER as low as 0.1% is achieved for the weighted feature level
fusion, showing a 85% relative improvement with respect to the best performing individual
protected characteristic.
Only secure irreversible templates are stored in the database or handled at verification
time. Furthermore, those references are robust to the reconstruction attack proposed by
Bringer et al. [2015], hence achieving irreversibility.
Templates are also unlinkable and robust to already proposed cross-matching attacks
[Bringer et al., 2015; Hermans et al., 2014].
Revocability is achieved with the introduction of the permutation key, thus fulfilling the
requirements of the ISO/IEC IS 24745 [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques,
2011].
Since no plain information is shared, no biometric information is leaked, thereby preventing
inverse biometrics attacks such as the ones presented in Chapter 4.
The proposed weighted feature-level fusion not only provides the highest security level,
requiring the use of a single protected template, but also outperforms the accuracy achieved
by a weighted score level fusion.
This chapter includes novel contributions in:
The proposal of an improved unlinkable and irreversible template protection scheme based
on Bloom filters.
The description of a general framework for the application of Bloom filter based template
protection to any given characteristic.
The proposal of the first template protection scheme for face biometrics based on Bloom
filters.
The proposal of the first template protection scheme for fingervein biometrics based on
Bloom filters.
The proposal of the first multi-biometrics template protection scheme based on Bloom
filters based on a weighted feature level fusion, for templates of possibly different sizes.
The thorough security and privacy evaluation of the aforementioned schemes, taking into
account potential cross-matching attacks.
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Chapter 6
Biometric Template Protection
Based on Homomorphic Encryption
In this chapter we present a generic Biometric and Multi-Biometric Template Protection
scheme based on Homomorphic Encryption to deal with the privacy issues unveiled in Chapter 4.
Then, we evaluate it in terms of accuracy, irreversibility, unlinkability and computational com-
plexity, in accordance with the security and privacy evaluation protocol established in Chapter 3,
Sect. 3.2, and with the requirements established in the ISO/IEC 24745 International Standard
on biometric information protection [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011].
As indicated in Chapter 2, signal processing in the encrypted domain provides a secure and
elegant way to overcome privacy problems [Barni et al., 2015; Lagendijk et al., 2013]. However,
its application to biometric recognition systems is still very recent and limited to unimodal
fixed-length templates for face, iris or fingerprint.
In this chapter, we present three different systems:
A scheme based on fixed-length templates, where implementations for computing similarity
scores with the Mahalanobis, Euclidean or Cosine distances are given.
A scheme using variable-length templates and based on the Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW) algorithm.
A multi-biometrics system for feature, score and decision level fusion. In all cases, all
computations are carried out in the encrypted domain and only encrypted information is
stored or exchanged, in order to avoid any privacy leakage.
It should be also noted that, contrary to the cancelable biometrics approach presented in
Chapter 5, in this case the result of the encrypted similarity function is equivalent to that
of the unprotected template comparison, whether it is a plain distance measure in the fixed-
length templates approach, or the results of a series of distance measurements within the DTW
algorithm for the variable-length templates.
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According to the security and privacy evaluation methodology described in Chapter 3,
Sect. 3.2, the verification accuracy of all the schemes is analysed on a single multimodal and
publicly available database, in order to contribute reproducible research and avoid biased re-
sults. Furthermore, other desired properties of BTPs, such as irreversibility, unlinkability and
computational complexity, are analysed and compared among the cases studies evaluated.
The chapter is structured as follows. Sect. 6.1 gives a brief introduction to Homomorphic
Encryption and presents the novel schemes, with one subsection dedicated to each of them:
Sect. 6.1.1 describes fixed-length template protection, Sect. 6.1.2 describes variable-length tem-
plate protection and Sect. 6.1.3 describes multi-biometric template protection. All methods are
analysed on Sect. 6.2, in terms of accuracy (Sect. 6.2.1), irreversibility (Sect. 6.2.2) and unlinka-
bility (Sect. 6.2.3), as well as computational complexity (Sect. 6.2.4), for a case study on on-line
signature and fingerprint. The chapter summary and conclusions are presented in Sect. 6.3.
This chapter assumes a basic understanding of the fundamentals of pattern recognition [Duda
et al., 2001; Theodoridis and Koutroumbas, 2008], image processing [Gonzalez and Woods,
2006], public key cryptography [Ferguson and Schneier, 2003; Goldwasser and Micali, 1984] and
Homomorphic Encryption [Fontaine and Galand, 2007].
This chapter is based on the publications: Gomez-Barrero et al. [2016a,b,c].
We will use the following notation throughout the Chapter:
Tp = {p1, . . . , pf , . . . , pF } and Tr = {r1, . . . , rf , . . . , rF }: one-dimensional probe and ref-
erence unprotected templates, comprising F features.
STp = {pu1 , . . . , puf , . . . , puF }Uu=1: two-dimensional unprotected templates, comprising F×U
features puf . Each F -dimensional point is denoted as STp[u] = p
u = {pu1 , . . . , ptuF }. To
simplify notation, to refer to any generic point we will use p = {p1, . . . , pF }.
Sdist = ddist (Tp,Tr): similarity score between two templates Tp and Tr, where ddist is a
particular distance function: maha stands for Mahalanobis, euc for Euclidean and cos for
cosine.
m and m∗: plain message and its corresponding ciphertext.
m∗ = Epk (m, s), where E denotes the encryption function, s a random number and pk the
public key, and E is defined in Eq. 6.1. To avoid overcomplicated notation, the encrypted
values Epk (m, s) will be simply denoted as E (m), even though the random number s and
the public key pk are needed for the encryption computation.
m = Dsk (m
∗), where D denotes the decryption function and sk the private key, being D
defined in Eq. 6.2.
E (Tr)dist: encrypted reference template for each distance measure. As will be explained in
Sect. 6.1.1, and defined in Eqs. 6.12 and 6.15, the encrypted template E (Tr)dist is different
for each distance. So the reader should be aware that E (Tr) 6= {E (r1) , . . . , E (rF )}. This
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is due to the impossibility to carry out some operations, such as division or square roots, in
the encrypted domain. One of the contributions of the Dissertation is defining E (Tr)dist
for each distance measure, so that the score can be directly computed in the encrypted
domain.
E (Sdist): encrypted similarity score, computed between Tp and E (Tr)dist as defined in
Eqs. 6.8, 6.11 and 6.14. Following E (Tr)dist, a contribution of the Dissertation is defining,
for each of the three considered distance measures, the function E (Sdist) that takes as input
Tp and E (Tr)dist, and outputs directly the encrypted score with no decryptions involved
in the process.
6.1. Biometric Template Protection Based on Homomorphic En-
cryption
In general, biometric recognition can be performed involving two different entities, as de-
picted in Fig. 6.1 (left):
A client, which acquires the probe biometric sample, extracts the features and encodes
them in the probe template Tp. Then it generates the similarity score S between the probe
Tp and reference templates Tr, and computes the final mated/non-mated verification
decision D = (S > δ), where δ is the pre-defined verification threshold.
A server, which holds the database with the reference templates Tr and sends them to the
client during verification.
Such a client-server model might be found, for example, in banking environments, where a
central server holds the clients’ information, which can be accessed from any local branch.
Due to the issues unveiled in Chapter 4, derived from the use of unprotected templates, the
server must process the client’s probe biometric data without extracting any information from
it, and at the same time, the server must protect the information stored in the database [Barni
et al., 2015]. Therefore, in order to increase the privacy of the subject, in the protected system
(see Fig. 6.1, right) all the data, either stored or shared between client and either the database
or the authentication servers in the verification process, should be encrypted. The database
and authentication server should be separate entities in order to avoid information leakage: if
encrypted templates were stored with the decryption key, sk, a malicious server or an eventual
external attacker could use the secret key to decrypt the templates. As a consequence, we define
two different entities and assume that both servers do not collude.
The new roles of the client and the servers are thus the following:
The client acquires the probe biometric sample, extracts the corresponding template Tp,
computes the encrypted similarity score E(S) and sends it to the authentication server.
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Figure 6.1: Unprotected vs Protected Biometric Verification. In the unprotected scenario (left),
a probe biometric sample is acquired and its features extracted (Tp). The similarity score with respect
to the probe reference, Tr, is computed (S). Then, the final output is the mated/non-mated decision,
D = (S > δ). In the protected scenario (right), all the encrypted data or information flow is depicted in
red: E (Tr) and E (S).
The DB server holds the database comprising only encrypted templates, and sends the
encrypted reference template E(Tr) to the client during verification.
The authentication server holds the key pair (pk, sk) and computes the final verification
decision D.
As it may be observed, since the client does not know sk, he cannot decrypt the reference
template E (Tr) or the similarity score E (S). This way, the comparator can be moved to the
authentication server and S cannot be used to carry out hill-climbing attacks that need access to
the score in order to be performed [Galbally et al., 2010b; Gomez-Barrero et al., 2014a; Maiorana
et al., 2015]. Furthermore, as it will be shown in Sects. 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, the probe template Tp
does not need to be encrypted, since it never leaves the client. As a consequence there is no leak
of biometric information in the communication channel.
In order to encrypt the data, the Paillier homomorphic probabilistic encryption scheme [Pail-
lier, 1999] is used, which is based on the decisional composite residuosity assumption (DCRA):
given a composite n and an integer z, it is hard to decide whether z is an n-residue modulo n2.
In other words, it is hard to decided whether there exists y such that z = yn mod n2.
As any other public key encryption scheme, two separate keys are required: i) a public key
pk for encryption, and ii) a private or secret key sk for decryption. In the Paillier cryptosystem,
the public key is defined as pk = (n, g), where n = p · q with p and q two large prime numbers
such that gcd (pq, (p− 1) (q − 1)) = 1, and g ∈ Z∗n2 . On the other hand, the secret key is defined
as sk = (λ, µ), where λ = lcm (p− 1, q − 1) and µ = (gλ mod n2)−1 mod n.
Given a message m ∈ Zn, its encryption is denoted as m∗ = Epk (m, s) ∈ Z∗n2 , and computed
as follows:
Epk (m, s) = g
m · sn mod n2 (6.1)
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where s ∈ Z∗n is a random number providing the probabilistic nature of the cryptosystem. This
property is necessary to grant semantic security against chosen-plaintext attacks [Goldwasser
and Micali, 1984]. In particular, different ciphertexts are obtained when the same plaintext is
encrypted several times using the same public key: Epk (m, s1) 6= Epk (m, s2). This randomness
provides the required unlinkability to the protected templates: even if the exact same unpro-
tected features are extracted from a particular biometric sample, the encrypted templates would
be different.
Paillier [1999] showed that E is a one-way function (i.e., irreversible) if and only if the
decisional composite residuosity assumption holds. Therefore, a computationally-bound attacker
in possession of an encrypted message m∗ (a protected biometric template) and the public key pk
would not be able to extract any information about the plaintext m (biometric information). He
could only do so if he obtained the secret key sk and decrypted the ciphertext m∗ = Epk (m, s)
as follows
m = Dsk (m
∗) = L
(
(m∗)λ mod n2
)
· µ mod n (6.2)
where L(t) = (t− 1) /n.
The main advantage of HE schemes with respect to other cryptosystems is the fact that some
operations can be carried out in the encrypted domain, yielding ciphertexts whose corresponding
plaintexts are the same we would obtain performing the operations over the plaintexts. In par-
ticular, the Paillier cryptosystem fulfils two properties which will be used in the present scheme.
On the one hand, the product of two ciphertexts, m∗1 = Epk (m1, s1) and m∗2 = Epk (m2, s2), will
decrypt to the sum of their corresponding plaintexts:
Dsk
(
m∗1 ·m∗2 mod n2
)
= m1 +m2 mod n (6.3)
On the other hand, an encrypted plaintext, m∗1 = Epk (m1, s1), raised to a constant l, will
decrypt to the product of the plaintext and the constant:
Dsk
(
(m∗1)
l mod n2
)
= m1 · l mod n (6.4)
As a consequence, while an unlimited number of summations can be carried out in the
encrypted domain, only some products can be computed - as it is shown in Eq. 6.4, one of the
factors should be a plaintext. This fact poses a severe challenge for the implementation of many
similarity measures or machine learning algorithms.
6.1.1. Fixed-Length Templates
Due to the aforementioned limitation on the operations that can be carried out in the en-
crypted domain, the main difficulty of designing BTP schemes based on HE lies in the implemen-
tation of complex algorithms for the comparison of probe and reference templates. Therefore,
an efficient and straightforward approach consists on computing S as the distance between the
probe Tp and the reference template Tr, S = d (Tp,Tr) (see Eqs. 6.6, 6.10 and 6.13). Based on
this concept, the general diagram of the proposed fixed-length verification system is depicted in
Fig. 6.2, where three entities are involved:
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Figure 6.2: General diagram of fixed-length template protection. A local client acquires and
extracts the features of the probe template (Tp) and computes the encrypted dissimilarity score (E (S))
between the probe and the reference templates (Tr), according to Eqs. 6.8, 6.11 and 6.14. The DB server
holds the encrypted database and the authentication server holds the key pair (pk, sk) and outputs the
final decision. All the encrypted values, either stored or transmitted on the communication channel, are
depicted in red.
The client, which acquires the probe biometric sample, extracts the corresponding template
Tp, computes the encrypted similarity score E(Sdist) and sends it to the authentication
server.
The DB server, which holds the database comprising only encrypted templates, and sends
the encrypted reference template E(Tr)dist to the client during verification.
The authentication server, which holds the key pair (pk, sk) and computes the final veri-
fication decision D.
As it may be observed, identity verification is carried out in six successive steps:
0. During enrolment, the reference biometric templates are encrypted using the server public
key pk. The encrypted templates E (Tr)dist are stored in the database (the encrypted data
stored for each distance is explained in the next subsections).
1. The client captures the probe sample and extracts the features, generating the probe
template Tp.
2. The DB server sends the reference template E (Tr)dist, encrypted using an HE scheme, to
the client.
3. The client computes the encrypted distance between the reference and the probe templates
E (Sdist), given only Tp and E (Tr)dist (the implementation of the different distances in
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the encrypted domain is explained in the next subsections). It should be noted that one
encrypted distance per reference template is computed: E (Smdist), with m = 1, . . . ,M .
Then, the product of those scores is considered as the final encrypted similarity score:
E (Sdist) =
∏M
m=1E (S
m
dist), which corresponds to the sum of the scores in the unencrypted
domain (see Eq. 6.3).
4. The client sends E (Sdist) to the authentication server.
5. The authentication server decrypts the score, using the secret key sk, thus obtaining Sdist.
6. Finally, the authentication server generates and outputs the final genuine/impostor verifi-
cation decision D = (Sdist > δ), where δ is a predefined threshold.
It should be noted that, in order to compute E (Sdist), we need to take into account the
aforementioned limitations in the operations we can perform in the encrypted domain, and the
fact that we can only work with integers. Additionally, all features should be in the same value
range in order to carry out the fusion of several characteristics in the multi-biometrics system.
To that end, we will consider a two-step approach. First, the real-valued extracted features
will be normalized to the interval [0, 1]. Then, we will transform those normalized real-valued
features to integer values in a bigger range, in our experiments [0, 103], in order to retain as
much information as possible:
X → round (103 X) (6.5)
6.1.1.1. Encrypted Mahalanobis Distance
Given a user model Tr = (µ, σ), where µ = {µ1, . . . , µF } and σ = {σ21, . . . , σ2F } are the
mean and the variance vectors of a set of M stored reference templates, the square Mahalanobis
distance of a given template Tp = {p1, . . . , pF } to the model in the encrypted domain is defined
as (Fig. 6.1 left)
d2maha (Tp,Tr) =
F∑
f=1
(pf − µf )2
σ2f
(6.6)
Let us see how to compute each addend in the encrypted domain. In order to deal with large
enough integers, each of them will be multiplied by 106:
106
(pf − µf )2
σ2f
= 106
(
p2f
σ2f
+
µ2f
σ2f
− 2pfµf
σ2f
)
= p2f
106
σ2f
+ µ2f
106
σ2f
− 2pfµf 10
6
σ2f
(6.7)
Applying Eqs. 6.3 and 6.4, the client can compute E (Smaha) as (Fig. 6.1 right)
E (Smaha) =
F∏
f=1
E
(
106
σ2f
)p2f
· E
(
µ2f
106
σ2f
)
· E
(
µf
106
σ2f
)−2pf (6.8)
where all three ciphertexts (i.e., encrypted information in Eq. 6.8) are sent by the server, and
exponentiations locally computed on the client side. Therefore, we define the reference template
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as
E (Tr)maha =
{
maha1∗f ,maha2
∗
f ,maha3
∗
f
}F
f=1
(6.9)
where maha1∗f = E
(
106
σ2f
)
, maha2∗f = E
(
µ2f
106
σ2f
)
and maha3∗f = E
(
µf
106
σ2f
)
.
In order to be able to encrypt those values, let us now see that 106/σ2f is an integer value. By
Popoviciu’s inequality, given a random variable X ∈ [0, c], V ar (X) ≤ c2/4. Since pf ∈ [0, 103],
we have σ2f = V ar (pf ) ≤ 106/4⇔ 106/σ2f ≥ 4.
6.1.1.2. Encrypted Euclidean Distance
Given two F -dimensional templates Tp and Tr in the unprotected domain the score Seuc =
d2euc (Tp,Tr), can be efficiently computed as (Fig. 6.1 left)
Seuc =
F∑
f=1
p2f + r
2
f − 2pfrf (6.10)
Then, using Eqs. 6.3 and 6.4, the encrypted score can be directly computed in the encrypted
domain without performing any encryptions in the client (Fig. 6.1 right) as
E (Seuc) =
F∏
f=1
E (1)p
2
f · E (r2f) · E (rf )−2pf = F∏
f=1
(1∗)p
2
f · euc∗1f ·
(
euc∗2f
)−2pf (6.11)
The subject’s reference template stored in the encrypted database is thus defined by the following
ciphertexts:
E (Tr)euc = {1∗} ∪
{
euc1∗f , euc1
∗
f
}F
f=1
(6.12)
where euc1∗f = E
(
r2f
)
and euc2∗f = E (rf ). As a consequence, all cyphertexts involved in
Eq. 6.11 are sent by the server, and products and exponentiations locally computed on the
client.
It should be noted that, given the probabilistic nature of the Paillier cryptosystem, E (1)
can be computed and stored separately for each subject at enrolment time, leading to different
encrypted values and thereby increasing the security and privacy of the subject.
6.1.1.3. Encrypted Cosine Similarity
The cosine similarity between two F -dimensional vectors Tp and Tr is defined in the unen-
crypted domain (Fig. 6.1 left) as
dcos (Tp,Tr) =
Tp ·Tr
‖Tp‖ · ‖Tr‖ =
F∑
f=1
pf · rf
‖Tp‖ · ‖Tr‖ (6.13)
Since dcos (Tp,Tr) is a positive number in the range [0, 1], in order to have a bigger range
of values that allows a comparison among integers with no significant information loss, we can
126
6.1 Biometric Template Protection Based on Homomorphic Encryption
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡𝑈×𝑉– Cost matrix 
Probe Temp. 𝐒𝐓𝑝 
R
ef
. T
em
p
. 𝐒
𝐓
𝑟
 
 
 
For each cell 𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢, 𝑣], given 𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣]) and all necessary 
𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[… ], compute the minimum between: 
𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢 − 1, 𝑣] + 𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣]) 
𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢 − 1, 𝑣 − 1] + 2 ∙ 𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣]) 
𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢, 𝑣 − 1] + 𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣]) 
 
Initialize first row, given 𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢 − 1,1],  𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[1]: 
𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢, 1] = 𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[1]) + 𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢 − 1,1] 
Initialize first column, given 𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[1, v − 1],  𝐒𝐓𝒑[1], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣]: 
𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[1, 𝑣] = 𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[1], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣]) + 𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[1, 𝑣 − 1] 
 
4 
2 
3 
1 
Initialize first cell, given 𝐒𝐓𝒑[1] and 𝐒𝐓𝒓[1]: 
𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[1,1] = 𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[1], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[1]) 
𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 = 𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑈, 𝑉]  
DTW Computation 
Figure 6.3: Unprotected DTW-based verification. In order to compare the probe STp and the
reference STr templates, the optimal path, depicted in red, minimizing the Euclidean distance between
points, is computed following the DTW algorithm. A cost matrix, Path is built in four steps. The last
entry of the matrix contains the final score SDTW .
compute the final similarity as Scos = 10
12dcos (Tp,Tr), which can be directly computed in the
encrypted domain (Fig. 6.1 right) as
E (Scos) =
F∏
f=1
E
(
106rf
‖Tr‖
)106pf/‖Tp‖
=
F∏
f=1
(
cos∗f
)106pf/‖Tp‖ (6.14)
The subject’s reference template stored in the encrypted database is therefore defined as
E (Tr)cos =
{
cos∗f
}F
f=1
(6.15)
where the ciphertexts cos∗f = E
(
106rf
‖Tr‖
)
. Therefore, all cyphertexts involved in Eq. 6.14 are sent
by the server, and products and exponentiations locally computed on the client.
It should be finally noted that, since yf ∈ [0, 103], we have ‖Tr‖ =
√∑F
f=1 r
2
f ≤
√∑F
f=1 10
6 =
103
√
F . Therefore, 106rf/‖Tr‖ ≥ 106rf/103
√
F = 103rf/
√
F . Assuming 103 >
√
F , 106rf/‖Tr‖ ≥
rf , which yields large enough integers to encrypt.
6.1.2. Variable-Length Templates
In spite of the efficiency of the scheme proposed in the previous section, for some biometric
characteristics, such as the signature, better recognition rates are achieved using variable-length
templates. To that end, we propose here an implementation within the Paillier cryptosystem
of the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) described in Sect. 3.3.6.1. The baseline unprotected
system, in order to obtain a dissimilarity score between the probe (STp, of dimensions U × F )
and the reference templates (STr, of dimensions V × F ), computes a cost matrix (PathU×V ),
minimizing the distance between signature points in terms of their Euclidean distance. To that
end, four steps are carried out (see Fig. 6.3):
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1. Initialize first cell:
Path[1, 1] = d2euc (STp[1],STr[1])
2. Initialize first row:
Path[u, 1] = d2euc (STp[u],STr[1]) + Path[u− 1, 1]
3. Initialize first column:
Path[1, v] = d2euc (STp[1],STr[v]) + Path[1, v − 1]
4. For each of the remaining cells, Path[u, v] is defined as the minimum between three options:
Path[u− 1, v − 1] + 2 · d2euc (STp[u],STr[v])
Path[u− 1, v] + d2euc (STp[u],STr[v])
Path[u, v − 1] + d2euc (STp[u],STr[v])
The final dissimilarity score is the last cell of the matrix, namely SDTW = Path[U, V ].
Building upon this unprotected scheme and the approach proposed in [Zhu et al., 2014],
a diagram of the encrypted DTW algorithm is shown in Fig. 6.4. As it may be observed, in
contrast to its unencrypted version (Fig. 6.3), all computations are now carried out directly in
the encrypted domain, yielding an encrypted cost matrix E (PathU×V ), obtained from a plain
probe template STp and an encrypted reference template E (STr), where each of the V points
are stored as defined in Eq. 6.12. To this end, Eqs. 6.3 and 6.4 are applied to convert steps 1 to
4 to the encrypted domain. This way, summations of plaintexts are substituted by products in
the encrypted domain, and products of plaintexts by exponentiations.
The encrypted DTW shown in Fig. 6.4 is used as the matching function of the full verification
system depicted in Fig. 6.5. In the complete system, three entities are involved:
A client, which captures the probe signature sample, extracts the template STp, and
computes the encrypted cost matrix E (PathU×V ) and the encrypted score E (SDTW )
between the probe template and the encrypted reference E (STr).
A DB server, which holds the database comprising encrypted templates.
An authentication server, which collaborates with the client on computing E (SDTW ) and
outputs the final binary verification decision D = (SDTW > δ).
Therefore, two different issues need to be solved in the encrypted domain: i) compute the
encrypted Euclidean distance between two points r and p, E
(
d2euc (r,p)
)
, having as input r
and E (p) (see steps 1 to 4 in Fig. 6.4); and ii) compute the minimum between three encrypted
values in the E (Path) matrix (see step 4 in Fig. 6.4 and steps 4 to 6 in Fig. 6.5). The first
issue was already solved in Sect. 6.1.1.2.
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For each cell 𝐸(𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢, 𝑣]), given 𝐸 (𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣])) and all necessary 
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𝐸(𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢 − 1, 𝑣]) ∙ 𝐸 (𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣])) 
𝐸(𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢 − 1, 𝑣 − 1]) ∙ 𝐸 (𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣]))
2
 
𝐸(𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢, 𝑣 − 1]) ∙ 𝐸 (𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣])) 
 
Initialize first row in enc. domain, given (𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢 − 1,1]),  𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐸(𝐒𝐓𝒓[1]): 
𝐸(𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢, 1]) = 𝐸 (𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[𝑢], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[1])) ∙ 𝐸( 𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑢 − 1,1]) 
Initialize first column in enc. dom., given (𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[1, v − 1]),  𝐒𝐓𝒑[1], 𝐸(𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣]): 
𝐸(𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[1, 𝑣]) = 𝐸 (𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[1], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[𝑣])) ∙ 𝐸(𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[1, 𝑣 − 1]) 
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Initialize first cell in the encrypted domain, given 𝐒𝐓𝒑[1] and 𝐸(𝐒𝐓𝒓[1]): 
𝐸(𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[1,1]) = 𝐸 (𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐
2 (𝐒𝐓𝒑[1], 𝐒𝐓𝒓[1])) 
𝐸(𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊) = 𝐸(𝐏𝐚𝐭𝐡[𝑈, 𝑉])  
Encrypted DTW Computation 
Figure 6.4: Encrypted DTW-based verification. In order to compare the probe STp and the
encrypted reference E (STr) templates, the encrypted optimal path, depicted in red, minimizing the Eu-
clidean distance between points, is computed following the DTW algorithm depicted in Fig. 6.3. An
encrypted cost matrix, E (Path) is built in four steps. The last entry of the matrix contains the final
score E (SDTW ). It should be noted that all computations are carried out in the encrypted domain.
In order to compute the minimum between three numbers,
a = Path[u− 1, v − 1] + 2 · d2euc (STp[u],STr[v]),
b = Path[u− 1, v] + d2euc (STp[u],STr[v]), and
c = Path[u, v − 1] + d2euc (STp[u],STr[v])
from which only its encrypted values are known to the client, and without revealing any in-
formation about the plain values involved to the authentication server, a two-phase protocol is
established (Fig. 6.5, steps 4 to 6):
In step 4, the client generates a list to hide the values to minimize, E (minList). To that
end, he computes a set of K random values N = {nmin, n2, . . . , nK}, where nk > nmin
for k = 2, . . . ,K. Then, the values to be minimized are obscured with nmin: E (m) →
E (m+ nmin) = E (m) · E (nmin), with m = {a, b, c}. To further hide those values, K − 1
additional numbers are generated randomly choosing one of those original three values,
mk ∈ {a, b, c}, and obscuring it with the remaining values in N : E (mk)→ E (mk) ·E (nk),
for k = 2, . . . ,K. This way, the list comprises:
E (minList) =
 E (a+ nmin) , E (b+ nmin) , E (c+ nmin)E (mk + nk) ,with mk ∈ {a, b, c} , k = 2, . . . ,K (6.16)
In step 5, the client then sends the complete list E (minList) to the authentication server,
who decrypts all the values using its secret key sk, and computes the obscured minimum,
minCost+ nmin.
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Figure 6.5: General diagram of variable-length template protection. A local client acquires and
extracts the features of the probe sample (STp) and computes the encrypted dissimilarity score (E (SDTW ))
between the probe and the reference templates (STr), in collaboration with a centralized authentication
server. This server holds the key pair (pk, sk) and outputs the final decision. The DB server holds the
encrypted database. All the encrypted values, either stored or transmitted, are depicted in red.
In step 6, the authentication server sends its encryption back to the client: E (minCost+ nmin).
This way, the client can finally compute E (minCost) = E (minCost+ nmin) · E (nmin)−1.
Finally the complete verification process is composed of nine steps (see Fig. 6.5):
0. During enrolment, the reference templates STr are acquired, encrypted using the server
public key pk to generate E (STr)euc as defined in Eq. 6.12, and stored in the database:
E (STr) =
1∗,{E (rvf)}Ff=1 , E
 F∑
f=1
(
rvf
)2
V
v=1
(6.17)
1. The client captures the probe signature sample and extracts the template:
STp =
{{
puf
}F
f=1
}U
u=1
(6.18)
2. The DB server sends the encrypted reference template E (STr) to the client.
Steps 3 to 6 are related to the iterative encrypted DTW verification algorithm, depicted
inside a green box in Fig. 6.5. In order to obtain the encrypted score, E (SDTW ), between
de probe template, STp, and the encrypted reference, E (STr), each value of the encrypted
cost matrix E (Path[u, v]) is computed as follows:
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3. The client calculates the encrypted Euclidean distance E
(
d2euc (STp[u],STr[v])
)
ac-
cording to Eq. 6.11.
4. If u, v 6= 1 (Fig. 6.4 step 4), the minimum between three values is computed following
the two step protocol established above. In this first step, the client generates an encrypted
list of values E (minList) and sends it to the authentication server.
5. The authentication server decrypts the list using sk, finds the obscured minimum
minCost+ rmin and re-encrypts it with pk.
6. The authentication server sends the re-encrypted minimum value to the client, setting
E (Path[u, v]) = E (minCost).
7. When the iterative process is finished, the client sends E (SDTW ) = Path[U, V ] to the
authentication server.
8. The authentication server decrypts the score with sk, obtaining SDTW .
9. In the last step, the authentication server generates and outputs the final binary verification
decision: D = (SDTW > δ).
6.1.3. Multi-Biometric Template Protection
In order to increase the recognition rates and security provided by BTP schemes, this section
builds upon the encrypted distance measures described in Sect. 6.1.1 to present a new HE-based
general multi-biometric template protection framework for each fusion level (i.e., feature, score
and decision level). In order to avoid overcomplicated notation and with no loss of generality, we
will stick to the case of fusing two biometric characteristics: in this particular case study, on-line
signature and fingerprint, thus using the superindices fp for fingerprints, sg for signatures and
fused for the fusion, where necessary. However, it should be noted that the present framework
can be applied to the fusion of any number of characteristics.
6.1.3.1. Feature Level Fusion
At this level, a single protected template comprising all the features, related to both signature
and fingerprint, is stored in the database and used at verification time. Therefore, all features
are concatenated in a single encrypted template, and a single verification encrypted score E (S)
is computed. Identity verification is thus carried out in six steps, as shown in Fig. 6.6:
0. During enrolment, the reference biometric templates are encrypted using the server public
key pk. The encrypted templates E
(
Tfp+sgr
)
(see Eqs. 6.9, 6.12 and 6.15) are stored in
the database.
1. Biometric samples are acquired and a single template, Tfp+sgp , is extracted on the client.
2. The DB server sends the encrypted enrolled template to the client, E
(
Tfp+sgr
)
.
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Figure 6.6: General diagram of multi-biometric feature level fusion. A local client acquires
and extracts the features of the probe samples, fusing them into a single template (Tfp+sgp ). Then it
computes the encrypted dissimilarity score (E (S)) between the probe and the reference templates (Tfp+sgr ),
sending it to a centralized authentication server. This server holds the key pair (pk, sk) and outputs the
final decision. The DB server holds the encrypted database. All the encrypted values, either stored or
transmitted on the communication channel, are depicted in red.
3. The client computes the similarity score in the encrypted domain: E (S), according to
Eqs. 6.8, 6.11 and 6.14 (depending on the distance measure selected as encrypted similarity
function).
4. The encrypted score E (S) is sent to the authentication server.
5. The authentication server decrypts the score using the secret key, sk.
6. Finally, the authentication server compares the score to the verification threshold δ and
outputs a mated/non-mated verification decision.
6.1.3.2. Score Level Fusion
In this approach, each biometric characteristic will be processed separately, generating two
individual probe templates: Tfpp and T
sg
p . Similarly, the DB server stores and sends E(T
fp
r )
and E(Tsgr ). The client matches them independently to T
fp
p and T
sg
p according to Eqs. 6.8, 6.11
and 6.14, depending on the distance measure considered, producing two individual encrypted
scores E
(
Sfp
)
and E (Ssg).
In order to normalise the individual scores prior to the fusion, several approaches are proposed
in [Jain et al., 2005]. However, it is not possible to implement most of them in the encrypted
domain without increasing the computational load due to the restriction in the type of operations
that can be performed. We therefore propose a different and simpler approach, that achieves
the same accuracy as the min-max rule in the unprotected domain. Since all the scores are
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computed with the same distance measure and all the features are normalised to [0, 103], for
each particular distance the range of variation of the scores will depend on the dimensionality
of the templates. Therefore, assuming that the dimensionality of the fingerprint vector is higher(
F fp > F sg
)
, we can perform the following normalisation, which in turn can be easily computed
in the encrypted domain:
S′sg = βSsg ⇒ E (S′sg) = E (Ssg)β (6.19)
where β is estimated as the average ratio between Sfp and Ssg for the mated scores.
Then, the final score is computed as the weighted sum of the two partial scores:
S = α · β · Ssg + (10− α) · Sfp (6.20)
where α ∈ [0, 10] and β is the aforementioned normalising parameter.
This way, it follows that the final encrypted score E (S) can be directly computed from the
partial fingerprint and signature encrypted scores, E
(
Sfp
)
and E (Ssg), as
E (S) = E(Ssg)α·β · E(Sfp)10−α (6.21)
Seven steps are therefore carried out for verification, as depicted in Fig. 6.7:
0. During enrolment, the reference biometric templates are encrypted using the server public
key pk. The encrypted templates E(Tfpr ) and E(T
sg
r ) (see Eqs. 6.9, 6.12 and 6.15) are
stored in the database.
1. Biometric samples are acquired and two different templates, Tfpp and T
sg
p , are extracted
on the client.
2. The DB server sends the encrypted enrolled templates to the client for each biometric
characteristic, E(Tfpr ) and E(T
sg
r ).
3. The client computes in parallel the similarity score for each biometric characteristic in the
encrypted domain: E(Sfp) and E(Ssg), according to Eqs. 6.8, 6.11 and 6.14 (depending
on the distance measure selected as encrypted similarity function).
4. The client fuses the individual scores according to Eq. 6.21.
5. The final encrypted score E (S) is sent to the authentication server.
6. The authentication server decrypts the score using the secret key, sk.
7. Finally, the authentication server compares the score to the verification threshold δ and
outputs a mated/non-mated verification decision.
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Figure 6.7: General diagram of multi-biometric score level fusion. A local client acquires and
extracts the features of the probe samples, Tfpp and T
fp
p . Then it computes the encrypted dissimilarity
scores (E
(
Sfp
)
and E (Ssg)) between the probe and the reference templates (Tfpr and T
sg
r ). Finally, both
scores are fused into a single score E (S), which is sent to a centralized authentication server. This server
holds the key pair (pk, sk) and outputs the final decision. The DB server holds the encrypted templates.
All the encrypted values, either stored or transmitted on the communication channel, are depicted in red.
6.1.3.3. Decision Level Fusion
As in the score level fusion, in this case, each probe biometric sample acquired at the client
is processed separately, generating two separate templates: Tfpp and T
sg
p . Both templates are
independently compared on the client to E(Tfpr ) and E(T
sg
r ), generating two partial scores
E
(
Sfp
)
and E (Ssg), which are sent to the authentication server. The final binary decision is
computed by the server taking into account both partial decisions (Dsg and Dfp), fused with
the OR rule:
Dsg = (Ssg > δsg) (6.22)
Dfp =
(
Sfp > δfp
)
(6.23)
DOR = D
sg OR Dfp (6.24)
Although the OR rule has been considered in this chapter, as the proposed protection frame-
work is general, any other logic rule could also be used (e.g., AND).
As in the previous case, seven steps are carried out during verification (see Fig. 6.8):
0. During enrolment, the reference biometric templates are encrypted using the server public
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Figure 6.8: General diagram of multi-biometric decision level fusion. A local client acquires
and extracts the features of the probe samples, Tfpp and T
fp
p . Then it computes the encrypted dissimilarity
scores (E
(
Sfp
)
and E (Ssg)) between the probe and the reference templates (Tfpr and T
sg
r ), sending them
to a centralized server. This server holds the key pair (pk, sk), computes the partial decisions Dfp and
Dsg, fuses them and outputs the final decision. The DB server holds the encrypted templates. All the
encrypted values, either stored or transmitted on the communication channel, are depicted in red.
key pk. The encrypted templates E(Tfpr ) and E(T
sg
r ) (see Eqs. 6.9, 6.12 and 6.15) are
stored in the database.
1. Biometric samples are acquired and two different templates, Tfpp and T
sg
p , are extracted
on the client.
2. The DB server sends the encrypted enrolled templates to the client for each biometric
characteristic, E(Tfpr ) and E(T
sg
r ).
3. The client computes in parallel the similarity score for each biometric characteristic in the
encrypted domain: E(Sfp) and E(Ssg), according to Eqs. 6.8, 6.11 and 6.14 (depending
on the distance measure selected as encrypted similarity function).
4. The individual encrypted scores, E(Sfp) and E(Ssg), are sent to the authentication server.
5. The authentication server decrypts both scores using the secret key, sk.
6. Each score is compared to its corresponding threshold (δfp and δsg) in order to generate
the individual decision, Dfp and Dsg.
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7. Finally, the authentication server fuses the individual Dfp and Dsg decisions (in this
particular case following the OR rule) and outputs a mated/non-mated verification decision.
6.2. Experimental Evaluation
Following the methodology described in Chapter 3, Sect. 3.2, for the security and privacy
evaluation of biometric systems, an experimental and theoretical analysis will be carried out,
involving four key steps:
Accuracy analysis: verification accuracy will be evaluated in Sect. 6.2.1 over the pub-
licly available BiosecurID Multimodal database [Fierrez et al., 2009]. We will compare
the accuracy of the biometric and multi-biometric systems, for the unprotected and the
protected scenarios.
Irreversibility analysis: given the cryptographic background of the HE algorithm used
for the protection of the templates, this property will be theoretically analysed in Sect. 6.2.2.
Unlinkability analysis: similarly, this second property of the protected templates will
be theoretically analysed in Sect. 6.2.3.
Complexity analysis: finally, we will study the computational complexity at verification
time in Sect. 6.2.4, in terms of the most costly operations (encryptions and decryptions,
products and exponentiations at verification time) and the storage requirements.
6.2.1. Accuracy Analysis
In order to establish a fair comparison between biometric and multi-biometric accuracy, we
have designed a common protocol for all three scenarios (i.e., on-line signature, fingerprint and
multi-biometrics). The database is divided into a train set (first 50 subjects) and a test set
(last 350 subjects). The score normalization parameter β and the score fusion parameter α (see
Eq. 6.21) are estimated over the train set and accuracy is evaluated over the test set. Regarding
the test set, the first 300 subjects are enrolled and modelled with the four samples captured in
the first session. The remaining 12 samples of those first 300 individuals are used for computing
the mated scores (12×300 = 3, 600 mated scores). Then, the first sample of the last 50 subjects
are compared to each subject model, leading to 50× 300 = 15, 000 non-mated scores.
We will first analyse the accuracy of the fixed-length templates, in terms of the Detection
Error Trade-off (DET) curves, which are shown in Fig. 6.9. For on-line signature (left), two
scenarios are considered: i) random forgeries (thick blue lines) and ii) skilled forgeries (thin
purple lines). Only the former can be analysed for fingerprint (right). For both characteristics,
the unprotected system’s curves are depicted with solid dark lines, and the protected scheme
with bright dashed lines. As it may be observed, the dashed curves (HE protected schemes) and
the solid curves (original unprotected systems) completely overlap, except for the Mahalanobis
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Figure 6.9: Unimodal fixed-length accuracy evalution. DET curves for the three distances con-
sidered, for on-line signature (left) and fingerprint (right), under random (thick blue) and skilled (thin
purple) forgeries scenarios, for the original unprotected scheme (solid) and the protected scheme (dashed).
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Figure 6.10: Unimodal variable-length accuracy analysis. DET curves for the three distances
considered, for on-line signature under random (thick blue) and skilled (thin purple) forgeries scenarios,
for the original unprotected scheme (solid) and the protected scheme (dashed).
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Figure 6.11: Multi-biometrics accuracy analysis. DET curves for the Euclidean (thin purple) and
the Cosine similarity (thick blue) for the unprotected (solid) and the protected (dashed) templates, for all
the fusion approaches.
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Table 6.1: Accuracy analysis. EERs for the biometric (only random forgeries scenario) and multi-
biometric systems for the unprotected and the protected domains.
Mahalanobis Euclidean Cosine
Unprotected Protected Unprotected Protected Unprotected Protected
Signature DTW - - 1.0 1.0 - -
Signature 13.7 19.7 4.6 4.6 5.1 5.1
Fingerprint 10.9 10.9 1.6 1.6 3.0 3.0
Feature 9.3 17.0 0.1 0.2 3.0 3.0
Score 17.0 18.7 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.3
Decision 6.3 7.2 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.7
distance in the on-line signature based system (Fig. 6.9a). In this particular case, accuracy
degrades between 44% (random forgeries) and 31% (skilled forgeries) at the Equal Error Rate
(EER). This is due to the fact that this is the only distance which takes into account subject
models, instead of one-to-one comparisons, thus being more severely affected by the rounding
errors introduced by the quantization of the original real-valued features (see Eq. 6.5). Further-
more, while the Cosine and Euclidean distances show a very similar accuracy, the Mahalanobis
distance shows a lower accuracy, regardless of the forgeries scenario.
Regarding the variable-length system, whose DET curves are shown in Fig. 6.10, the same
behaviour can be observed: the curves completely overlap, hence proving there’s no accuracy
degradation. Additionally, as it could be expected, the accuracy for on-line signature is con-
siderably increased using variable-length templates: EER decreases from 4.6% and 8.9%, for
the Euclidean distance, to 1.0% and 5.5%, for the random and the skilled forgeries scenarios,
respectively.
For the multi-biometrics schemes, due to the poor accuracy shown by the Mahalnobis dis-
tance (Figs. 6.9a and 6.9b), we restrict the analysis to the Euclidean and Cosine distances.
First we need to optimize the parameters α and β (see Eq. 6.21 for the score level fusion) over
the train subset, using exhaustive search, in order to obtain the best possible accuracy. Then
the accuracy is analysed over the test subset. The DET curves for the three fusion levels are
depicted Fig. 6.11, where we can observe that accuracy is preserved in all cases. Furthermore,
the feature level fusion offers the highest accuracy with an EER of 0.1%.
Therefore, taking into account all the analyses (EERs are summarised in Table 6.1), two
general trends are observed:
The main take away message of the accuracy analysis is that there is no accuracy loss in
the protected domain: for all biometric (based on either fixed-length or variable length
templates) and multi-biometric schemes, the Euclidean and Cosine distances are robust to
the rounding errors introduced by HE (see Eq. 6.5).
As a secondary observation, the Euclidean distance performs better in all the fixed-length
based schemes considered, specially for the multi-biometric fusion. This is a direct conse-
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quence of the accuracy for the unimodal systems, for which it shows a higher accuracy. In
particular, for the Euclidean distance the EER decreases 92% at feature level, 53% at score
level and 25% at decision level with respect to the best performing unimodal characteristic,
the fingerprint (see Table 6.1).
6.2.2. Irreversibility Analysis
For all biometric and multi-biometric schemes, under an honest-but-curious threat model,
where both parties, client and server, follow the established protocols but may try to learn
additional information about the sample/template on the other side, three different pieces of
information should be hidden:
Only the client can have access to the plain probe biometric data Tp.
The plain reference templates Tr should not be seen by the client, being only their en-
crypted version E (Tr) stored or exchanged.
The plain score S should not be transmitted as it can potentially be used to perform
hill-climbing or inverse-biometrics attacks, such as the ones proposed in Chapter 4.
For each distance measure considered, the information exchanged from the servers to the
client is the encrypted reference template E (Tr)dist. Since only the authentication server knows
the decryption key, sk, there is no way for the client or the DB server to learn any information
from it, given the semantic security granted by Paillier’s cryptosystem against chosen-plaintext
attacks [Anderson, 2001]. Conversely, the client sends no information about the acquired probe
samples Tp to any of the servers.
Additionally, in the particular case of the DTW based scheme, a fourth piece of information
should be hidden both from the servers and from the client:
The optimal path PathU×V .
If the DB server could access this path, with the knowledge of the reference template STr, it
could reconstruct the probe sample being verified, STp, and similarly the client could use STp
to guess the reference template STr.
Furthermore, in order to avoid information leakage about the optimal path, one additional
requirement should be met: given two matrix entries with the same values, their encryption
should be different. Otherwise, a malicious attacker could find out identical segments within
sequences. Given the probabilistic nature of Paillier’s cryptosystem, a given message encrypted
twice with the same key will yield different ciphertexts: Epk (m, s1) 6= Epk (m, s2). We may
therefore conclude that no information can be extracted from identical parts of sequences.
Similarly, in the computation of E (minCost), the server re-encrypts the value of
E (minCost+ nmin), thus yielding a different ciphertext from the one the client sent. This way,
an eventual man-in-the-middle attack could not learn which is the position within the initial
140
6.2 Experimental Evaluation
E (minList) of E (minCost+ nmin), since its value has changed with the re-encryption. In addi-
tion, during this minimum computation protocol, the client only shares with the server encrypted
distances obscured with random values (E (Path[u− 1, v − 1] + nmin), E (Path[u− 1, v] + nmin),
E (Path[u, v − 1] + nmin)), and padded with additional encrypted values, so that not even the
minimum distance minCost is known to the server.
Regarding each multi-biometric fusion level, templates are equally irreversible. However, the
complexity level varies: since both score and decision levels require a separate storage of en-
crypted templates, feature level has been identified as the preferable approach [Kelkboom et al.,
2009; Paul and Gavrilova, 2012]. Furthermore, while only one encrypted score is sent from the
client to the server for the feature and score levels, decision level fusion in our approach requires
the exchange of two different encrypted scores (one per instance), which increases slightly the
complexity of the system as shown in the next section.
We may thus conclude that the first requirement established by the ISO/IEC 24745 standard,
irreversibility, is met.
6.2.3. Unlinkability Analysis
Let us now see why unlinkability is also granted. On the one hand, since unencrypted dis-
tances (i.e., similarity scores) between plaintexts are not preserved in the encrypted domain,
given two samples B1 and B2 stemming from a given instance, their corresponding protected
templates E (T1) and E (T2), encrypted with the same or different keys, are not related. On the
other hand, since the Paillier cryptosystem provides semantic security against chosen-plaintext
attacks [Anderson, 2001], given a protected template E (T1), no information can be feasibly de-
rived about the original unprotected features T1. That way, no comparison can be established
in the unprotected domain between some kind of information retrieved from the protected tem-
plates.
Moreover, since the Paillier cryptosystem is based on probabilistic encryption, the random-
ness incorporated in the encryption algorithm (see Eq. 6.1) leads to different ciphertexts given a
particular message. This means that if Tr is encrypted twice with the same key, the correspond-
ing ciphertexts could not be matched: Epk (Tr, s1) 6= Epk (Tr, s2). It should be noted that this
property is difficult to achieve in cancelable biometric approaches, such as the one proposed in
Chapter 5.
Additionally, as stated in Sect. 6.1, only the server has access to the plain score S, and
the only output is a mated/non-mated verification decision. Therefore, attacks based on the
evolution of the score for different probe signatures, like the hill-climbing attacks described in
[Gomez-Barrero et al., 2014a; Maiorana et al., 2015], or the inverse biometrics methods proposed
in Chapter 4, are prevented: they lack the necessary feedback to reconstruct an appropriate
template or biometric sample.
Finally, we should bear in mind that, even if templates are irreversible and unlinkable, stolen
templates could still be used to impersonate the subject. In that case, a new key pair (sk, pk)
would be generated and the entire database could be re-encrypted (i.e., re-secured) without
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having to re-acquire any new samples from the enrolled subjects, thereby achieving renewability
(as pointed out in Chapter 2, this is not possible with cancelable biometrics approaches).
6.2.4. Computational Complexity Analysis
Finally, the computational cost is estimated in terms of the most complex operations, namely:
encryptions, decryptions, products and exponentiations carried out at verification time. The
encryption of the reference templates E (Tr) stored in the database is done during the enrolment,
where we can assume that time or speed are not restricted.
It should be noted that, for the estimation of the template size (and exchanged data), the
size of the modulo n = p · q has to be taken into account: for a length of |n| bits, ciphertexts will
be 2|n| bits long. In order to achieve a security comparable to a state-of-the-art RSA, we have
chosen a modulo of length |n| = 1024 bits [Catalano et al., 2001], thus leading to ciphertexts of
2,048 bits = 0.25 KB. Additionally, M = 4 enrolment samples are considered.
6.2.4.1. Fixed-Length Templates and Multi-Biometrics
We should first note that no encryptions or decryptions, which are the most costly operations,
are carried out in the local client at verification time for any of the distances or fusion level
approaches proposed. On the server, only one (unimodal scheme, feature and score levels) or
two (decision level) decryptions are needed to compute the final decision D. This way, fast
verification is achieved.
Keeping that remark in mind, let us see some numeric examples in Table 6.2, for the on-line
signature unimodal system (Table 6.2a) and for each fusion level (Tables 6.2b to 6.2d), where
we considered F sg = 40 and F fp = 100 features.
As it may be observed in Table 6.2a, the Mahalanobis distance is the most efficient one:
templates are 25% to 60% smaller than in any of the other two cases, and the number of
products and exponentiations is also the lowest (119 vs 479 or 159, and 80 vs 320 or 160).
However, its verification accuracy drops considerably (see Fig. 6.9 left). On the other hand, the
Cosine similarity shows no accuracy degradation and it can also be computed twice as efficiently
as the Euclidean distance. Therefore, we may conclude that the overall most efficient distance
measure is the Cosine similarity.
On the other hand, it should be observed that, even if template sizes are reasonable (in all
cases lower than 80 KB for the on-line signature system, and lower than 200.25 KB for the
multi-biometric scheme), smaller templates are needed in the unprotected domain, comprising
from |Tsgmaha| = 0.04 KB to |Tfp+sgeuc | = 0.55 KB. This is due to the fact that, in order to be able
to compute the distances in the encrypted domain, up to two or three sets of sequences, instead
of just one, need to be stored (see Eqs. 6.9 and 6.12). Additionally, whereas each unprotected
feature can be encoded as a 8-bit integer, each ciphertext requires 2,048 bits. Both facts lead to
encrypted templates 250 to 750 times bigger than the corresponding unprotected templates.
Now, regarding multi-biometric schemes, since the same amount of encrypted information is
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Table 6.2: Complexity analysis for fixed-length templates, where Fsg = 40 and Ffp = 100.
(a) Unimodal system, for F = 40 features..
Mahalanobis Dist. Euclidean Distance Cosine Similarity
Enc / Dec 0 / 1 0 / 1 0 / 1
Products 119 479 159
Exponentiations 80 320 160
Enc. Temp. size (|E (T) |) 30 KB 81 KB 40 KB
Temp. size (|T|) 0.04 KB 0.16 KB
(b) Feature level fusion.
Mahalanobis Dist. Euclidean Distance Cosine Similarity
Enc / Dec 0 / 1 0 / 1 0 / 1
Products 419 1,679 559
Exponentiations 280 1,120 560
Enc. Temp. size (|E (T) |) 105 KB 200.25 KB 140 KB
Temp. size (|T|) 0.14 KB 0.55 KB
(c) Score level fusion.
Mahalanobis Dist. Euclidean Distance Cosine Similarity
Enc / Dec 0 / 1 0 / 1 0 / 1
Products 419 1,679 559
Exponentiations 280 1,120 560
Enc. Temp. size (|E (T) |) 105 KB 200.25 KB 140 KB
Temp. size (|T|) 0.14 KB 0.55 KB
(d) Decision level fusion.
Mahalanobis Dist. Euclidean Distance Cosine Similarity
Enc / Dec 0 / 2 0 / 2 0 / 2
Products 418 1,678 558
Exponentiations 280 1,120 560
Enc. Temp. size (|E (T) |) 105 KB 200.25 KB 140 KB
Temp. size (|T|) 0.14 KB 0.55 KB
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being stored (in a single template for the feature level fusion, and in two different templates for
the score and decision levels), the template size remains unchanged across levels. Furthermore,
as the only difference between the fusion levels is the computation of a single score (feature level)
or the computation of two separate scores (score and decision levels), which might be fused by
the client (score level, see Eq. 6.21) or by the server (decision level), the only difference is the
computation of one more product on the client for the feature and score level fusions, and of
one more decryption on the server for the decision level. Therefore, whenever it is possible to
acquire all the samples at the same location, the feature level is preferred: it shows the best
verification accuracy, and it is the most computationally efficient (only one template is stored
and only one decryption is needed).
Building upon those observations, a generalized complexity analysis is now shown in Table 6.3
for each distance, for the unimodal and each multi-biometric scenario. Let us know see how to
obtain those figures for generic M , F and N (number of instances fused) values. We will first
analyse the complexity of the unimodal systems, to develop later the analysis for the multi-
biometric scenarios. To that end, we should take into account three considerations:
In order to verify an identity claim, we need to compute M single distances between the
probe and each enrolled template for the Cosine and Euclidean distances:
E (S) = E
 M∑
j=1
Sj
 = M∏
j=1
E
(
Sj
)
where M is the number of enrolled templates. Therefore, the complexity of computing a
single distance should be multiplied by M .
In order to combine those individual scores we need to perform M −1 additional products
in the encrypted domain.
Similarly, we need to store M templates for each subject.
For the Mahalanobis distance, in order to compute E (Smaha) (see Eq. 6.8), for each of the
F addends the client computes two exponentiations and two products. Then, all addends are
multiple with F − 1 extra products. This leads to a total number of
2F + F − 1 = 3F − 1 products.
2F exponentiations.
Regarding the template size, 3F ciphertexts should be stored at the server (Eq. 6.9). Even if
those values could be computed using only two of them, that would increase the number of
encryptions and decryptions, being usually better to increase only the storage requirements. In
this case, the templates would comprise 3F ciphertexts.
The Euclidean distance, E (Seuc) is computed according to Eq. 6.11. Therefore, each score
involves 2F exponentiations (2 for each factor) and 3F −1 products (2 for each factor and F −1
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to combine all factors) for each of the M enrolled samples. With the additional products for
the combination of the partial scores, the final number of operations is
M (3F − 1) + (M − 1) = 3M · F − 1 products.
2M · F exponentiations.
Regarding the template size, the server has to keep in the database M · (2F + 1) ciphertexts
(Eq. 6.12).
Finally, the encrypted cosine similarity is defined according to Eq. 6.14. The client hence
computes F exponentiations (one for each factor) and F − 1 products to combine all factors.
With the additional products for the combination of the partial scores, the final number of
operations is
M · (F − 1) + (M − 1) = M · F − 1 products.
M · F exponentiations.
Regarding the template size, the server has to keep in the database M · F ciphertexts (see
Eq. 6.15).
In Table 6.3, the template size is measured in terms of the number of ciphertexts stored.
Taking a key length of |n| = 1, 024, each ciphertext comprises 2,048 bits = 0.25 KB. It is thus
enough to divide those figures by four in order to know the corresponding size in KB. For the
reason mentioned above (i.e., we need to store twice as many values for the Euclidean distance,
and thrice as many values for the Mahalanobus distance, and each number requires 2,048 instead
of 8 bits), template sizes are multiplied by 250 to 750 in the encrypted domain. Finally, for both
distances, in the unimodal schemes one decryption is carried out in the server in order to decrypt
the similarity score and output the final decision D = (S > δ).
Based on those computations, in the multi-biometrics scenarios, where N instances are fused,
we should take into account several observations. First of all, for all fusion scenarios, the
template comprises now Ffused features instead of F , thus increasing its size accordingly (it
depends linearly on F ). The only difference between the feature level and the other two fusion
levels is the storage as single template or as N separate templates, one for each instance.
Regarding the number of operations, for the feature level fusion, we will perform verification
in the same way as in the unimodal case, but the templates handled will now comprise Ffused =
F1 + · · · + FN features. Since all figures depend linearly on F , we just need to change F by
Ffused.
At score level, we need to perform all the operations for each individual template. Then,
N−1 additional products and N exponentiations have to be carried out in order to fuse the scores
yielded by each characteristic with their corresponding weights. Therefore, for the Mahalanobis
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Table 6.3: Detailed complexity analysis for fixed-length templates. Number of encryptions
/ decryptions, and operations carried out during verification, as well as storage requirements, where
F denotes the number of features of each characteristic used, N the number of characteristics fused,
Ffused = F1 + · · ·+ FN , and M the number of samples used at enrollment.
Mahalanobis Dist. Euclidean Distance Cosine Similarity
U
n
im
o
d
al
Enc / Dec 0 / 1 0 / 1 0 / 1
Products 3F − 1 3M · F − 1 M · F − 1
Exponentiations 2F 2M · F M · F
Enc. Temp. size (|E (T) |, ×0.25 KB) 3F 2M · F +M M · F
Temp. size (|T|, ×2−10 KB) F M · F
F
ea
tu
re
Enc / Dec 0 / 1 0 / 1 0 / 1
Products 3Ffused − 1 3M · Ffused − 1 M · Ffused − 1
Exponentiations 2Ffused 2M · Ffused M · Ffused
Enc. Temp. size (|E (T) |, ×0.25 KB) 3Ffused 2M · Ffused +M M · Ffused
Temp. size (|T|, ×2−10 KB) Ffused M · Ffused
S
co
re
Enc / Dec 0 / 1 0 / 1 0 / 1
Products 3Ffused − 1 3M · Ffused − 1 M · Ffused − 1
Exponentiations 2Ffused +N 2M · Ffused +N M · Ffused +N
Enc. Temp. size (|E (T) |, ×0.25 KB) 3Ffused 2M · Ffused +M M · Ffused
Temp. size (|T|, ×2−10 KB) Ffused M · Ffused
D
ec
is
io
n
Enc / Dec 0 / N 0 / N 0 / N
Products 3Ffused − 2 3M · Ffused −N M · Ffused −N
Exponentiations 2Ffused 2M · Ffused M · Ffused
Enc. Temp. size (|E (T) |, ×0.25 KB) 3Ffused 2M · Ffused +M M · Ffused
Temp. size (|T|, ×2−10 KB) Ffused M · Ffused
distance the number of operations is
(3F1 − 1) + · · ·+ (3FN − 1) + (N − 1) = (3 · Ffused −N) + (N − 1)
= 3Ffused − 1 products.
2F1 + . . .+ 2FN +N = 2Ffused +N exponentiations.
Now, for the Euclidean distance the number of operations is
(3M · F1 − 1) + · · ·+ (3M · FN − 1) + (N − 1) = (3M · Ffused −N) + (N − 1)
= 3M · Ffused − 1 products.
(2M · F1) + . . .+ (2M · FN ) +N = 2M · Ffused +N exponentiations.
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And finally, for the cosine similarity we compute:
(M · F1 − 1) + · · ·+ (M · FN − 1) + (N − 1) = (M · Ffused −N) + (N − 1)
= M · Ffused − 1 products.
(M · F1) + . . .+ (M · FN ) +N = M · Ffused +N exponentiations.
At decision level, we need to carry out all the operations for each individual template. Since
both products and exponentiations depend linearly on F , we only need to substitute F by
Ffused. Additionally, since N separate partial similarity scores E (S1) , . . . , E (SN ) are sent from
the client to the server, N instead of one decryptions need to be performed on the server in
order to output the D verification decision.
It should be finally noted that in most biometric systems, the number of enrolled samples,
M , or fused characteristic, N , are low, in most cases lower than ten. Therefore, since M,N  F ,
the number of products and exponentiations increases linearly with Ffused, for all fusion levels
and distances, achieving a linear complexity of O (Ffused).
6.2.4.2. Variable-Length Templates
Let us now analyse the complexity of the DTW based protected verification, starting with
some numeric values as in the previous section. For the particular system here proposed, F = 9
time sequences and M = 4 enrolment samples are used, K = 10 random values added in step
4 in Fig. 6.3 to the three values to minimize, and the average sequence length in BiosecurID is
U¯ = 370. Using Kun Liu’s implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem in Java1, and running
the experiments in a machine with an Intel Core i7 with four 2.67 GHz cores, one comparison
takes approximately two minutes and 450 MB of data are exchanged. It should be noted that
this is just an illustrative approximation: code should be optimized and a server, instead of
a regular desktop computer, would bear the highest computational cost. Furthermore, a high
accuracy is achieved with DTW using a lower number of enrolment samples, thereby reducing
the time needed and the amount of exchanged data - in the present chapter we used four in
order to allow a fair comparison with the fixed-length templates schemes.
Now, we analyse in detail the complexity in terms of any given F , M and K. First, in Fig. 6.5
step 1, the client extracts the probe template. Then, the server sends to the client the encrypted
reference template E (STr), comprising V · (2M · F +M) ciphertexts (see Table 6.3, unimodal
Euclidean distance). In order to compute the encrypted cost matrix, it should be noted that
no additional encryptions or decryptions are needed for the encrypted distances calculations,
since all values had been already encrypted at enrolment. On the other hand, for each of the
(U − 1) · (V − 1) iterations involving a minimum computation (Fig. 6.4, step 4), the client needs
to encrypt each of the K random values nk and send an encrypted list comprising K + 2 values
to the server. The server, in turn, needs to perform K + 2 decryptions, one encryption, and
send one ciphertext back (Fig. 6.5 step 4–6).
1Publicly available at http://www.csee.umbc.edu/k˜unliu1/research/Paillier.html
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Table 6.4: Complexity analysis for variable-length templates.
Client Server
Encryptions O
(
U2K
)
O
(
U2
)
Decryptions 0 O
(
U2K
)
Comm. channel O
(
U2K
)
To sum up, the client needs to encrypt (U − 1) · (V − 1) · K = O (UVK) ciphertexts.
The server, on the other hand, decrypts (U − 1) · (V − 1) · (K + 2) = O (UVK) ciphertexts
and encrypts (U − 1) · (V − 1) = O (UV ) ciphertexts. Finally, V · (2M · F +M) + (U − 1) ·
(V − 1) (K + 3) = O (MFV + UVK) = O (UVK) ciphertexts are exchanged between server
and client (MF  UK). These results are summarized in Table 6.4, where, without loss of
generality, UV has been substituted by U2.
6.3. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
We have proposed in this chapter the first general framework for variable-length and fixed-
length, biometric and multi-biometric template protection based on Homomorphic Encryption,
where all the information, either stored in the database or exchanged between the client (issuing
the identity claim) and the server (holding the database and verifying the identity claim), is
encrypted.
Regarding the multi-biometrics approach, different models have been described and analysed
for the three fusion levels considered in the ISO/IEC TR 24722 on multimodal and other multi-
biometric fusion [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics, 2007], namely: feature, score and decision
level.
According to the protocol established in Chapter 3, we have evaluated the system in order to
assess the key requirements within the ISO/IEC IS 24745 on biometric information protection
[ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011], namely: i) verification accuracy preserva-
tion, ii) irreversibility and iii) unlinkability. To that end, experiments were carried out on the
on-line signature and fingerprint subcorpora of the publicly available BiosecurID multimodal
database, following a clear protocol in order to make our research reproducible and allow future
comparisons to other methods. The main findings of the chapter can be summarised in the
following:
There is no accuracy loss in the protected domain, regardless of the considered approach.
Furthermore, for the proposed multi-biometrics scheme, an EER as low as 0.1% is achieved
for the feature level fusion, showing a 92% relative improvement with respect to the best
performing individual characteristic. We may therefore conclude that the loss on accuracy
due to the use of baseline systems with higher error rates than the current state-of-the-art
can be partly compensated fusing two characteristics.
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Only secure irreversible templates are stored in the server’s database, hence achieving
irreversibility.
Templates are also unlinkable and renewability is achieved, thus fulfilling the requirements
of the ISO/IEC IS 24745 [ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27 IT Security Techniques, 2011].
Since no plain information is shared, no biometric information is leaked, thereby preventing
hill-climbing [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2014a; Maiorana et al., 2015] or inverse biometrics
attacks such as the ones presented in Chapter 4.
While variable-length templates can achieve a better accuracy for characteristics such as
on-line signature, they also entail a higher computational load. The proposed scheme based
on fixed-length templates can be deployed for real-time applications: no encryptions and
only one decryption are performed on the server at verification time, and templates require
at most 200 KB, a reasonable size even if is still a high compared to the 0.55 KB in the
unprotected domain.
Feature level fusion is preferable to the other two levels, since it achieves a better accuracy
and a unique template is generated for each subject.
On the other hand, score level fusion is more flexible: it can be implemented in a distributed
manner, where each client extracts one biometric sample and computes the corresponding
similarity score. In that case, the score fusion would be carried out by the server, without
each client having access to the other clients’ scores.
In contrast to the aforementioned advantages, using Homomorphic Encryption for biometric
template protection entails some limitations. For instance, the implementation of more sophis-
ticated recognition schemes usually implies a higher computational load, or pre-aligned samples
may be required.
This chapter includes novel contributions in:
The implementation of three different distance measure in the encrypted domain, which
involves the definition of the encrypted template and the encrypted distance function for
each measure, so that the score can be directly computed in the encrypted domain.
The description of the first variable-length biometric template protection scheme based on
Homomorphic Encryption.
The proposal of the first multi-biometrics template protection scheme based on Homomor-
phic Encryption for feature, score and decision level fusion.
The experimental analysis of the accuracy variation on a real multimodal database.
The unlinkability, irreversibility and computational load analysis of the protected tem-
plates.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This Thesis has considered the problem of evaluating the security and privacy provided by
biometric systems, through a systematic analysis of the accuracy of the systems, as well as
the irreversibility and unlinkability of the templates. After a summary of the state-of-the-art
in inverse biometrics and biometric template protection, the security and privacy evaluation
methodology followed in the Thesis has been presented. In particular, a new framework for the
systematic analysis of templates unlinkability has been proposed. Furthermore, novel methods
for inverse biometrics and template protection, for both biometric and multi-biometric systems
have been developed. The procedural guidelines for the objective evaluation of security and
privacy of biometric systems have been applied to competitive unprotected systems and to the
newly proposed template protection approaches for several characteristics, namely: face, iris,
handshape, fingerprint, fingervein and on-line signature. In order to contribute reproducible
research and allow future comparisons with other approaches, publicly available databases and
systems have been used in the experimental evaluations.
7.1. Conclusions
Chapter 1 introduced the basics of biometric systems, privacy issues related to biometric
systems, our perspective on the security and privacy evaluation problem, the motivation of the
Thesis, and the research contributions originated from this Thesis. Chapter 2 summarized the
most relevant works related to the different research lines developed in the Dissertation and
which served as motivation for the work that originated the Thesis. The security evaluation and
privacy methodology followed in the Thesis was presented in Chapter 3, which also described
the baseline unprotected biometric systems and biometric databases used in the Thesis. In
particular, a new methodology for the systematic analysis of the unlinkability of biometric
templates was introduced as part of the general evaluation framework.
The experimental part of the Dissertation started in Chapter 4 with the description of two
original inverse biometric methods based on optimization algorithms to reconstruct synthetic bio-
metric samples from the information stored in the (unprotected) templates. The reconstructed
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samples were subsequently used to launch attacks to academic and commercial systems. More
specifically, i) an inverse biometrics method based on the uphill simplex algorithm was pre-
sented and used to analyse the irreversibility of three different handshape templates based on
independent sets of features, and ii) an inverse biometric method based on genetic algorithms
was proposed and used to analyse the irreversibility of iriscodes.
In order to address the security and privacy issues derived from the use and storage of
unprotected templates, a new framework for template protection schemes based on Bloom Filters
was presented in Chapter 5. An improved version of the original approach was first introduced, in
order to increase the irreversibility of the templates, add unlinkability to the initial system, and,
at the same time, preserve verification accuracy. Additionally, a methodology was developed for
the estimation of the main parameters of Bloom filter based templates computation, based on
a statistical analysis of the unprotected templates. Due to the higher privacy and verification
accuracy granted by multi-biometric schemes, a general framework for the weighted feature level
fusion of Bloom filter templates, of possibly different sizes, was proposed. The experimental
evaluation showed that only at very high security operating points some verification accuracy
degradation was observed, due to the inherent nature of Bloom filters. Additionally, a very high
accuracy, with an EER of 0.1%, was achieved for the fusion of only two characteristics, namely
face and iris. Furthermore, the unlinkability of the enhanced templates was increased for all
attacking scenarios analysed with respect to the original scheme.
Finally, in Chapter 6 a new framework for template protection schemes based on Homomor-
phic Encryption was presented. On the one hand, regarding unimodal systems, we implemented
in the encrypted domain several distance measures for fixed-length templates, namely: the Ma-
halanobis, Euclidean and Cosine distances. Given that some characteristics, such as on-line
signature, achieve a higher verification accuracy when variable-length templates are used, a sys-
tem based on a DTW implementation in the encrypted domain was also proposed. Finally, in
order to achieve more secure templates and higher accuracy rates, a general multi-biometric
template protection framework for feature, score and decision level fusion was described. The
experimental evaluation showed that verification accuracy is preserved at all operation points,
while the comparison process, being carried out in the encrypted domain, reveals no information
about the underlying biometric data. Furthermore, the additional computational load due to the
encryption technique was analysed, conlcuding that the comparison of fixed-length templates
can be carried out on high demanding real time applications.
It should be noted that both template protection approaches offer different advantages and
disadvantages. First of all, regarding verification accuracy, while the use of Bloom filter based
templates can imply to some degradation for very low FMRs, Homomorphic Encryption can
grant an accuracy equivalent to that of the unprotected templates at all operating points. On
the other hand, whereas the implementation of complex algorithms in the encrypted domain
may not be straightforward and/or lead to a high computational load within Homomorphic
Encryption BTPs, Bloom filters templates can be in principle extracted form any given unpro-
tected template, including those designed within top-ranked approaches in the state-of-the-art.
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Furthermore, since the Bloom filter similarity score computation remains the same, regardless
of the unprotected template considered, and is basically an efficient normalised Hamming Dis-
tance, no additional load computational is entailed. Moreover, both approaches involve different
storage requirements: while Bloom filter based templates are compact (e.g., the original face
templates comprising 9.4 KB are compressed to protected templates of 1.9 KB, and the orig-
inal iriscode, comprising 1.25 KB, is transformed into a 4 KB protected template), the use of
Homomorphic Encryption encompasses a big increase in template size: each original integer (8
to 16 bits) is encoded into 2,048 bits in the encrypted domain, yielding templates of 40 KB for
the fixed-length or up to 225 MB for the variable-length on-line signature verification systems
considered.
Taking into account the privacy of the subjects, Bloom filter based templates provide a
permanent protection, even in the challenging scenario when an attacker is in possession of
secret keys. As it has been shown, even in that case the attacker cannot invert the templates
to its unprotected form (full irreversibility is provided) and a high level of unlinkability is also
achieved. On the other hand, should the private or secret key of the Paillier cryptosystem be
compromised, an eventual attacker could easily decrypt the protected templates to obtain its
unprotected counterparts. However, such an scheme can also entail some advantages: for some
applications, we may require to have access to the unprotected templates at some point, or,
in the case of re-enrolment with a different key due to a database leakage, no further samples
should be acquired from the subjects. Only a decryption and re-encryption would be required.
On the contrary, assuming that secret keys are not compromised, which is a reasonable
assumption within cryptographic schemes, a higher level of unlinkability is provided by Homo-
morphic Encryption. Due to the probabilistic nature of Paillier’s cryptosystem, encrypting twice
a single message using the same public key will lead to different ciphertexts. As a consequence,
not only the encrypted mated and non-mated score distributions obtained from comparisons
of templates protected with different keys will overlap. The distribution of encrypted scores,
obtained from mated and non-mated comparisons of templates protected with the same key are
also expected to overlap. However, this is not the case for the Bloom filter approach: should
we use the same key to protect the templates in two different systems, the score distributions
would be easily separable.
In summary, the main results and contributions obtained from this Thesis are:
The security and privacy evaluation methodology for biometric systems followed through-
out the Dissertation.
The unlinkability analysis of biometric templates proposed as part of the general evaluation
protocol.
The inverse biometrics methods developed and used for the irreversibility analysis of un-
protected biometric templates: i) new inverse biometric attack based on the uphill simplex
algorithm and ii) new inverse biometric method based on genetic algorithms for the re-
construction of iris images.
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The biometric template protection schemes developed and systematically evaluated in
terms of the security and privacy provided: i) new biometric and multi-biometric tem-
plate protection scheme based on Bloom filters, and ii) new biometric and multi-biometric
template protection scheme based on Homomorphic Encryption.
The experimental evidence of the application of the security and privacy evaluation method-
ology to unprotected systems based on handshape and iris.
The experimental evidence of the application of the security and privacy evaluation method-
ology to protected biometric systems based on very relevant characteristics: face, iris,
fingerprint, fingervein and on-line signature.
7.2. Future Work
A number of research lines arise from the work carried out in this Thesis. We consider of
special interest the following ones:
Application of the proposed security and privacy evaluation methodology to other biomet-
ric systems. In spite of the numerous biometric template protection schemes introduced
in the literature [Patel et al., 2015; Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011], in most cases a systematic
evaluation of the accuracy degradation of the system with respect to its unprotected coun-
terpart, or irreversibility and unlinkability analyses under realistic adversary models, are
not provided. The biometric community should thus direct some efforts not only to the
proposal of new biometric template protection schemes but also to the systematic and
thorough evaluation of the security and privacy provided.
Proposal of a more general unlinkability analysis framework. The described framework
only takes into account one-to-one comparisons, when the attacker is in possession of
two protected templates and wants to decide whether they belong to the same subject.
However, other scenarios should be taken into account when analysing the unlinkability
of the templates. For instance, we will further investigate the more general case when
the attacker can compare a single template with a database of N different templates and
decide whether any of them conceal the same identity.
Analysis of the impact of intra-class variability on Bloom filter based schemes’ accuracy.
Even if verification accuracy was preserved to a great extent in the case studies analysed in
the Dissertation, it could be expected that a higher intra-class variability could affect the
protected systems accuracy. In fact, for the characteristic exhibiting the highest variability
(i.e., face), Bloom filters should be shorter in order to be able to handle such variability
and maintain verification accuracy. Therefore, the relationship between the intra-class
variability and the level of protection granted will be analysed and quantified.
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Analysis of the impact of different feature extraction methods on Bloom filter based
schemes’ accuracy. The experimental assessment in Chapter 5 showed that Log-Gabor
based schemes yielded less accuracy degradation at very low FMRs than those templates
based on minutiae features. We may conclude that different behaviours can be expected
when dealing with unprotected templates based on different types of features. In order
to improve the accuracy rates of BTP schemes based on Bloom filters, unrelated feature
extraction methods will be analysed and some guidelines as to which are the most appro-
priate types of features for the Bloom filter computation will be developed.
Further analysis of the unlinkability of Homomorphic Encryption based templates. Due
to the semantic security provided by such encryption scheme, it can be argued that the
encrypted templates protect the security and privacy of the subject under an honest-
but-curious adversary model. However, it has been shown that systems based on the
Goldwasser-Micali or the Paillier cryptosystems exhibit potential weaknesses if evaluations
are carried out under more challenging adversary models [Simoens et al., 2012a]. Therefore,
a similar evaluation should be applied to the proposed methods under the advanced model
defined in Chapter 2, Sect. 2.2.1.
Implementation of more accurate biometric verification schemes within Homomorphic En-
cryption BTPs. Even though Homomorphic Encryption has recently emerged as a powerful
alternative to current biometric template protection schemes, and, in general, to enhance
signal processing tasks where privacy is of the utmost importance [Aguilar-Melchor et al.,
2013; Barni et al., 2015], the limitations in the number of operations which can be carried
out in the encrypted domain have reduced its application to simple comparison techniques
which may not be top-ranked in the state of the art. Therefore, some efforts should
be directed to the implementation of more complex algorithms, yielding state-of-the-art
accuracy rates.
Development of more general multi-biometric schemes within Homomorphic Encryption
BTPs. In this Dissertation we have only taken into account a simple weighted sum for
the score level fusion. However, more complex fusions have shown better accuracy rates
for unprotected systems [Poh and Kittler, 2012]. As a consequence, in order to make the
proposed multi-biometric scheme as general as possible, further fusion rules, such as those
based on quality measures [Fierrez et al., 2005], will be studied.
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Ape´ndice A
Resumen Extendido de la Tesis
Mejora de la Seguridad y la Privacidad de
los Sistemas Biome´tricos
A.1. Resumen
La consecucio´n de la seguridad perfecta es una utop´ıa. Cualquier tecnolog´ıa rela-
cionada con la seguridad tiene puntos de´biles que un atacante puede explotar para evadir el
sistema, aunque todav´ıa no seamos conscientes de ello. Debemos por tanto dirigir nuestros es-
fuerzos al desarrollo de aplicaciones cuyo nivel de seguridad haga imposible para los atacantes
con recursos limitados eludir los sistemas.
Esta Tesis se centra en la mejora de la seguridad y la privacidad que ofrecen los sistemas
biome´tricos. Dado la creciente necesidad de verificar identidades de un modo fiable y automa´tico,
la biometr´ıa ha emergido en las u´ltimas de´cadas como una alternativa pujante a los me´todos
de autenticacio´n tradicionales. Sin duda el reconocimiento biome´trico es atractivo y u´til para
el pu´blico en general: olvida los PINs y contrasen˜as, tu´ eres tu propia clave. Sin embargo, la
amplia implantacio´n de sistemas de reconocimiento biome´trico tanto en aplicaciones a gran escala
(p.ej., el control de fronteras a nivel europeo o los sistemas de identificacio´n nacionales) como
en tareas cotidianas (p.ej., acceso a Smartphones o PCs), ha planteado serias preocupaciones
acerca del uso y almacenamiento de datos tan sensibles. Tiene por tanto una gran importancia
la comprensio´n de las amenazas que puedan afectar a dichos sistemas y analizar hasta que´ punto
esta´ protegida la privacidad de los usuarios.
En este contexto, esta Tesis Doctoral pretende arrojar luz sobre el dif´ıcil problema de la
evaluacio´n de la seguridad y la privacidad de los sistemas de reconocimiento biome´trico. Con
este objetivo se ha llevado a cabo un ana´lisis sistema´tico de la privacidad ofrecida por plantillas
157
A. RESUMEN EXTENDIDO DE LA TESIS
no protegidas, y se han propuesto nuevos sistemas de proteccio´n de plantillas para hacer frente
a los problemas de privacidad desvelados, evaluando rigurosamente la robustez frente a dichas
amenazas contra la privacidad de los individuos. De este modo, el ana´lisis experimental desa-
rrollado en esta Disertacio´n puede ayudar a desarrollar los actuales esfuerzos de estandarizacio´n
de la evaluacio´n de sistemas de proteccio´n de plantillas.
Esta Tesis se ha desarrollado siguiendo el principio de seguridad a trave´s de la transparen-
cia de Kerckhoffs, extensamente aplicado en otras a´reas relacionadas con la seguridad como la
criptograf´ıa. Este paradigma se basa en el hecho de que las vulnerabilidades existen con inde-
pendencia de si han sido publicadas, y por ello aboga por hacer los sistemas de seguridad tan
pu´blicos como sea posible en lugar de mantener los algoritmos en secreto. Ello no implica que
la oscuridad no ofrezca ninguna proteccio´n. Sin embargo, dicha proteccio´n es en el mejor de
los casos so´lo temporal. Debemos por tanto hacer todo lo posible por encontrar las amenazas y
proponer soluciones que mitiguen sus efectos. Creemos que para garantizar la proteccio´n de la
privacidad a la que tienen derecho los individuos, es necesario entender y evaluar las amenazas,
y publicar ana´lisis cuantitativos de su impacto en la privacidad de los sujetos con el objetivo de
facilitar el desarrollo de contramedidas efectivas.
Dichos problemas de privacidad ya han sido reconocidos en la comunidad biome´trica y se
han propuesto numerosos sistemas de proteccio´n de plantillas para abordarlos. Sin embargo,
en la mayor´ıa de los casos no se han llevado a cabo evaluaciones rigurosas de la seguridad y la
privacidad ofrecidas por esos sistemas. En esta Disertacio´n, tras resumir los trabajos relaciona-
dos con la Tesis ma´s relevantes, describimos la metodolog´ıa de evaluacio´n de la seguridad y la
privacidad que se ha seguido durante los cap´ıtulos experimentales. E´stos esta´n dedicados a: i) la
evaluacio´n de plantillas no protegidas y ii) la propuesta y evaluacio´n de sistemas de proteccio´n
de plantillas biome´tricas y multi-biome´tricas, centra´ndonos en cara, iris, huella dactilar, forma
de la mano, patrones de venas y firma dina´mica, usando bases de datos biome´tricas y bancos de
pruebas pu´blicos para hacer la investigacio´n reproducible.
La parte experimental de la Tesis comienza con la evaluacio´n de la seguridad y la privacidad
de sistemas biome´tricos no protegidos. Para ello se ha analizado la irreversibilidad de las planti-
llas hacie´ndonos la siguiente pregunta: partiendo de la informacio´n almacenada en la plantilla,
¿podemos reconstruir muestras sinte´ticas que sean identificadas positivamente con las plantillas
de referencia del sistema? Para contestar esa pregunta hemos desarrollado e implementado dos
me´todos de inverse biometrics o ingenier´ıa inversa y hemos usado las muestras reconstruidas pa-
ra lanzar ataques. Los experimentos muestran que es de hecho posible engan˜ar sistemas basados
en iris o en geometr´ıa de la mano con las muestras reconstruidas.
Para abordar los problemas de privacidad desvelados con el estudio anterior hemos propuesto
un marco general para sistemas de proteccio´n de plantillas biome´tricas y multi-biome´tricas basa-
do en Bloom filters. El sistema propuesto no so´lo evita la reconstruccio´n de muestras sinte´ticas
sino que tambie´n afronta un segundo grupo de preguntas relacionada con la proteccio´n de la
privacidad: ¿puede alguien monitorizar mis actividades en diversos sistemas de reconocimiento
biome´trico? ¿Que´ ocurre si la plantilla basada en, por ejemplo, mi cara, es comprometida: no
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puedo volver a registrarme en un sistema con ella nunca ma´s? Una rigurosa evaluacio´n experi-
mental de sistemas de verificacio´n basada en cara, iris, huella dactilar y patro´n de venas muestra
que el sistema propuesto protege la privacidad de los individuos, incluso en el dif´ıcil escenario en
que el atacante conoce las claves secretas del mismo. Asimismo, el sistema es robusto a ataques
basados en debilidades conocidas de los algoritmos en los que se basa, preservando al mismo
tiempo la precisio´n y la velocidad de verificacio´n.
Finalmente, como alternativa a este sistema, presentamos un marco general para proteccio´n
de plantillas biome´tricas y multi-biome´tricas basado en Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica (Homomorp-
hic Encryption). La seguridad y la privacidad del sistema se han evaluado de forma ana´loga para
huella dactilar y firma dina´mica, probando que las plantillas encriptadas y todas las operaciones
llevadas a cabo en el dominio encriptado no revelan ninguna informacio´n sobre la informacio´n
biome´trica subyacente. Adema´s, la precisio´n de la verificacio´n en el dominio encriptado es
equivalente a la conseguida en el dominio no protegido, y se puede conseguir una velocidad de
verificacio´n similar usando plantillas de longitud fija.
El trabajo de investigacio´n descrito en esta Disertacio´n ha conducido a nuevas contribuciones
que incluyen el desarrollo de: i) un me´todo general para la evaluacio´n de la seguridad y la pri-
vacidad de sistemas biome´tricos y, en particular, al ana´lisis de la unlinkability1 de las plantillas
biome´tricas, ii) dos nuevos me´todos de ingenier´ıa inversa de plantillas biome´tricas no protegi-
das, iii) un nuevo sistema de proteccio´n de plantillas biome´tricas y multi-biome´tricas basado en
Bloom filters, y iv) un nuevo sistema de proteccio´n de plantillas biome´tricas y multi-biome´tricas
basado en Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica. Asimismo, se han llevado a cabo diversos estudios experi-
mentales durante el desarrollo de la Tesis. Adicionalmente, el trabajo de investigacio´n realizado
durante la Tesis se ha complementado con la generacio´n de diversas revisiones del estado del
arte y la mejora de sistemas actuales de reconocimiento de firma.
A.2. Conclusiones
Esta Tesis Doctoral ha considerado el problema de la evaluacio´n de la seguridad y la pri-
vacidad ofrecidas por sistemas de reconocimiento biome´trico, a trave´s de un ana´lisis sistema´tico
de la precisio´n del sistema, as´ı como la irreversibilidad y unlinkability de las plantillas. Tras
un resumen del estado del arte en inverse biometrics y proteccio´n de plantillas biome´tricas, se
ha presentado la metodolog´ıa usada durante la Tesis para la evaluacio´n de la seguridad y la
privacidad. En particular, se ha propuesto un nuevo marco para el ana´lisis sistema´tico de la
unlinkability de las plantillas. Asimismo, se han desarrollado nuevos me´todos de inverse biome-
trics y proteccio´n de plantillas, para sistemas tanto biome´tricos como multi-biome´tricos. Las
directrices para la evaluacio´n objetiva de la seguridad y la privacidad de sistemas biome´tricos
se han aplicado a sistemas no protegidos competitivos y a los nuevos sistemas propuestos de
1Unlinkability denota la imposibilidad de vincular dos plantillas, es decir, de ser capaces de decidir si ambas
pertenecen al mismo individuo.
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proteccio´n de plantillas para diversos rasgos, a saber: cara, iris, geometr´ıa de la mano, huella
dactilar, patrones de venas y firma dina´mica. Con el objetivo de hacer la investigacio´n reprodu-
cible y permitir comparaciones con otras aproximaciones en el futuro, durante las evaluaciones
experimentales se han usado bases de datos y sistemas disponibles pu´blicamente.
El Cap´ıtulo 1 ha incluido una introduccio´n a los sistemas biome´tricos, los problemas de
privacidad relacionados con ellos, nuestra perspectiva sobre el problema de la evaluacio´n de la
seguridad y la privacidad, la motivacio´n de la Tesis, y las contribuciones originadas en la misma.
El Cap´ıtulo 2 ha resumido los trabajos ma´s relevantes relacionados con las diferentes l´ıneas de
investigacio´n desarrolladas en esta Disertacio´n y que sirven como motivacio´n para el trabajo
que origino´ la Tesis. La metodolog´ıa seguida en la Tesis para la evaluacio´n de la seguridad y la
privacidad se ha presentado en el Cap´ıtulo 3, en el que tambie´n se han descrito los sistemas de
reconocimiento biome´trico no protegidos de referencia y las bases de datos biome´tricas usados en
esta Tesis. En particular, se ha introducido una nueva metodolog´ıa para el ana´lisis sistema´tico
de la unlinkability de plantillas biome´tricas como parte del marco de evaluacio´n general.
La parte experimental de la Disertacio´n ha comenzado en el Cap´ıtulo 4 con la descripcio´n
de dos me´todos originales de inverse biometrics, basados en algoritmos de optimizacio´n, para la
reconstruccio´n de muestras biome´tricas sinte´ticas a partir de la informacio´n almacenada en las
plantillas (no protegidas). Las muestras reconstruidas se han usado a continuacio´n para lanzar
ataques contra sistemas acade´micos y comerciales. En particular, i) se ha presentado un me´todo
de inverse biometrics basado en el algoritmo conocido como uphill simplex y un generador de
ima´genes de manos, y se ha usado para analizar la irreversibilidad de tres plantillas diferentes
basadas en conjuntos de caracter´ısticas distintas, y ii) se ha propuesto un me´todo de inverse
biometrics basado en un algoritmo gene´tico y se ha usado para analizar la irreversibilidad de los
iriscodes.
Con el objetivo de abordar los problemas de seguridad y privacidad derivados del uso y
almacenamiento de plantillas no protegidas, se ha presentado en el Cap´ıtulo 5 un nuevo marco
para sistemas de proteccio´n de plantillas basados en Bloom filters. En primer lugar se ha intro-
ducido una versio´n mejorada con respecto a la aproximacio´n original, en la que se ha aumentado
la irreversibilidad de las plantillas, se ha an˜adido unlinkability al sistema original, y, al mismo
tiempo, se ha mantenido la precisio´n de verificacio´n. Adicionalmente, se ha desarrollado una me-
todolog´ıa para la estimacio´n de los principales para´metros en la extraccio´n de plantillas basadas
en Bloom filters, basada a su vez en un ana´lisis estad´ıstico de las plantillas no protegidas. Dada
la mayor privacidad y precisio´n en la verificacio´n ofrecida por los sistemas multi-biome´tricos, se
ha propuesto un marco general para una fusio´n ponderada a nivel de caracter´ıstica de plantillas
basadas en Bloom filters, posiblemente de diferentes taman˜os. La evaluacio´n experimental ha
mostrado que so´lo en puntos de trabajo de muy alta seguridad se aprecia alguna degradacio´n de
la precisio´n del sistema, debido a la naturaleza inherente de los Bloom filters. Se ha conseguido
asimismo una gran precisio´n, con un EER del 0.1%, con la fusio´n de so´lo dos rasgos, a saber,
cara e iris. Adicionalmente, se ha incrementado la unlinkability de las plantillas mejoradas con
respecto a la aproximacio´n original para todos los escenarios de ataque analizados.
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Finalmente, en el Cap´ıtulo 6 se ha presentado un nuevo marco para los sistemas de proteccio´n
de la plantillas basado en Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica. Por un lado, hemos implementado en el
dominio encriptado diversas funciones de distancia para plantillas de longitud fija, a saber: las
distancias de Mahalanobis, Eucl´ıdea y Coseno. Dado que para algunos rasgos, como la firma
dina´mica, se obtiene una mayor precisio´n usando plantillas de longitud variable, se ha propuesto
tambie´n un sistema basado en la implementacio´n de DTW en el dominio encriptado. Finalmente,
para conseguir plantillas ma´s seguras y una mayor precisio´n en la verificacio´n, se ha descrito
un marco general para la proteccio´n de plantillas multi-biome´tricas para fusiones a nivel de
caracter´ıstica, puntuacio´n y decisio´n. La evaluacio´n experimental ha mostrado que la precisio´n
de la verificacio´n se mantiene para todos los puntos de trabajo, mientras que el proceso de
comparacio´n, al ser llevado a cabo en el dominio encriptado, no revela ninguna informacio´n sobre
los datos biome´tricos subyacentes. Se ha analizado asimismo la carga computacional an˜adida
por el proceso de encriptacio´n, concluyendo que la comparacio´n de plantillas de longitud fija se
puede realizar en aplicaciones en tiempo real.
Cabe destacar que ambos sistemas de proteccio´n de plantillas ofrecen distintas ventajas y
desventajas. En primer lugar, en cuanto a la precisio´n de los sistemas, mientras que el uso
de Bloom filters puede implicar cierta degradacio´n para FMRs muy bajas, la Encriptacio´n
Homomo´rfica puede garantizar una precisio´n equivalente a la obtenida con las plantillas no
protegidas para todos los puntos de trabajo. Por otro lado, mientras que la implementacio´n de
algoritmos complejos en el dominio encriptado pues no ser directa y/o conducir a una mayor
carga computacional en BTPs basados en Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica, las plantillas basadas
en Bloom filters pueden en principio extraerse de cualquier plantilla no protegida, incluidas
aque´llas disen˜adas para los esquemas a la cabeza del estado del arte. Asimismo, dado que
el ca´lculo de las puntuaciones de similitud entre Bloom filters se reduce a una Distancia de
Hamming ponderada, muy eficiente, independientemente de la plantilla no protegida utilizada,
no se an˜ade ninguna carga computacional. Adema´s, ambos enfoques tienen distintos requisitos
de almacenamiento: mientras que las plantillas basadas en Bloom filters son compactas (p.ej.,
las plantillas de cara originales, que comprenden 9.4 KB, con comprimidas a plantillas de 1.9
KB, y el iriscode original, que comprende 1.25 KB, se transforma en una plantilla protegida de
4 KB), el uso de Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica acarrea un considerable aumento del taman˜o de las
plantillas: cada entero (8 a 16 bits) se codifica con 2,048 bits en el dominio encriptado, dando
lugar a plantillas de 40 KB para el caso de longitud fija, y de hasta 225 MB para las de longitud
variable, en los sistemas de verificacio´n de firma dina´mica considerados.
Teniendo en cuenta la privacidad de los individuos, las plantillas basadas en Bloom filters
ofrecen una proteccio´n permanente, incluso en el desafiante escenario en el que el atacante cono-
ce las claves secretas. Como se ha probado, incluso en ese caso el atacante no puede invertir la
plantilla a su forma no protegida (se ofrece una irreversibilidad completa) y se consigue tambie´n
un alto nivel de unlinkability. Por otro lado, si la clave privada del criptosistema de Paillier
es comprometida, un atacante podr´ıa fa´cilmente desencriptar las plantillas para obtener sus
homo´logas sin proteger. Este esquema sin embargo puede tambie´n conllevar ciertas ventajas:
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para algunas aplicaciones, puede requerirse el acceso a las plantillas sin proteger en algu´n mo-
mento, o, en caso de re-registro con otra clave tras una filtracio´n en la base de datos, no se
tendr´ıan que adquirir nuevas muestras de los sujetos. Bastar´ıa con desencriptar y re-encriptar
las plantillas.
Al contrario, asumiendo que las claves secretas no han sido comprometidas, una suposicio´n
razonable en sistemas criptogra´ficos, la Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica ofrece un mayor nivel de
unlinkability. Dada la naturaleza probabil´ıstica del criptosistema de Paillier, si se encripta dos
veces un mismo mensaje usando la misma clave pu´blica, el resultado son dos mensajes encripta-
dos distintos. Como consecuencia, no so´lo observamos un solapamiento entre las distribuciones
de puntuaciones encriptadas obtenidas de comparaciones mated y non-mated entre plantillas
protegidas con distintas claves. Las distribuciones de puntuaciones encriptadas, obtenidas de
comparaciones mated y non-mated entre plantillas protegidas con la misma clave tambie´n cabr´ıa
esperar que se solaparan. Sin embargo, esto no se extiende a los Bloom filters: si usamos la mis-
ma clave para proteger plantillas en dos sistemas diferentes, las distribuciones de puntuaciones
sera´n fa´cilmente separables.
En resumen, los principales resultados y contribuciones obtenidos en esta Tesis son:
La metodolog´ıa de evaluacio´n de la seguridad y la privacidad de los sistemas de reconoci-
miento biome´trico seguida durante la Disertacio´n.
El ana´lisis de la unlinkability de las plantillas biome´tricas propuesto como parte del pro-
tocolo general de evaluacio´n.
Los me´todos de inverse bimetrics desarrollados y usados en el ana´lisis de la irreversibilidad
de las plantillas biome´tricas no protegidas: i) nuevo ataque de inverse biometrics basado en
el uphill simplex y ii) nuevo me´todo de inverse biometrics basado en algoritmos gene´ticos
para la reconstruccio´n de iris.
Sistemas de proteccio´n de plantillas biome´tricas desarrollados y evaluados sistema´ticamente
en cuanto a la seguridad y privacidad ofrecidas: i) nuevo esquema de proteccio´n de planti-
llas biome´tricas y multi-biome´tricas basado en Bloom filters y ii) nuevo esquema de protec-
cio´n de plantillas biome´tricas y multi-biome´tricas basado en Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica.
Las evidencias experimentales de la aplicacio´n de la metodolog´ıa de evaluacio´n de la segu-
ridad y la privacidad a sistemas no protegidos basados en mano e iris.
Las evidencias experimentales de la aplicacio´n de la metodolog´ıa de evaluacio´n de la seguri-
dad y la privacidad a sistemas de proteccio´n de plantillas basado en rasgos muy relevantes:
cara, iris, huella dactilar, patrones de venas y firma dina´mica.
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A.3. L´ıneas de Trabajo Futuro
Se proponen las siguientes l´ıneas de trabajo futuro relacionadas con el trabajo desarrollado
en esta Tesis Doctoral:
Aplicacio´n de la metodolog´ıa de evaluacio´n de la seguridad y la privacidad propuesta
a otros sistemas de reconocimiento biome´trico. A pesar de los numerosos esquemas de
proteccio´n de plantillas presentes en la literatura [Patel et al., 2015; Rathgeb and Uhl,
2011], en la mayor´ıa de los casos no se incluyen evaluaciones sistema´ticas de la degradacio´n
de la precisio´n en la verificacio´n con respecto a los sistemas sin proteger, o los ana´lisis de
irreversibilidad y unlinkability se llevan a cabo bajo modelos de amenazas no realistas.
La comunidad biome´trica debe por tanto dirigir sus esfuerzos no so´lo a proponer nuevos
sistemas de proteccio´n de plantillas sino tambie´n a la evaluacio´n sistema´tica y rigurosa de
la seguridad y la privacidad ofrecidas.
Propuesta de un marco de ana´lisis de la unlinkability ma´s general. El marco descrito
so´lo tiene en cuenta comparaciones uno-a-uno, cuando el atacante obtiene dos plantillas
protegidas y quiere decidir sin pertenecen a la misma persona. Sin embargo, se deber´ıan
tener en cuenta otros escenarios a la hora de analizar la unlinkability de las plantillas. Por
ejemplo, investigaremos en mayor profundidad el caso ma´s general en el que el atacante
puede comparar una u´nica plantilla con una base de datos de N plantillas y decidir si
alguna de ellas esconde la misma identidad.
Ana´lisis del impacto de la variabilidad intra-clase en la precisio´n de los sistemas basados
en Bloom filters. Aunque la precisio´n en la verificacio´n se mantiene en un alto grado en los
casos de estudio analizados en esta Disertacio´n, cabr´ıa esperar que una mayor variabilidad
intra-clase pudiera afectar la precisio´n del sistema protegido. De hecho, para el rasgo con
una mayor variabilidad (la cara), los Bloom filters deben ser ma´s cortos para poder hacer
frente a dicha variabilidad y mantener la precisio´n. Por lo tanto, se analizara´ y cuantificara´
la relacio´n entre la variabilidad intra-clase y el nivel de proteccio´n garantizado.
Ana´lisis del impacto de diferentes me´todos de extraccio´n de caracter´ısticas en la precisio´n
de los sistemas basados en Bloom filters. La evaluacio´n experimental del Cap´ıtulo 5
muestra que los esquemas basados en filtros LogGabor consiguen una menor degradacio´n
de la precisio´n para Tasas de Falsa Aceptacio´n (FMR) muy bajas que aque´llos basados
en minucias. Podr´ıamos por tanto concluir que cabe esperar diferentes comportamientos
cuando trabajamos con plantillas basadas en distintos tipos de caracter´ısticas. Con el
fin de mejorar la tasas de error de los esquemas basados en Bloom filters, analizaremos
diversos me´todos de extraccio´n de caracter´ısticas y se desarrollara´n pautas sobre los tipos
de caracter´ısticas ma´s apropiados para el ca´lculo de los Bloom filters.
Ana´lisis ma´s detallado de la unlinkability de las plantillas basadas en Encriptacio´n Ho-
momo´rfica. Debido a la seguridad sema´ntica ofrecida por los sistemas de encriptacio´n,
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puede argumentarse que las plantillas encriptadas protegen la seguridad y la privacidad
del individuo bajo un modelo honesto pero curioso (honest-but-curious adversary model).
Sin embargo, se ha probado que sistemas basados en los criptosistemas de Goldwasser-
Micali o Paillier muestran debilidades si las evaluaciones se llevan a cabo bajo modelos
ma´s severos [Simoens et al., 2012a]. Debemos por tanto realizar una evaluacio´n similar de
los me´todos propuestos bajo el model avanzado definido en el Cap´ıtulo 2, Sec. 2.2.1.
Implementacio´n de sistemas de reconocimiento biome´trico ma´s precisos en el marco de
la Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica. A pesar de que la Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica ha surgido
recientemente como una potente alternativa a los esquemas actuales de proteccio´n de
plantillas, y, en general, para mejorar tareas relacionado con el procesado de sen˜al en las
que la privacidad tiene una gran importancia [Aguilar-Melchor et al., 2013; Barni et al.,
2015], las limitaciones en el nu´mero de operaciones que pueden llevarse a cabo en el dominio
encriptado han reducido su aplicacio´n a te´cnicas de comparacio´n simples que pueden no
estar a la cabeza del estado del arte. Es por ello que debemos dirigir nuestros esfuerzos a
la implementacio´n de algoritmos ma´s complejos, que consigan tasas de error en el estado
del arte.
Desarrollo de esquemas ma´s generales de proteccio´n de plantillas multi-biome´tricas en el
marco de la Encriptacio´n Homomo´rfica. En esta Disertacio´n so´lo hemos tenido en cuenta
una suma ponderada para la fusio´n a nivel de puntuacio´n. Sin embargo, otras fusiones
ma´s complejas han obtenido mayor precisio´n en sistemas no protegidos [Poh and Kittler,
2012]. De este modo, con el objetivo de hacer el marco de proteccio´n de plantillas multi-
biome´tricas lo ma´s general posible, estudiaremos otras reglas de fusio´n, como aque´llas
basadas en medidas de calidad [Fierrez et al., 2005].
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